Shuo Sun
Shuo Sun has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jingdian Ming
School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China
2 shared publications - Rui Zhang
Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications Yan Zhuang
2 shared publications- Yongbin Zhou
Nanjing University of Science and Technology
2 shared publications Feng Zhang
1 shared publication- Handong Cui
Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 323-346
Towards Practical Privacy-Preserving AI: Applications of Fully Homomorphic Encryption in Learning Models
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 323-346
Towards Practical Privacy-Preserving AI: Applications of Fully Homomorphic Encryption in Learning Models
- 6 October 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 11963-11974
Finding More Hints—Improved Power Analysis Attacks on Dilithium
CRYSTALS-Dilithium (referred to as Dilithium) is a standard in NIST’s post-quantum cryptography project. However, its design does not include protections against attacks exploiting intermediate data leakage. Since Ravi and Bruinderink introduced schemes to forge Dilithium signatures, numerous works have leveraged power analysis attack to exploit vulnerabilities in Dilithium implementations. In this paper, we revisit previous attacks and identify promising optimization strategies for hints-oriented attacks. In such attacks, an adversary first utilizes side-channel leakage to derive hint equations related to the secret key and then solves for the secret key using these equations. Our new strategy enables each signature to generate more valid hint equations, significantly reducing the number of required signatures for a successful attack. By incorporating machine learning techniques, specifically the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), we can efficiently detect hint equations with high accuracy. Furthermore, by combining a lattice-based algorithm with hybrid filtering methods, our scheme can further reduce the required number of hint equations. Additionally, our attack method is applicable to Dilithium security levels 2, 3, and 5. For Dilithium-2, the proposed attack successfully recovers the complete secret key even under low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) conditions, requiring 395, 330, and 305 signatures at SNRs of 0.0167, 0.0210, and 0.0406, respectively.
- 6 October 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 11963-11974
Finding More Hints—Improved Power Analysis Attacks on Dilithium
CRYSTALS-Dilithium (referred to as Dilithium) is a standard in NIST’s post-quantum cryptography project. However, its design does not include protections against attacks exploiting intermediate data leakage. Since Ravi and Bruinderink introduced schemes to forge Dilithium signatures, numerous works have leveraged power analysis attack to exploit vulnerabilities in Dilithium implementations. In this paper, we revisit previous attacks and identify promising optimization strategies for hints-oriented attacks. In such attacks, an adversary first utilizes side-channel leakage to derive hint equations related to the secret key and then solves for the secret key using these equations. Our new strategy enables each signature to generate more valid hint equations, significantly reducing the number of required signatures for a successful attack. By incorporating machine learning techniques, specifically the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), we can efficiently detect hint equations with high accuracy. Furthermore, by combining a lattice-based algorithm with hybrid filtering methods, our scheme can further reduce the required number of hint equations. Additionally, our attack method is applicable to Dilithium security levels 2, 3, and 5. For Dilithium-2, the proposed attack successfully recovers the complete secret key even under low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) conditions, requiring 395, 330, and 305 signatures at SNRs of 0.0167, 0.0210, and 0.0406, respectively.
- 24 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 109-127
Fast Fourier Orthogonalization over NTRU Lattices
- 24 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 109-127
Fast Fourier Orthogonalization over NTRU Lattices
- 25 December 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 16 (15566013) , 1868-1879
On the Security of Lattice-Based Fiat-Shamir Signatures in the Presence of Randomness Leakage
Leakages during the signing process, including partial key exposure and partial (or complete) randomness exposure, may be devastating for the security of digital signatures. In this work, we investigate the security of lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signatures in the presence of randomness leakage. To this end, we present a generic key recovery attack that relies on minimum leakage of randomness, and then theoretically connect it to a variant of Integer-LWE (ILWE) problem. The ILWE problem, introduced by Bootle et al. at Asiacrypt 2018, is to recover the secret vector s given polynomially many samples of the form$({\text{a}}, \langle {\text{a}}, {\text{s}} \rangle + \text {e}) \in \mathbb {Z}^{\text {n}+1}$ , and it is solvable if the error$\text {e} \in \mathbb {Z}$ is not superpolynomially larger than the inner product$\langle {\text{a}}, {\text{s}} \rangle $ . However, in our variant (we call the variant FS-ILWE problem in this paper),${\text{a}}\in \mathbb {Z}^{\text {n}}$ is a sparse vector whose coefficients are NOT independent any more, and e is related to a and s as well. We prove that the FS-ILWE problem can be solved in polynomial time, and present an efficient algorithm to solve it. Our generic key recovery method directly implies that many lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signatures will be totally broken with one (deterministic or probabilistic) bit of randomness leakage per signature. Our attack has been validated by experiments on two NIST PQC signatures Dilithium and qTESLA. For example, as to Dilithium-III of 125-bit quantum security, the secret key will be recovered within 10 seconds over an ordinary PC desktop, with about one million signatures. Similarly, key recovery attacks on Dilithium under other parameters and qTESLA will be completed within 20 seconds and 31 minutes respectively. In addition, we also present a non-profiled attack to show how to obtain the required randomness bit in practice through power analysis attacks on a proof-of-concept implementation of polynomial addition. The experimental results confirm the practical feasibility of our method.- 25 December 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 16 (15566013) , 1868-1879
On the Security of Lattice-Based Fiat-Shamir Signatures in the Presence of Randomness Leakage
Leakages during the signing process, including partial key exposure and partial (or complete) randomness exposure, may be devastating for the security of digital signatures. In this work, we investigate the security of lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signatures in the presence of randomness leakage. To this end, we present a generic key recovery attack that relies on minimum leakage of randomness, and then theoretically connect it to a variant of Integer-LWE (ILWE) problem. The ILWE problem, introduced by Bootle et al. at Asiacrypt 2018, is to recover the secret vector s given polynomially many samples of the form$({\text{a}}, \langle {\text{a}}, {\text{s}} \rangle + \text {e}) \in \mathbb {Z}^{\text {n}+1}$ , and it is solvable if the error$\text {e} \in \mathbb {Z}$ is not superpolynomially larger than the inner product$\langle {\text{a}}, {\text{s}} \rangle $ . However, in our variant (we call the variant FS-ILWE problem in this paper),${\text{a}}\in \mathbb {Z}^{\text {n}}$ is a sparse vector whose coefficients are NOT independent any more, and e is related to a and s as well. We prove that the FS-ILWE problem can be solved in polynomial time, and present an efficient algorithm to solve it. Our generic key recovery method directly implies that many lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signatures will be totally broken with one (deterministic or probabilistic) bit of randomness leakage per signature. Our attack has been validated by experiments on two NIST PQC signatures Dilithium and qTESLA. For example, as to Dilithium-III of 125-bit quantum security, the secret key will be recovered within 10 seconds over an ordinary PC desktop, with about one million signatures. Similarly, key recovery attacks on Dilithium under other parameters and qTESLA will be completed within 20 seconds and 31 minutes respectively. In addition, we also present a non-profiled attack to show how to obtain the required randomness bit in practice through power analysis attacks on a proof-of-concept implementation of polynomial addition. The experimental results confirm the practical feasibility of our method.