Lin Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Lin Zhang has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fanxin Kong
University of Notre Dame
5 shared publications - Mengyu Liu
Washington State University, Tri-Cities, USA
3 shared publications - Insup Lee
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication - Kaustubh Sridhar
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, United States
1 shared publication - Oleg Sokolsky
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication - Pengyuan Lu
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
- Vol. 29 (5) , 1-16
CPSim: Simulation Toolbox for Security Problems in Cyber-Physical Systems
There are various applications of Cyber-Physical systems (CPSs) that are life-critical where failure or malfunction can result in significant harm to human life, the environment, or substantial economic loss. Therefore, it is important to ensure their reliability, security, and robustness to the attacks. However, there is no widely used toolbox to simulate CPS and target security problems, especially the simulation of sensor attacks and defense strategies against them. In this work, we introduce our toolbox CPSim, a user-friendly simulation toolbox for security problems in CPS. CPSim aims to simulate common sensor attacks and countermeasures to these sensor attacks. We have implemented bias attacks, delay attacks, and replay attacks. Additionally, we have implemented various recovery-based methods against sensor attacks. The sensor attacks and recovery methods configurations can be customized with the given APIs. CPSim has built-in numerical simulators and various implemented benchmarks. Moreover, CPSim is compatible with other external simulators and can be deployed on a real testbed for control purposes. 1
- 4 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
- Vol. 29 (5) , 1-16
Open AccessCPSim: Simulation Toolbox for Security Problems in Cyber-Physical Systems
There are various applications of Cyber-Physical systems (CPSs) that are life-critical where failure or malfunction can result in significant harm to human life, the environment, or substantial economic loss. Therefore, it is important to ensure their reliability, security, and robustness to the attacks. However, there is no widely used toolbox to simulate CPS and target security problems, especially the simulation of sensor attacks and defense strategies against them. In this work, we introduce our toolbox CPSim, a user-friendly simulation toolbox for security problems in CPS. CPSim aims to simulate common sensor attacks and countermeasures to these sensor attacks. We have implemented bias attacks, delay attacks, and replay attacks. Additionally, we have implemented various recovery-based methods against sensor attacks. The sensor attacks and recovery methods configurations can be customized with the given APIs. CPSim has built-in numerical simulators and various implemented benchmarks. Moreover, CPSim is compatible with other external simulators and can be deployed on a real testbed for control purposes. 1
- Open Access
- 26 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Computing Surveys
- Vol. 56 (8) , 1-31
Recovery from Adversarial Attacks in Cyber-physical Systems: Shallow, Deep, and Exploratory Works
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have experienced rapid growth in recent decades. However, like any other computer-based systems, malicious attacks evolve mutually, driving CPS to undesirable physical states, and potentially causing catastrophes. Although the current state-of-the-art is well aware of this issue, the majority of researchers have not focused on CPS recovery, the procedure we defined as restoring a CPS’s physical state back to a target condition under adversarial attacks. To call for attention on CPS recovery and identify existing efforts, we have surveyed a total of 30 relevant papers. We identify a major partition of the proposed recovery strategies: shallow recovery vs. deep recovery, where the former does not use a dedicated recovery controller while the latter does. Additionally, we surveyed exploratory research on topics that facilitate recovery. From these publications, we discuss the current state-of-the-art of CPS recovery, with respect to applications, attack type, attack surfaces, and system dynamics. Then, we identify untouched sub-domains in this field and suggest possible future directions for researchers.
- 26 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Computing Surveys
- Vol. 56 (8) , 1-31
Open AccessRecovery from Adversarial Attacks in Cyber-physical Systems: Shallow, Deep, and Exploratory Works
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have experienced rapid growth in recent decades. However, like any other computer-based systems, malicious attacks evolve mutually, driving CPS to undesirable physical states, and potentially causing catastrophes. Although the current state-of-the-art is well aware of this issue, the majority of researchers have not focused on CPS recovery, the procedure we defined as restoring a CPS’s physical state back to a target condition under adversarial attacks. To call for attention on CPS recovery and identify existing efforts, we have surveyed a total of 30 relevant papers. We identify a major partition of the proposed recovery strategies: shallow recovery vs. deep recovery, where the former does not use a dedicated recovery controller while the latter does. Additionally, we surveyed exploratory research on topics that facilitate recovery. From these publications, we discuss the current state-of-the-art of CPS recovery, with respect to applications, attack type, attack surfaces, and system dynamics. Then, we identify untouched sub-domains in this field and suggest possible future directions for researchers.
- 11 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 91-120
AI-enabled Real-Time Sensor Attack Detection for Cyber-Physical Systems
- 11 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 91-120
AI-enabled Real-Time Sensor Attack Detection for Cyber-Physical Systems
- Open Access
- 24 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1-21
Optimal Checkpointing Strategy for Real-time Systems with Both Logical and Timing Correctness
Real-time systems are susceptible to adversarial factors such as faults and attacks, leading to severe consequences. This paper presents an optimal checkpoint scheme to bolster fault resilience in real-time systems, addressing both logical consistency and timing correctness. First, we partition message-passing processes into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) based on their dependencies, ensuring checkpoint logical consistency. Then, we identify the DAG’s critical path, representing the longest sequential path, and analyze the optimal checkpoint strategy along this path to minimize overall execution time, including checkpointing overhead. Upon fault detection, the system rolls back to the nearest valid checkpoints for recovery. Our algorithm derives the optimal checkpoint count and intervals, and we evaluate its performance through extensive simulations and a case study. Results show a 99.97% and 67.86% reduction in execution time compared to checkpoint-free systems in simulations and the case study, respectively. Moreover, our proposed strategy outperforms prior work and baseline methods, increasing deadline achievement rates by 31.41% and 2.92% for small-scale tasks and 78.53% and 4.15% for large-scale tasks.
- 24 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1-21
Open AccessOptimal Checkpointing Strategy for Real-time Systems with Both Logical and Timing Correctness
Real-time systems are susceptible to adversarial factors such as faults and attacks, leading to severe consequences. This paper presents an optimal checkpoint scheme to bolster fault resilience in real-time systems, addressing both logical consistency and timing correctness. First, we partition message-passing processes into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) based on their dependencies, ensuring checkpoint logical consistency. Then, we identify the DAG’s critical path, representing the longest sequential path, and analyze the optimal checkpoint strategy along this path to minimize overall execution time, including checkpointing overhead. Upon fault detection, the system rolls back to the nearest valid checkpoints for recovery. Our algorithm derives the optimal checkpoint count and intervals, and we evaluate its performance through extensive simulations and a case study. Results show a 99.97% and 67.86% reduction in execution time compared to checkpoint-free systems in simulations and the case study, respectively. Moreover, our proposed strategy outperforms prior work and baseline methods, increasing deadline achievement rates by 31.41% and 2.92% for small-scale tasks and 78.53% and 4.15% for large-scale tasks.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 21 (4) , 1-25
Attack-resilient Fusion of Sensor Data with Uncertain Delays
Malicious attackers may disrupt the safety of autonomous systems through compromising sensors to feed wrong measurements to the controller. This article proposes attack-resilient sensor fusion that combines local sensor readings and shared sensing information from multiple sources. The method results in higher resilience against sensor attacks through jointly considering sensing noise and uncertain communication delay. To be specific, we first identify the considerable impact of the delay on determining attacked sensors. Second, we present a novel two-dimensional abstract sensor model, where each measurement is augmented as a probabilistic interval based on the convolution of the noise and delay. Third, we propose a fusion algorithm that admits the fused value with highest joint probability distribution of the intervals to tolerate corrupted measurements. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in a vehicle-platoon case study using extensive simulations and testbed experiments.
- 31 July 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 21 (4) , 1-25
Open AccessAttack-resilient Fusion of Sensor Data with Uncertain Delays
Malicious attackers may disrupt the safety of autonomous systems through compromising sensors to feed wrong measurements to the controller. This article proposes attack-resilient sensor fusion that combines local sensor readings and shared sensing information from multiple sources. The method results in higher resilience against sensor attacks through jointly considering sensing noise and uncertain communication delay. To be specific, we first identify the considerable impact of the delay on determining attacked sensors. Second, we present a novel two-dimensional abstract sensor model, where each measurement is augmented as a probabilistic interval based on the convolution of the noise and delay. Third, we propose a fusion algorithm that admits the fused value with highest joint probability distribution of the intervals to tolerate corrupted measurements. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in a vehicle-platoon case study using extensive simulations and testbed experiments.