Pieter Raymaekers
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Pieter Raymaekers has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Koen Migchelbrink
Erasmus University Rotterdam
2 shared publications - Ben Somers
KU Leuven
1 shared publication - Florian Lange
KU Leuven
1 shared publication - Janne Teerlinck
KU Leuven
1 shared publication - Kelly Wittemans
KU Leuven
1 shared publication - Trui Steen
KU Leuven
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Policy Studies
- p. 1-32
Citizen support for climate adaptation policy instruments in gardens
1. As climate change intensifies, human behaviour plays a dual role. It contributes to the problem but also shapes our ability to respond and adapt to climate-change related hazards (Clayton et al....
- 22 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Policy Studies
- p. 1-32
Citizen support for climate adaptation policy instruments in gardens
1. As climate change intensifies, human behaviour plays a dual role. It contributes to the problem but also shapes our ability to respond and adapt to climate-change related hazards (Clayton et al....
- Open Access
- 25 July 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioural Public Policy
- Vol. 9 (2) , 386-409
Public managers’ trust in citizens and their preferences for behavioral policy instruments: evidence from a mixed-methods study
Local public managers increasingly use behavioral policy instruments to influence the behavior of citizens. However, despite their increased reliance on these instruments, there is little evidence on why local public manager would prefer behavioral instruments over classic stick, carrot or sermon-type instruments. We conduct a mixed-methods study, combining a stated-preference survey and two focus groups, to examine whether senior local public managers (directors and deputy directors) in Flanders prefer behavioral policy instruments over classic stick, carrot and sermon-type instruments, and explore whether their trust in citizens (perceptions of citizen’s ability, benevolence and integrity) affects these preferences for policy instruments. The results indicate that in some policy areas, such as health, public nuisance and road safety, public managers appear more willing to use behavioral policy instruments than classic sticks and carrots, but not sermons. Furthermore, we find that public managers’ trust in citizens does not appear to significantly affect their preferences for policy instruments, but that political and economic motives do play a role in their preferences for behavioral policy instruments. Finally, the results also indicate that the simultaneous use of behavioral and classic policy instruments (packaging) can help mediate the perceived risks of citizens’ non-compliance with behavioral policy instruments.
- 25 July 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioural Public Policy
- Vol. 9 (2) , 386-409
Open AccessPublic managers’ trust in citizens and their preferences for behavioral policy instruments: evidence from a mixed-methods study
Local public managers increasingly use behavioral policy instruments to influence the behavior of citizens. However, despite their increased reliance on these instruments, there is little evidence on why local public manager would prefer behavioral instruments over classic stick, carrot or sermon-type instruments. We conduct a mixed-methods study, combining a stated-preference survey and two focus groups, to examine whether senior local public managers (directors and deputy directors) in Flanders prefer behavioral policy instruments over classic stick, carrot and sermon-type instruments, and explore whether their trust in citizens (perceptions of citizen’s ability, benevolence and integrity) affects these preferences for policy instruments. The results indicate that in some policy areas, such as health, public nuisance and road safety, public managers appear more willing to use behavioral policy instruments than classic sticks and carrots, but not sermons. Furthermore, we find that public managers’ trust in citizens does not appear to significantly affect their preferences for policy instruments, but that political and economic motives do play a role in their preferences for behavioral policy instruments. Finally, the results also indicate that the simultaneous use of behavioral and classic policy instruments (packaging) can help mediate the perceived risks of citizens’ non-compliance with behavioral policy instruments.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Nudging People to Pay Their Parking Fines on Time. Evidence from a Cluster-Randomized Field Experiment
The timely payment of municipal parking tickets signifies people’s acceptance of parking regulations and reduces individual and administrative and enforcement costs. However, public administrations face challenges in enforcing the timely payment of parking fines. A large group of people fails to pay their fine on time, incurring additional enforcement actions that translate into individual costs and payment related stress. In this study we collaborated with the Belgian city of Mechelen to test the compounded effects of three communicative nudges – simplification, explicit penalty, and social norm - on people’s timely payment of parking fines. In a cluster-randomized field experiment, parking offenders received either the original notification letter, a simplified notification letter, a simplified notification letter with an explicit penalty message, or a simplified notification letter with an explicit penalty and a social norm message. The results indicate that people can be nudged to pay their fines on time, but only when multiple nudges are used simultaneously.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessNudging People to Pay Their Parking Fines on Time. Evidence from a Cluster-Randomized Field Experiment
The timely payment of municipal parking tickets signifies people’s acceptance of parking regulations and reduces individual and administrative and enforcement costs. However, public administrations face challenges in enforcing the timely payment of parking fines. A large group of people fails to pay their fine on time, incurring additional enforcement actions that translate into individual costs and payment related stress. In this study we collaborated with the Belgian city of Mechelen to test the compounded effects of three communicative nudges – simplification, explicit penalty, and social norm - on people’s timely payment of parking fines. In a cluster-randomized field experiment, parking offenders received either the original notification letter, a simplified notification letter, a simplified notification letter with an explicit penalty message, or a simplified notification letter with an explicit penalty and a social norm message. The results indicate that people can be nudged to pay their fines on time, but only when multiple nudges are used simultaneously.