AGAndrea Gangemi

Andrea Gangemi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Andrea Gangemi has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Sneaking up the ranks: Partial key exposure attacks on rank-based schemes

    by Giuseppe D’aLconzo, Andre Esser, Andrea Gangemi, Carlo Sanna

    A partial key exposure attack is a key recovery attack where an adversary obtains a priori partial knowledge of the secret key, e.g., through side-channel leakage. While for a long time post-quantum cryptosystems, unlike RSA, have been believed to be resistant to such attacks, recent results by Esser, May, Verbel, and Wen (CRYPTO ’22), and by Kirshanova and May (SCN ’22), have refuted this belief. In this work, we focus on partial key exposure attacks in the context of rank-metric-based schemes, particularly targeting the RYDE, MIRA, and MiRitH digital signatures schemes, which are active candidates in the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process. We demonstrate that, similar to the RSA case, the secret key in RYDE can be recovered from a constant fraction of its bits. Specifically, for NIST category I parameters, our attacks remain efficient even when less than 25% of the key material is leaked. Interestingly, our attacks lead to a natural improvement of the best generic attack on RYDE without partial knowledge , reducing security levels by up to 9 bits. For MIRA and MiRitH our attacks remain efficient as long as roughly 57–60% of the secret key material is leaked. Additionally, we initiate the study of partial exposure of the witness in constructions following the popular MPCitH (MPC-in-the-Head) paradigm. We show a generic reduction from recovering RYDE and MIRA’s witness to the MinRank problem, which again leads to efficient key recovery from constant fractions of the secret witness in both cases.


  • Enhancing E-Voting with Multiparty Class Group Encryption

    by Michele Battagliola, Giuseppe D’aLconzo, Andrea Gangemi, Chiara Spadafora

  • TRIFORS: LINKable trilinear forms ring signature

    by Giuseppe D’aLconzo, Andrea Gangemi

    We present TRIFORS (TRIlinear FOrms Ring Signature), a logarithmic post-quantum (linkable) ring signature based on a novel assumption regarding the equivalence of alternating trilinear forms. The basis of this work is the construction by Beullens, Katsumata, and Pintore from Asiacrypt 2020 to obtain a linkable ring signature from a cryptographic group action. The group action on trilinear forms used here is the same employed in the signature presented by Tang et al. [Annu. Int. Conf. on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (Springer, 2022), pp. 582–612] at Eurocrypt 2022. We first define a sigma protocol that, given a set of public keys, the ring, allows us to prove the knowledge of a secret key corresponding to a public one in the ring. Furthermore, some optimisations are used to reduce the size of the signature: among others, we use a novel application of the combinatorial number system to the space of the challenges. Using the Fiat-Shamir transform, and taking into account the attack of Beullens from Crypto 2023, we obtain a (linkable) ring signature of competitive length with the state-of-the-art among post-quantum proposals for security level 128.


  • Non-interactive Commitment from Non-transitive Group Actions

    by Giuseppe D’aLconzo, Andrea Flamini, Andrea Gangemi


  • Open Access

    Towards a Privacy-Preserving Dispute Resolution Protocol on Ethereum

    by Andrea Gangemi, Aida Manzano Kharman

    We present a new dispute resolution protocol that can be built on the Ethereum blockchain. Unlike existing applications like Kleros, privacy is ensured by design through the use of the zero-knowledge protocols Semaphore and MACI (Minimal Anti-Collusion Infrastructure), which provide, among other things, resistance to Sybil-like attacks and corruption. Differently from Kleros, dispute resolution is guaranteed despite the users having the final say. Moreover, the proposed model does not use a native token on the platform, but aims to reward stakeholders through a social incentive mechanism based on soulbound tokens, introduced by Weyl, Ohlhaver, and Buterin in 2022. Users with these tokens will be considered trustworthy and will have the ability to govern the platform. As far as we know, this is one of the first blockchain projects that seeks to introduce social governance rather than one based on economic incentives.

  • Open Access

    Bitcoin: a new proof-of-work system with reduced variance

    by Danilo Bazzanella, Andrea Gangemi

    Since its inception, bitcoin has used the popular consensus protocol proof-of-work (PoW). PoW has a well-known flaw: it distributes all rewards to a single miner (or pool) who inserts a new block. Consequently, the variance of rewards and the mining enterprise risk are extremely high. In 2016, Shi proposed addressing this problem with a theoretical algorithm. We introduce an easily-implemented PoW variant that improves Shi’s idea. The network must not find a single nonce but a few to insert a block. This simple change allows for a fairer distribution of rewards and also has the effect of regularizing the insertion time of blocks. This method would facilitate the emergence of small pools or autonomous miners.


  • Open Access

    Special Subsets of Addresses for Blockchains Using the secp256k1 Curve

    by Antonio J. Di Scala, Andrea Gangemi, Giuliano Romeo, Gabriele Vernetti

    In 2020, Sala, Sogiorno and Taufer were able to find the private keys of some Bitcoin addresses, thus being able to spend the cryptocurrency linked to them. This was unexpected since the recovery of non-trivial private keys for blockchain addresses is deemed to be an infeasible problem. In this paper, we widen this analysis by mounting a similar attack on other small subsets of the set of private keys. We then apply it to other blockchains as well, examining Ethereum, Dogecoin, Litecoin, Dash, Zcash and Bitcoin Cash. In addition to the results, we also explain the techniques we have used to perform this exhaustive search for all the addresses that have ever appeared in these blockchains, and we give an estimate of the time needed to perform all the computations. Finally, we also examine the possibility of mounting a similar attack on other elliptic curves used in blockchains, i.e., Curve25519 and NIST P-256.


  • Open Access

    Special subsets of addresses for blockchains using the secp256k1 curve

    by Antonio J. Di Scala, Andrea Gangemi, Giuliano Romeo, Gabriele Vernetti

    In 2020 Sala, Sogiorno and Taufer have been able to find the private keys of some Bitcoin addresses, thus being able to spend the cryptocurrency linked to them. This result was unexpected, since the recovery of non-trivial private keys for blockchain addresses is deemed to be an infeasible problem. In this paper we widen this analysis by mounting a similar attack to other small subsets of the set of private keys. We then apply it to other blockchains as well, examining Ethereum, Dogecoin, Litecoin, Dash, Zcash and Bitcoin Cash. In addition to the results, we also explain the techniques we have used to perform this exhaustive search for all the addresses that have ever appeared in these blockchains.