Tine Paulsen

Emocratic theorists have long argued that states can create more resilient democracies through education. Educational investments are thought to produce more economic equality and instill in citizens greater capacity and responsibility to participate in politics. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design and township-level data from Antebellum New York State, we examine whether state funding for common schools led to higher voter turnout as well as higher earnings and lower inequality. Our estimates support the view that a participatory democratic culture emerged not only because of initial favorable endowments but also because of subsequent government decisions to fund education. New York townships that received more school funding later had higher median earnings, lower earnings inequality, and higher levels of voter turnout. Our findings support the view that maintaining democracy requires active investments by the state, something that has important implications for other places and other times-including today.

Do local political institutions impact the balance of power in national politics? If so, how? This paper argues that certain political institutions, like local elections, empower local party branches, leading to better electoral support in national-level elections. To test this theory, I take advantage of a quasi-experimental local governance arrangement in early 20th-century Sweden that made local institutions dependent on a population threshold. I find that municipalities that use elections display markedly different support for the major parties in national elections compared to municipalities using a more traditional community meeting. Parties that have members as a central component of their strategy receive higher support in areas with local partisan elections. Moreover, this is a pattern that is especially pronounced in places with a strong local activist base. The result demonstrates that local-level political institutions can significantly impact national-level politics with consequences for institutional reform outcomes and citizen welfare.

Many large survey courses rely on multiple professors or teaching assistants to judge student responses to open-ended questions. Even following best practices, students with similar levels of conceptual understanding can receive widely varying assessments from different graders. We detail how this can occur and argue that it is an example of differential item functioning (or interpersonal incomparability), where graders interpret the same possible grading range differently. Using both actual assessment data from a large survey course in Comparative Politics and simulation methods, we show that the bias can be corrected by a small number of “bridging” observations across graders. We conclude by offering best practices for fair assessment in large survey courses.

Democratic theorists have long argued that states can create more resilient democracies through education. Educational investments are thought to produce more economic equality and instill in citizens greater capacity and responsibility to participate in politics. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design and township-level data from Antebellum New York State, we examine whether state funding for common schools led to higher voter turnout as well as higher earnings and lower inequality. Our estimates support the view that a participatory democratic culture emerged not only because of initial favorable endowments but also because of subsequent government decisions to fund education. New York townships that received more school funding later had higher median earnings, lower earnings inequality, and higher levels of voter turnout. Our findings support the view that maintaining democracy requires active investments by the state, something that has important implications for other places and other times—including today.