Elanor Taylor
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- p. 1-19
Explanatory Substantivity
1. Metaphysicians are often asked to defend the legitimacy of metaphysics. Common critiques of metaphysics include that its language is meaningless, its debates merely verbal, and its practitioners...
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- p. 1-19
Explanatory Substantivity
1. Metaphysicians are often asked to defend the legitimacy of metaphysics. Common critiques of metaphysics include that its language is meaningless, its debates merely verbal, and its practitioners...
- Open Access
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 10 (3) , 467-482
Explanation and the Right to Explanation
In response to widespread use of automated decision-making technology, some have considered a right to explanation. In this article, I draw on insights from philosophical work on explanation to present a series of challenges to this idea, showing that the normative motivations for access to such explanations ask for something difficult, if not impossible, to extract from automated systems. I consider an alternative, outcomes-focused approach to the normative evaluation of automated decision making and recommend it as a way to pursue the goods originally associated with explainability.
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 10 (3) , 467-482
Open AccessExplanation and the Right to Explanation
In response to widespread use of automated decision-making technology, some have considered a right to explanation. In this article, I draw on insights from philosophical work on explanation to present a series of challenges to this idea, showing that the normative motivations for access to such explanations ask for something difficult, if not impossible, to extract from automated systems. I consider an alternative, outcomes-focused approach to the normative evaluation of automated decision making and recommend it as a way to pursue the goods originally associated with explainability.
- Open Access
- 22 March 2023
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Philosophers' Imprint
- Vol. 23
Substantive Social Metaphysics
- 22 March 2023
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Philosophers' Imprint
- Vol. 23
Open AccessSubstantive Social Metaphysics
- Open Access
- 12 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 89 (2) , 302-318
Power Emergentism and the Collapse Problem
Strong emergentism is the position that certain higher-level properties display a kind of metaphysical autonomy from the lower-level properties in which they are grounded. The prospect of collapse is a problem for strong emergentism. According to those who press the collapse problem any purportedly strongly emergent feature inheres in the emergence base, and so is not genuinely autonomous from that base. Recently, Umut Baysan and Jessica Wilson have argued that power emergentism avoids the collapse problem. In this paper, I challenge the claim that power emergentism avoids the collapse problem, and argue for explanatory emergentism in its place.
- 12 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 89 (2) , 302-318
Open AccessPower Emergentism and the Collapse Problem
Strong emergentism is the position that certain higher-level properties display a kind of metaphysical autonomy from the lower-level properties in which they are grounded. The prospect of collapse is a problem for strong emergentism. According to those who press the collapse problem any purportedly strongly emergent feature inheres in the emergence base, and so is not genuinely autonomous from that base. Recently, Umut Baysan and Jessica Wilson have argued that power emergentism avoids the collapse problem. In this paper, I challenge the claim that power emergentism avoids the collapse problem, and argue for explanatory emergentism in its place.
- 22 November 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
How to Make the Case for Brute Facts
Ontologically brute facts are facts with no explanation. Although such facts appear to be mysterious, some philosophers have argued that we should embrace ontologically brute facts. This raises a methodological question: what is an adequate ground for belief in ontological bruteness? This chapter explores this question. It begins by considering three failed attempts to make the case for bruteness and draws cautionary lessons from these failures. It then offers a positive proposal according to which if a naturalistic, general metaphysical theory with strong abductive support posits ontologically brute facts, then this is an adequate (but defeasible) case for ontological bruteness.
- 22 November 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
How to Make the Case for Brute Facts
Ontologically brute facts are facts with no explanation. Although such facts appear to be mysterious, some philosophers have argued that we should embrace ontologically brute facts. This raises a methodological question: what is an adequate ground for belief in ontological bruteness? This chapter explores this question. It begins by considering three failed attempts to make the case for bruteness and draws cautionary lessons from these failures. It then offers a positive proposal according to which if a naturalistic, general metaphysical theory with strong abductive support posits ontologically brute facts, then this is an adequate (but defeasible) case for ontological bruteness.