EHEinav Hart

Einav Hart

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Einav Hart has a total of 102 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Speed Is a Signal: When Faster Replies Increase Hiring Likelihood

    by Einav Hart, Eric M. VanEpps, Ovul Sezer, On Amir

    When determining whom to hire, employers care about how quickly they receive replies from the job seekers and service providers they contact. Across transaction data from a large real-world marketplace (N = ∼11.66 million) and experiments (three main studies (total n = 3,603) and five supplemental studies (total n = 5,039)), we show that providers benefit from responding to employers’ messages quickly. First, we document substantial real-world consequences of reply speed in Fiverr marketplace transaction data (Study 1), finding a strong negative relationship between the length of delay in replying to a service request and the likelihood of securing a contract. Even delays of just 5–10 minutes dramatically reduce providers’ likelihood of being hired. In our experimental studies, providers who take less (versus more) time to reply are seen as more likely to be responsive in the future (Studies 2–4), make more positive impressions than slower responders (Study 3), and in turn, are more likely to be hired (Studies 2–4). Fast replies signal a provider’s future responsiveness and increase hiring likelihood independently from other signals of future responsiveness, such as a worker’s quality (Study 2) or the content of the message sent (Study 4). Together, our studies identify a distinct signal that employees can control to increase their hireability: replying to messages quickly. Empirically, every minute counts. This paper was accepted by Jack Soll, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06185 .

  • Open Access

    Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs

    by Christoph Huber, Anna Dreber, Jürgen Huber, Magnus Johannesson, Michael Kirchler, Utz Weitzel, Miguel Abellán, Xeniya Adayeva, Fehime Ceren Ay, Kai Barron, et al.

    Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source of ambivalent empirical results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity—variation in true effect sizes across various reasonable experimental research protocols. To provide further evidence on whether competition affects moral behavior and to examine whether the generalizability of a single experimental study is jeopardized by design heterogeneity, we invited independent research teams to contribute experimental designs to a crowd-sourced project. In a large-scale online data collection, 18,123 experimental participants were randomly allocated to 45 randomly selected experimental designs out of 95 submitted designs. We find a small adverse effect of competition on moral behavior in a meta-analysis of the pooled data. The crowd-sourced design of our study allows for a clean identification and estimation of the variation in effect sizes above and beyond what could be expected due to sampling variance. We find substantial design heterogeneity—estimated to be about 1.6 times as large as the average standard error of effect size estimates of the 45 research designs—indicating that the informativeness and generalizability of results based on a single experimental design are limited. Drawing strong conclusions about the underlying hypotheses in the presence of substantive design heterogeneity requires moving toward much larger data collections on various experimental designs testing the same hypothesis.


  • Open Access

    To Reveal or Not to Reveal a Secret: Navigating the Conflict between Honesty and Loyalty

    by Eric VanEpps, Einav Hart, Maurice E. Schweitzer

    Secrets create moral dilemmas. Individuals who know others’ secrets face a choice: to be honest (and reveal the secret) or to be loyal (and keep the secret). We introduce a triadic model of secret-keeping involving a focal actor who knows a partner’s secret, a partner who has a secret, and an audience likely interested in knowing the secret information; the actor faces conflicting obligations: to be honest with the audience or to be loyal to the partner. Across four pre-registered experiments (N=1,514), we show that observers judge actors who privilege honesty (and reveal the secret) to be more moral but less likable than actors who privilege loyalty (and keep the secret). The nature of the secret information moderates these interpersonal judgments. When the secret information involves unethical behavior, observers judge actors who disclose secrets to be more moral (and less likable) than they judge actors who keep secrets, but when the secret information does not involve unethical behavior, observers judge actors who disclose secrets to be less moral (and much less likable) than actors who keep secrets.

  • Open Access

    I Didn’t Want to Offend You: The Cost of Avoiding Sensitive Questions

    by Einav Hart, Eric VanEpps, Maurice E. Schweitzer

    Within a conversation, individuals balance competing concerns, such as the motive to gather information and the motives to avoid discomfort and to create a favorable impression. Across three pilot studies and four experimental studies, we demonstrate that individuals avoid asking sensitive questions, because they fear making others uncomfortable and because of impression management concerns. We demonstrate that this aversion to asking sensitive questions is both costly and misguided. Even when we incentivized participants to ask sensitive questions, participants were reluctant to do so in both face-to-face and computer-mediated chat conversations. Interestingly, rather than accurately anticipating how sensitive questions will influence impression formation, we find that question askers significantly overestimate the interpersonal costs of asking sensitive questions. Across our studies, individuals formed similarly favorable impressions of partners who asked non-sensitive (e.g., “Are you a morning person?”) and sensitive (e.g., “What are your views on abortion?”) questions, despite askers’ reticence to ask sensitive questions.


  • Open Access

    When Inequality is Good for Groups: The Moderating Role of Fairness

    by Einav Hart, Paul K. Piff

    Many societies today are experiencing growing inequality in terms of wealth, income, health, education, resources or opportunities, trends that have negative effects upon well-being, trust, and motivation. We investigated whether inequalities –– particularly those perceived as fair –– can have positive effects upon individuals and groups. Using cross-national survey data (Study 1) and experimental data (Study 2), we find that inequalities arising from merit-based processes are perceived as fairer and as less acute. Further, in two experimental studies, using both monetary and real-effort social dilemmas, we demonstrate that inequalities perceived as procedurally fair can promote cooperation and trust. Participants received payments based on a fair (merit-based) or unfair (luck-based) process prior to being assigned to a group in which the other members’ payments were either equal or unequal to their own. We then measured positive contributions to the group via monetary contributions to a public good (Study 3) or a real-effort cooperation task (Study 4). Compared to conditions of equality, participants were more likely to cooperate when inequality of initial payments was perceived as fair, and less likely to contribute when inequality was perceived as unfair. We disentangle the effects of inequality and fairness on behavior, and underscore the importance of understanding how people construe the systems that give rise to inequality to an understanding of inequality’s effects on motivation and cooperation.


  • Open Access

    Getting Less: When Negotiating Harms Post-Agreement Performance

    by Einav Hart, Maurice E. Schweitzer

    In contrast to prior work that has assumed that negotiated agreements represent the economic value of negotiation outcomes, we demonstrate that the negotiation process can influence post-agreement behavior in a way that changes the economic value of the agreement. Our findings have particular relevance for negotiations for services, and fill a critical gap in our understanding of how negotiations influence performance. Across four studies, we demonstrate that negotiations can harm post-agreement behavior on both effortful and creative tasks. Specifically, we find that wage negotiations can harm productivity. Perceptions of conflict mediate the relationship between engaging in a negotiation and diminished motivation. Compared to not negotiating, individuals who negotiate may secure favorable deal terms, but risk incurring affective, relational, and economic costs. We call for future work to explore negotiations across a broader context of domains (e.g., negotiations for services in addition to goods) and to investigate how the negotiation process affects subsequent behavior (e.g., the provision of services). Our findings suggest that individuals should enter negotiations with caution.