Mingjiang Deng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Mingjiang Deng has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Changgao Cheng
School of Economics and Finance, Hohai University, Changzhou, China
1 shared publication - Deshan Tang
College of Water Conservancy and Hydropower Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
1 shared publication - Liyuan Zheng
Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
1 shared publication - Nan Li
College of Water Conservancy and Hydropower Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
1 shared publication - Qin Zhou
Business School Hohai University Nanjing Jiangsu Province China
1 shared publication - Yukuo Zhang
Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 July 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (14) , 8342
Government Participation in Supply Chain Low-Carbon Technology R&D and Green Marketing Strategy Optimization
This paper uses the differential game approach to construct a model of cooperative emission reduction involving the government, manufacturing firms, and retail firms under different power structures. It is found that the dominant player receives more subsidies; the development of a mechanism for horizontal technology R&D among enterprises can reduce the financial pressure on the government to implement compensation strategies and improve the effectiveness and performance of supply chain emission reduction; and the government can develop differentiated subsidy schemes to achieve Pareto optimality in the supply chain and environmental performance based on different game strategies and revenue-sharing agreements by enterprises.
- 7 July 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (14) , 8342
Open AccessGovernment Participation in Supply Chain Low-Carbon Technology R&D and Green Marketing Strategy Optimization
This paper uses the differential game approach to construct a model of cooperative emission reduction involving the government, manufacturing firms, and retail firms under different power structures. It is found that the dominant player receives more subsidies; the development of a mechanism for horizontal technology R&D among enterprises can reduce the financial pressure on the government to implement compensation strategies and improve the effectiveness and performance of supply chain emission reduction; and the government can develop differentiated subsidy schemes to achieve Pareto optimality in the supply chain and environmental performance based on different game strategies and revenue-sharing agreements by enterprises.