Yu Pang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yu Pang has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chengze Simon Fan
Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
3 shared publications - Pierre Pestieau
University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
2 shared publications - Fuhai Hong
Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
1 shared publication - Gregory W. Whitten
Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China
1 shared publication - Ping Lin
Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
1 shared publication Simon Fan
Department of Economics Lingnan University Tuen Mun Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 28 (5) , e70141
A Dynamic Model of Exchange Bequest and Eldercare
This paper develops an overlapping generations model with intrafamily bargaining to analyze the provision of informal eldercare by non‐altruistic children. Parents strategically deploy wealth transfers—comprising their personal savings and inheritances received from their own parents—to incentivize informal care, with formal care serving as their credible outside option. Informal care plays a key role in preserving household financial resources that could otherwise be exhausted by the cost of formal care. We show that inherited wealth progressively dampens the incentive for new savings, propelling the economy toward a zero‐savings steady state, whereas parental transfers and the resulting eldercare provision rise in tandem toward their steady‐state levels. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient during the transition path: individuals may underprovide eldercare under certain parameter configurations and save excessively. A government subsidy for formal care, which enhances the elderly's bargaining position, can correct the inefficiency associated with informal care and improve social welfare in the steady state.
- 28 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 28 (5) , e70141
A Dynamic Model of Exchange Bequest and Eldercare
This paper develops an overlapping generations model with intrafamily bargaining to analyze the provision of informal eldercare by non‐altruistic children. Parents strategically deploy wealth transfers—comprising their personal savings and inheritances received from their own parents—to incentivize informal care, with formal care serving as their credible outside option. Informal care plays a key role in preserving household financial resources that could otherwise be exhausted by the cost of formal care. We show that inherited wealth progressively dampens the incentive for new savings, propelling the economy toward a zero‐savings steady state, whereas parental transfers and the resulting eldercare provision rise in tandem toward their steady‐state levels. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient during the transition path: individuals may underprovide eldercare under certain parameter configurations and save excessively. A government subsidy for formal care, which enhances the elderly's bargaining position, can correct the inefficiency associated with informal care and improve social welfare in the steady state.
- 28 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 141 (1) , 57-92
Mitigation and adaptation: an informational perspective
- 28 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 141 (1) , 57-92
Mitigation and adaptation: an informational perspective
- 30 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 31 (9) , 2050-2071
A theory of fiscal policy response to an epidemic
Governments worldwide have issued massive amounts of debt to inject fiscal stimulus during the COVID‐19 pandemic. This paper analyzes fiscal responses to an epidemic, in which interactions at work increase the risk of disease and mortality. Fiscal policies, which are designed to borrow against the future and provide transfers to individuals suffering economic hardship, can facilitate consumption smoothing while reduce hours worked and hence mitigate infections. We examine the optimal fiscal policy and characterize the condition under which fiscal policy improves social welfare. We then extend the model analyzing the static and dynamic pecuniary externalities under scale economies—the decrease in labor supply during the epidemic lowers the contemporaneous average wage rate while enhances the post‐epidemic workforce health and productivity. We suggest that fiscal policy may not work effectively unless the government coordinates working time, and the optimal size of public debt is affected by production technology and disease severity and transmissibility.
- 30 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 31 (9) , 2050-2071
A theory of fiscal policy response to an epidemic
Governments worldwide have issued massive amounts of debt to inject fiscal stimulus during the COVID‐19 pandemic. This paper analyzes fiscal responses to an epidemic, in which interactions at work increase the risk of disease and mortality. Fiscal policies, which are designed to borrow against the future and provide transfers to individuals suffering economic hardship, can facilitate consumption smoothing while reduce hours worked and hence mitigate infections. We examine the optimal fiscal policy and characterize the condition under which fiscal policy improves social welfare. We then extend the model analyzing the static and dynamic pecuniary externalities under scale economies—the decrease in labor supply during the epidemic lowers the contemporaneous average wage rate while enhances the post‐epidemic workforce health and productivity. We suggest that fiscal policy may not work effectively unless the government coordinates working time, and the optimal size of public debt is affected by production technology and disease severity and transmissibility.
- 29 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 29 (2) , 286-315
Investment in children, social security, and intragenerational risk sharing
- 29 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 29 (2) , 286-315
Investment in children, social security, and intragenerational risk sharing
- Open Access
- 22 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Shipping and Trade
- Vol. 5 (1) , 1-24
Do political relations affect international trade? Evidence from China’s twelve trading partners
China’s growing influence on the world has generated profound effects on the political and economic decisions of her partner nations. Recent conflict escalation between China and western countries gives rise to widespread concern over the possibility of delinking China from global trade and supply chain. By drawing on utility theory, we suggest that the political relationship is a key determinant of collective emotions of consumers and trading companies and consequently the interactions between importers and exporters. We hypothesize that warmer relations lead to larger increases (or smaller decreases) in trade while cooler relations have the opposite effect. Based on monthly data of China and her twelve trading partners from 1981 to 2019, our study provides an empirical investigation into the association between political relationship and bilateral trade flows. Our results show that shocks to relations are highly persistent and frequently cause changes in trade. However, relations themselves are little influenced by changes in trade, changes that show little persistence. We also address the US-China trade war and the observation that innovations to China’s exports to the US improve China’s relations with the US while shocks to American exports to China worsen relations from China’s perspective.
- 22 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Shipping and Trade
- Vol. 5 (1) , 1-24
Open AccessDo political relations affect international trade? Evidence from China’s twelve trading partners
China’s growing influence on the world has generated profound effects on the political and economic decisions of her partner nations. Recent conflict escalation between China and western countries gives rise to widespread concern over the possibility of delinking China from global trade and supply chain. By drawing on utility theory, we suggest that the political relationship is a key determinant of collective emotions of consumers and trading companies and consequently the interactions between importers and exporters. We hypothesize that warmer relations lead to larger increases (or smaller decreases) in trade while cooler relations have the opposite effect. Based on monthly data of China and her twelve trading partners from 1981 to 2019, our study provides an empirical investigation into the association between political relationship and bilateral trade flows. Our results show that shocks to relations are highly persistent and frequently cause changes in trade. However, relations themselves are little influenced by changes in trade, changes that show little persistence. We also address the US-China trade war and the observation that innovations to China’s exports to the US improve China’s relations with the US while shocks to American exports to China worsen relations from China’s perspective.
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 57 (2) , 159-180
Command-and-control regulation, incentive for pollution abatement, and market structure
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 57 (2) , 159-180
Command-and-control regulation, incentive for pollution abatement, and market structure
- 19 November 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (4) , 845-876
A model of the optimal allocation of government expenditures
Government expenditures can be used for various socioeconomic objectives, including public education, consumption of public goods and services, and social protection. This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of public expenditures among these competing functions. We establish an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals in which the government optimally chooses income tax, transfer payment, educational spending, and public consumption. Our model characterizes the transitional dynamics and the steady state of each function with and without a pay‐as‐you‐go intergenerational contract. We also conduct a simulation illustrating that the presence of an intergenerational contract may raise public consumption and social welfare in the steady state.
- 19 November 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (4) , 845-876
A model of the optimal allocation of government expenditures
Government expenditures can be used for various socioeconomic objectives, including public education, consumption of public goods and services, and social protection. This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of public expenditures among these competing functions. We establish an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals in which the government optimally chooses income tax, transfer payment, educational spending, and public consumption. Our model characterizes the transitional dynamics and the steady state of each function with and without a pay‐as‐you‐go intergenerational contract. We also conduct a simulation illustrating that the presence of an intergenerational contract may raise public consumption and social welfare in the steady state.