Mélissa Rossi
Research Subjects
Mélissa Rossi has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mehdi Tibouchi
NTT Social Informatics Laboratories, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications - Pierre-Alain Fouque
Univ Rennes, Inria, CNRS, IRISA
2 shared publications - Pierrick Méaux
University of Luxembourg
2 shared publications - Sonia Belaïd
CryptoExperts
2 shared publications - Thomas Espitau
PQShield
2 shared publications - Akira Takahashi
J.P.Morgan AI Research & AlgoCRYPT CoE, New York, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 287-318
Learning with Errors with Output Dependencies: LWE, LWR, and Physical Learning Problems Under the Same Umbrella
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 287-318
Learning with Errors with Output Dependencies: LWE, LWR, and Physical Learning Problems Under the Same Umbrella
- 4 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Extended security of lattice-based cryptography
Sécurité étendue de la cryptographie fondée sur les réseaux Euclidiens: La cryptographie fondée sur les réseaux euclidiens représente une alternative prometteuse à la cryptographie asymétrique utilisée actuellement, en raison de sa résistance présumée à un ordinateur quantique universel. Cette nouvelle famille de schémas asymétriques dispose de plusieurs atouts parmi lesquels de fortes garanties théoriques de sécurité, un large choix de primitives et, pour certains de ses représentants, des performances comparables aux standards actuels. Une campagne de standardisation post-quantique organisée par le NIST est en cours et plusieurs schémas utilisant des réseaux euclidiens font partie des favoris. La communauté scientifique a été encouragée à les analyser car ils pourraient à l'avenir être implantés dans tous nos systèmes. L'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à cet effort. Nous étudions la sécurité de ces nouveaux cryptosystèmes non seulement au sens de leur résistance à la cryptanalyse en ''boîte noire'' à l'aide de moyens de calcul classiques, mais aussi selon un spectre plus large de modèles de sécurité, comme les attaques quantiques, les attaques supposant des failles d'utilisation, ou encore les attaques par canaux auxiliaires. Ces différents types d’attaques ont déjà été largement formalisés et étudiés par le passé pour des schémas asymétriques et symétriques pré-quantiques. Dans ce mémoire, nous analysons leur application aux nouvelles structures induites par les réseaux euclidiens. Notre travail est divisé en deux parties complémentaires : les contremesures et les attaques. La première partie regroupe nos contributions à l'effort actuel de conception de nouvelles protections algorithmiques afin de répondre aux nombreuses publications récentes d’attaques par canaux auxiliaires. Les travaux réalisés en équipe auxquels nous avons pris part on abouti à l'introduction de nouveaux outils mathématiques pour construire des contre-mesures algorithmiques, appuyées sur des preuves formelles, qui permettent de prévenir systématiquement les attaques physiques et par analyse de temps d'exécution. Nous avons ainsi participé à la protection de plusieurs schémas de signature fondés sur les réseaux euclidiens comme GLP, BLISS, qTesla ou encore Falcon. Dans une seconde partie consacrée à la cryptanalyse, nous étudions dans un premier temps de nouvelles attaques qui tirent parti du fait que certains schémas de chiffrement à clé publique ou d'établissement de clé peuvent échouer avec une faible probabilité. Ces échecs sont effectivement faiblement corrélés au secret. Notre travail a permis d’exhiber des attaques dites « par échec de déchiffrement » dans des modèles de failles d'utilisation ou des modèles quantiques. Nous avons d'autre part introduit un outil algorithmique de cryptanalyse permettant d’estimer la sécurité du problème mathématique sous-jacent lorsqu’une information partielle sur le secret est donnée. Cet outil s’est avéré utile pour automatiser et améliorer plusieurs attaques connues comme des attaques par échec de déchiffrement, des attaques classiques ou encore des attaques par canaux auxiliaires.
- 4 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Extended security of lattice-based cryptography
Sécurité étendue de la cryptographie fondée sur les réseaux Euclidiens: La cryptographie fondée sur les réseaux euclidiens représente une alternative prometteuse à la cryptographie asymétrique utilisée actuellement, en raison de sa résistance présumée à un ordinateur quantique universel. Cette nouvelle famille de schémas asymétriques dispose de plusieurs atouts parmi lesquels de fortes garanties théoriques de sécurité, un large choix de primitives et, pour certains de ses représentants, des performances comparables aux standards actuels. Une campagne de standardisation post-quantique organisée par le NIST est en cours et plusieurs schémas utilisant des réseaux euclidiens font partie des favoris. La communauté scientifique a été encouragée à les analyser car ils pourraient à l'avenir être implantés dans tous nos systèmes. L'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à cet effort. Nous étudions la sécurité de ces nouveaux cryptosystèmes non seulement au sens de leur résistance à la cryptanalyse en ''boîte noire'' à l'aide de moyens de calcul classiques, mais aussi selon un spectre plus large de modèles de sécurité, comme les attaques quantiques, les attaques supposant des failles d'utilisation, ou encore les attaques par canaux auxiliaires. Ces différents types d’attaques ont déjà été largement formalisés et étudiés par le passé pour des schémas asymétriques et symétriques pré-quantiques. Dans ce mémoire, nous analysons leur application aux nouvelles structures induites par les réseaux euclidiens. Notre travail est divisé en deux parties complémentaires : les contremesures et les attaques. La première partie regroupe nos contributions à l'effort actuel de conception de nouvelles protections algorithmiques afin de répondre aux nombreuses publications récentes d’attaques par canaux auxiliaires. Les travaux réalisés en équipe auxquels nous avons pris part on abouti à l'introduction de nouveaux outils mathématiques pour construire des contre-mesures algorithmiques, appuyées sur des preuves formelles, qui permettent de prévenir systématiquement les attaques physiques et par analyse de temps d'exécution. Nous avons ainsi participé à la protection de plusieurs schémas de signature fondés sur les réseaux euclidiens comme GLP, BLISS, qTesla ou encore Falcon. Dans une seconde partie consacrée à la cryptanalyse, nous étudions dans un premier temps de nouvelles attaques qui tirent parti du fait que certains schémas de chiffrement à clé publique ou d'établissement de clé peuvent échouer avec une faible probabilité. Ces échecs sont effectivement faiblement corrélés au secret. Notre travail a permis d’exhiber des attaques dites « par échec de déchiffrement » dans des modèles de failles d'utilisation ou des modèles quantiques. Nous avons d'autre part introduit un outil algorithmique de cryptanalyse permettant d’estimer la sécurité du problème mathématique sous-jacent lorsqu’une information partielle sur le secret est donnée. Cet outil s’est avéré utile pour automatiser et améliorer plusieurs attaques connues comme des attaques par échec de déchiffrement, des attaques classiques ou encore des attaques par canaux auxiliaires.
- 28 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 94-123
New Techniques for Random Probing Security and Application to Raccoon Signature Scheme
- 28 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 94-123
New Techniques for Random Probing Security and Application to Raccoon Signature Scheme
- Open Access
- 5 September 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2024 (4) , 156-178
A Not So Discrete Sampler: Power Analysis Attacks on HAWK signature scheme
HAWK is a lattice-based signature scheme candidate to the fourth call of the NIST’s Post-Quantum standardization campaign. Considered as a cousin of Falcon (one of the future NIST post-quantum standards) one can wonder whether HAWK shares the same drawbacks as Falcon in terms of side-channel attacks. Indeed, Falcon signature algorithm and particularly its Gaussian sampler, has shown to be highly vulnerable to power-analysis attacks. Besides, efficiently protecting Falcon’s signature algorithm against these attacks seems a very challenging task. This work presents the first power analysis leakage review on HAWK signature scheme: it extensively assesses the vulnerabilities of a central and sensitive brick of the scheme, the discrete Gaussian sampler. Knowing the output x of the sampler for a given signature leads to linear information about the private key of the scheme. This paper includes several demonstrations of simple power analysis attacks targeting this sample x with various attacker strengths, all of them performed on the reference implementation on a ChipWhisperer Lite with STM32F3 target (ARM Cortex M4). We report being able to perform key recoveries with very low (to no) offline resources. As this reference implementation of HAWK is not claimed to be protected against side-channel attacks, the existence of such attacks is not surprising, but they still concretely warn about the use of this unprotected signature on physical devices. To go further, our study proposes a generic way of assessing the performance of a sidechannel attack on x even when less information is recovered, in a setting where some protections are implemented or when the attacker has less measurement possibilities. While it is easy to see that x is a sensitive value, quantifying the residual complexity of the key recovery with some knowledge about x (like the parity or the sign of some coefficients) is not straightforward as the underlying hardness assumption is the newly introduced Module-LIP problem. We propose to adapt the existing methodology of leaky LWE estimation tools (Dachman-Soled et al. at Crypto 2020) to exploit the retrieved information and lower down the residual key recovery complexity. To finish, we propose an ad-hoc technique to lower down the leakage on the identified vulnerability points. These modifications prevent our attacks on our platform and come with essentially no cost in terms of performance. It could be seen as a temporary solution and encourages more analysis on proven side-channel protection of HAWK like masking.
- 5 September 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2024 (4) , 156-178
Open AccessA Not So Discrete Sampler: Power Analysis Attacks on HAWK signature scheme
HAWK is a lattice-based signature scheme candidate to the fourth call of the NIST’s Post-Quantum standardization campaign. Considered as a cousin of Falcon (one of the future NIST post-quantum standards) one can wonder whether HAWK shares the same drawbacks as Falcon in terms of side-channel attacks. Indeed, Falcon signature algorithm and particularly its Gaussian sampler, has shown to be highly vulnerable to power-analysis attacks. Besides, efficiently protecting Falcon’s signature algorithm against these attacks seems a very challenging task. This work presents the first power analysis leakage review on HAWK signature scheme: it extensively assesses the vulnerabilities of a central and sensitive brick of the scheme, the discrete Gaussian sampler. Knowing the output x of the sampler for a given signature leads to linear information about the private key of the scheme. This paper includes several demonstrations of simple power analysis attacks targeting this sample x with various attacker strengths, all of them performed on the reference implementation on a ChipWhisperer Lite with STM32F3 target (ARM Cortex M4). We report being able to perform key recoveries with very low (to no) offline resources. As this reference implementation of HAWK is not claimed to be protected against side-channel attacks, the existence of such attacks is not surprising, but they still concretely warn about the use of this unprotected signature on physical devices. To go further, our study proposes a generic way of assessing the performance of a sidechannel attack on x even when less information is recovered, in a setting where some protections are implemented or when the attacker has less measurement possibilities. While it is easy to see that x is a sensitive value, quantifying the residual complexity of the key recovery with some knowledge about x (like the parity or the sign of some coefficients) is not straightforward as the underlying hardness assumption is the newly introduced Module-LIP problem. We propose to adapt the existing methodology of leaky LWE estimation tools (Dachman-Soled et al. at Crypto 2020) to exploit the retrieved information and lower down the residual key recovery complexity. To finish, we propose an ad-hoc technique to lower down the leakage on the identified vulnerability points. These modifications prevent our attacks on our platform and come with essentially no cost in terms of performance. It could be seen as a temporary solution and encourages more analysis on proven side-channel protection of HAWK like masking.
- 16 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 409-444
Raccoon: A Masking-Friendly Signature Proven in the Probing Model
- 16 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 409-444
Raccoon: A Masking-Friendly Signature Proven in the Probing Model
- Open Access
- 9 April 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (1)
A provably masked implementation of BIKE Key Encapsulation Mechanism
BIKE is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) selected for the 4th round of the NIST's standardization campaign. It relies on the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem for quasi-cyclic codes and on the indistinguishability of the public key from a random element, and provides the most competitive performance among round 4 candidates, which makes it relevant for future real-world use cases. Analyzing its side-channel resistance has been highly encouraged by the community and several works have already outlined various side-channel weaknesses and proposed ad-hoc countermeasures. However, in contrast to the well-documented research line on masking lattice-based algorithms, the possibility of generically protecting code-based algorithms by masking has only been marginally studied in a 2016 paper by Chen et al. in SAC 2015. At this stage of the standardization campaign, it is important to assess the possibility of fully masking BIKE scheme and the resulting cost in terms of performances. In this work, we provide the first high-order masked implementation of a code-based algorithm. We had to tackle many issues such as finding proper ways to handle large sparse polynomials, masking the key-generation algorithm or keeping the benefit of the bitslicing. In this paper, we present all the gadgets necessary to provide a fully masked implementation of BIKE, we discuss our different implementation choices and we propose a full proof of masking in the Ishai Sahai and Wagner (Crypto 2003) model. More practically, we also provide an open C-code masked implementation of the key-generation, encapsulation and decapsulation algorithms with extensive benchmarks. While the obtained performance is slower than existing masked lattice-based algorithms, we show that masking at order 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 implies a performance penalty of x5.8, x14.2, x24.4, x38 and x55.6 compared to order 0 (unmasked and unoptimized BIKE). This scaling is encouraging and no Boolean to Arithmetic conversion has been used.
- 9 April 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (1)
Open AccessA provably masked implementation of BIKE Key Encapsulation Mechanism
BIKE is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) selected for the 4th round of the NIST's standardization campaign. It relies on the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem for quasi-cyclic codes and on the indistinguishability of the public key from a random element, and provides the most competitive performance among round 4 candidates, which makes it relevant for future real-world use cases. Analyzing its side-channel resistance has been highly encouraged by the community and several works have already outlined various side-channel weaknesses and proposed ad-hoc countermeasures. However, in contrast to the well-documented research line on masking lattice-based algorithms, the possibility of generically protecting code-based algorithms by masking has only been marginally studied in a 2016 paper by Chen et al. in SAC 2015. At this stage of the standardization campaign, it is important to assess the possibility of fully masking BIKE scheme and the resulting cost in terms of performances. In this work, we provide the first high-order masked implementation of a code-based algorithm. We had to tackle many issues such as finding proper ways to handle large sparse polynomials, masking the key-generation algorithm or keeping the benefit of the bitslicing. In this paper, we present all the gadgets necessary to provide a fully masked implementation of BIKE, we discuss our different implementation choices and we propose a full proof of masking in the Ishai Sahai and Wagner (Crypto 2003) model. More practically, we also provide an open C-code masked implementation of the key-generation, encapsulation and decapsulation algorithms with extensive benchmarks. While the obtained performance is slower than existing masked lattice-based algorithms, we show that masking at order 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 implies a performance penalty of x5.8, x14.2, x24.4, x38 and x55.6 compared to order 0 (unmasked and unoptimized BIKE). This scaling is encouraging and no Boolean to Arithmetic conversion has been used.
- 19 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 65-81
Mask Compression: High-Order Masking on Memory-Constrained Devices
- 19 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 65-81
Mask Compression: High-Order Masking on Memory-Constrained Devices
- 29 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptology
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-58
Masking the GLP Lattice-Based Signature Scheme at Any Order
- 29 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptology
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-58
Masking the GLP Lattice-Based Signature Scheme at Any Order
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 532-564
Constant Input Attribute Based (and Predicate) Encryption from Evasive and Tensor LWE
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 532-564
Constant Input Attribute Based (and Predicate) Encryption from Evasive and Tensor LWE
- 28 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 516-538
GeT a CAKE: Generic Transformations from Key Encaspulation Mechanisms to Password Authenticated Key Exchanges
- 28 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 516-538
GeT a CAKE: Generic Transformations from Key Encaspulation Mechanisms to Password Authenticated Key Exchanges