Karine Heydemann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Karine Heydemann has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Quentin L. Meunier
Olam International Ltd, Galerie Tsika Libreville Gabon
5 shared publications - Damien Couroussé
Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CEA, LIST, Grenoble, France
2 shared publications - Emmanuelle Encrenaz
Sorbonne Universite
2 shared publications Inès Ben El Ouahma
Sorbonne Universite
2 shared publicationsLetitia Li
FAST Labs, BAE Systems, Burlington, USA
2 shared publications- Nicolas Moro
Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives (CEA), 13541 Gardanne, France
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 23 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 62-83
Fault Attacks Sensitivity of Public Parameters in the Dilithium Verification
- 23 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 62-83
Fault Attacks Sensitivity of Public Parameters in the Dilithium Verification
- 15 May 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 42 (12) , 4555-4568
MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks
Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art countermeasures, hardware-only or with hardware support, do not consider the integrity of microarchitecture control signals that are the target of these faults. We present MAFIA, a microarchitecture protection against fault injection attacks. MAFIA ensures integrity of pipeline control signals through a signature-based mechanism, and ensures fine-grained control-flow integrity with a complete indirect branch support and code authenticity. We analyze the security properties of two different implementations with different security/overhead tradeoffs: one with a CBC-MAC/Prince signature function, and another one with a CRC32. We present our implementation of MAFIA in a RISC-V processor, supported by a dedicated compiler toolchain based on LLVM/Clang. We report a hardware area overhead of 23.8% and 6.5% for the CBC-MAC/Prince and CRC32, respectively. The average code size and execution time overheads are 29.4% and 18.4%, respectively, for the CRC32 implementation and are 50% and 39% for the CBC-MAC/Prince.
- 15 May 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 42 (12) , 4555-4568
MAFIA: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks
Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art countermeasures, hardware-only or with hardware support, do not consider the integrity of microarchitecture control signals that are the target of these faults. We present MAFIA, a microarchitecture protection against fault injection attacks. MAFIA ensures integrity of pipeline control signals through a signature-based mechanism, and ensures fine-grained control-flow integrity with a complete indirect branch support and code authenticity. We analyze the security properties of two different implementations with different security/overhead tradeoffs: one with a CBC-MAC/Prince signature function, and another one with a CRC32. We present our implementation of MAFIA in a RISC-V processor, supported by a dedicated compiler toolchain based on LLVM/Clang. We report a hardware area overhead of 23.8% and 6.5% for the CBC-MAC/Prince and CRC32, respectively. The average code size and execution time overheads are 29.4% and 18.4%, respectively, for the CRC32 implementation and are 50% and 39% for the CBC-MAC/Prince.
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-22
SAMVA: Static Analysis for Multi-fault Attack Paths Determination
- 23 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-22
SAMVA: Static Analysis for Multi-fault Attack Paths Determination
- 6 March 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 49 (6) , 3359-3375
LeakageVerif: Efficient and Scalable Formal Verification of Leakage in Symbolic Expressions
Side-channel attacks are a powerful class of attacks targeting cryptographic devices. Masking is a popular protection technique to thwart such attacks as it can be theoretically proven secure. However, correctly implementing masking schemes is a non-trivial task and error-prone. If several techniques have been proposed to formally verify masked implementations, they all come with limitations regarding expressiveness, scalability or accuracy. In this work, we propose a symbolic approach, based on a variant of the classical substitution method, for formally verifying arithmetic and boolean masked programs. This approach is more accurate and scalable than existing approaches thanks to a careful design and implementation of key heuristics, algorithms and data structures involved in the verification process. We present all the details of this approach and the open-source tool called LeakageVerif which implements it as a python library, and which offers constructions for symbolic expressions and functions for their verification. We compare LeakageVerif to three existing state-of-the-art tools on a set of 46 masked programs, and we show that it has very good scalability and accuracy results while providing all the necessary constructs for describing algorithmic to assembly masking schemes. Finally, we also provide the set of 46 benchmarks, named MaskedVerifBenchs and written for comparing the different verification tools, in the hope that they will be useful to the community for future comparisons.
- 6 March 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 49 (6) , 3359-3375
LeakageVerif: Efficient and Scalable Formal Verification of Leakage in Symbolic Expressions
Side-channel attacks are a powerful class of attacks targeting cryptographic devices. Masking is a popular protection technique to thwart such attacks as it can be theoretically proven secure. However, correctly implementing masking schemes is a non-trivial task and error-prone. If several techniques have been proposed to formally verify masked implementations, they all come with limitations regarding expressiveness, scalability or accuracy. In this work, we propose a symbolic approach, based on a variant of the classical substitution method, for formally verifying arithmetic and boolean masked programs. This approach is more accurate and scalable than existing approaches thanks to a careful design and implementation of key heuristics, algorithms and data structures involved in the verification process. We present all the details of this approach and the open-source tool called LeakageVerif which implements it as a python library, and which offers constructions for symbolic expressions and functions for their verification. We compare LeakageVerif to three existing state-of-the-art tools on a set of 46 masked programs, and we show that it has very good scalability and accuracy results while providing all the necessary constructs for describing algorithmic to assembly masking schemes. Finally, we also provide the set of 46 benchmarks, named MaskedVerifBenchs and written for comparing the different verification tools, in the hope that they will be useful to the community for future comparisons.
- 9 August 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 41 (11) , 3733-3744
ARMISTICE: Microarchitectural Leakage Modeling for Masked Software Formal Verification
Side-channel attacks are powerful attacks for retrieving secret data by exploiting physical measurements, such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. Masking is a popular countermeasure as it can be proven secure against an attacker model. In practice, software-masked implementations suffer from a security reduction due to a mismatch between the considered leakage sources in the security proof and the real ones, which depend on the microarchitecture. We propose ARMISTICE, a framework for formally verifying the absence of leakage in first-order masked implementations taking into account modeled microarchitectural sources of leakage. As a proof of concept, we present the modeling of an Arm Cortex-M3 core from its RTL description and leakage test vectors, as well as the modeling of the memory of an STM32F1 board, exclusively using leakage test vectors. We show that, with these models, ARMISTICE pinpoints vulnerable instructions in real-world masked implementations and helps the design of masked software implementations which are practically secure.
- 9 August 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 41 (11) , 3733-3744
ARMISTICE: Microarchitectural Leakage Modeling for Masked Software Formal Verification
Side-channel attacks are powerful attacks for retrieving secret data by exploiting physical measurements, such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. Masking is a popular countermeasure as it can be proven secure against an attacker model. In practice, software-masked implementations suffer from a security reduction due to a mismatch between the considered leakage sources in the security proof and the real ones, which depend on the microarchitecture. We propose ARMISTICE, a framework for formally verifying the absence of leakage in first-order masked implementations taking into account modeled microarchitectural sources of leakage. As a proof of concept, we present the modeling of an Arm Cortex-M3 core from its RTL description and leakage test vectors, as well as the modeling of the memory of an STM32F1 board, exclusively using leakage test vectors. We show that, with these models, ARMISTICE pinpoints vulnerable instructions in real-world masked implementations and helps the design of masked software implementations which are practically secure.
- 4 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (2) , 197
Correction to: Editorial about PROOFS 2019
- 4 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (2) , 197
Correction to: Editorial about PROOFS 2019
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (2) , 103-104
Editorial about PROOFS 2015
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (2) , 103-104
Editorial about PROOFS 2015
- 30 July 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 39 (11) , 3774-3786
Maskara: Compilation of a Masking Countermeasure With Optimized Polynomial Interpolation
Side-channel attacks are amongst the major threats for embedded systems and IoT devices. Masking is one of the most used countermeasure against such attacks, but its application remains a difficult process. We propose a target-independent approach for applying a first-order boolean masking countermeasure during compilation, on the static single assignment form. Contrary to state-of-the art automated approaches that require to simplify the control flow of the input program, our approach supports regular control-flow program structures. Moreover, our compiler is the first to automatically mask table lookups using a polynomial interpolation approach. We also present new optimisations to speed up the evaluation of polynomials: we reduce the number of terms of the polynomial, and we accelerate finite field multiplication. We show that our approach is faster than the standard masked table approach with mask refresh after each access, with speedups up to ×2.4 in our experiments. Finally, using a formal verification approach, we show that the compiled machine code is secure, i.e., that all intermediate computations are statistically independent of the secrets.
- 30 July 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 39 (11) , 3774-3786
Maskara: Compilation of a Masking Countermeasure With Optimized Polynomial Interpolation
Side-channel attacks are amongst the major threats for embedded systems and IoT devices. Masking is one of the most used countermeasure against such attacks, but its application remains a difficult process. We propose a target-independent approach for applying a first-order boolean masking countermeasure during compilation, on the static single assignment form. Contrary to state-of-the art automated approaches that require to simplify the control flow of the input program, our approach supports regular control-flow program structures. Moreover, our compiler is the first to automatically mask table lookups using a polynomial interpolation approach. We also present new optimisations to speed up the evaluation of polynomials: we reduce the number of terms of the polynomial, and we accelerate finite field multiplication. We show that our approach is faster than the standard masked table approach with mask refresh after each access, with speedups up to ×2.4 in our experiments. Finally, using a formal verification approach, we show that the compiled machine code is secure, i.e., that all intermediate computations are statistically independent of the secrets.
- 16 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 9 (3) , 231-242
Side-channel robustness analysis of masked assembly codes using a symbolic approach
- 16 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 9 (3) , 231-242
Side-channel robustness analysis of masked assembly codes using a symbolic approach
- Open Access
Studying EM Pulse Effects on Superscalar Microarchitectures at ISA Level
In the area of physical attacks, system-on-chip (SoC) designs have not received the same level of attention as simpler micro-controllers. We try to model the behavior of secure software running on a superscalar out-of-order microprocessor typical of more complex SoC, in the presence of electromagnetic (EM) pulses. We first show that it is possible, in a black box approach, to corrupt the loop iteration count of both original and hardened versions of two sensitive loops. We propose a characterization methodology based on very simple codes, to understand and classify the fault effects at the level of the instruction set architecture (ISA). The resulting classification includes the well established instruction skip and register corruption models, as well as new effects specific to more complex processors, such as operand substitution, multiple correlated register corruptions, advanced control-flow hijacking, and combinations of all reported effects. This diversity and complexity of effects can lead to powerful attacks. The proposed methodology and fault classification at ISA level is a first step towards a more complete characterization. It is also a tool supporting the designers of software and hardware countermeasures.
Open AccessStudying EM Pulse Effects on Superscalar Microarchitectures at ISA Level
In the area of physical attacks, system-on-chip (SoC) designs have not received the same level of attention as simpler micro-controllers. We try to model the behavior of secure software running on a superscalar out-of-order microprocessor typical of more complex SoC, in the presence of electromagnetic (EM) pulses. We first show that it is possible, in a black box approach, to corrupt the loop iteration count of both original and hardened versions of two sensitive loops. We propose a characterization methodology based on very simple codes, to understand and classify the fault effects at the level of the instruction set architecture (ISA). The resulting classification includes the well established instruction skip and register corruption models, as well as new effects specific to more complex processors, such as operand substitution, multiple correlated register corruptions, advanced control-flow hijacking, and combinations of all reported effects. This diversity and complexity of effects can lead to powerful attacks. The proposed methodology and fault classification at ISA level is a first step towards a more complete characterization. It is also a tool supporting the designers of software and hardware countermeasures.