Florian Kerzenmacher
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Florian Kerzenmacher has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Eberhard Feess
3 shared publicationsGerd Muehlheusser
2 shared publications- Eberhard Feess
8491 Victoria University of Wellington , Pipitea Campus, Lambton Quay , Wellington , New Zealand
1 shared publication - Yuriy Timofeyev
Graduate School of Business HSE University Moscow Russia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 140, 380-400
Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives
- 28 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 140, 380-400
Open AccessMorally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives
- Open Access
- 6 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 81 (1-2) , 367-389
Sorting of trustees: the good and the bad stay in the game
We extend the theoretical and experimental analysis of endogenous sorting in social dilemma games to decisions of trustees in trust games. Trustees first decide about the amount they send back if the trustor sends the money and then learn that they can exit the game for a payoff that is identical to the trustor’s endowment. We develop a behavioral model where trustors and trustees have reciprocal preferences, and hence put positive weight on the other player’s payoff if they perceive their behavior as kind. Our model yields two possible constellations: Only trustees with high reciprocity participate, or all types except those with intermediate reciprocity participate. Our data lend strong support for the second pattern, as we observe a U-shaped relation between the trustees’ participation rate and the amount they return. Trustors are hence left with an extreme pool of participants where they are either matched with particularly selfish or generous trustees.
- 6 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 81 (1-2) , 367-389
Open AccessSorting of trustees: the good and the bad stay in the game
We extend the theoretical and experimental analysis of endogenous sorting in social dilemma games to decisions of trustees in trust games. Trustees first decide about the amount they send back if the trustor sends the money and then learn that they can exit the game for a payoff that is identical to the trustor’s endowment. We develop a behavioral model where trustors and trustees have reciprocal preferences, and hence put positive weight on the other player’s payoff if they perceive their behavior as kind. Our model yields two possible constellations: Only trustees with high reciprocity participate, or all types except those with intermediate reciprocity participate. Our data lend strong support for the second pattern, as we observe a U-shaped relation between the trustees’ participation rate and the amount they return. Trustors are hence left with an extreme pool of participants where they are either matched with particularly selfish or generous trustees.
- Open Access
- 28 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 149
Utilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior—What predicts morally questionable decisions?
- 28 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 149
Open AccessUtilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior—What predicts morally questionable decisions?
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Moral Transgressions by Groups: What Drives Individual Voting Behavior?
We conduct an experiment where subjects are matched in groups of three and vote on a moral transgression. Analyzing different voting rules, the frequency of votes for the moral transgression increases with the number of votes required for it. This effect persists when considering pivotal votes only, which eliminates opportunities to save on own moral costs and to rely instead on sufficiently many votes for the transgression by other group members. A series of novel treatments allows us to identify guilt sharing and preferences for consensual voting as empirically relevant and independent drivers of voting behavior.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMoral Transgressions by Groups: What Drives Individual Voting Behavior?
We conduct an experiment where subjects are matched in groups of three and vote on a moral transgression. Analyzing different voting rules, the frequency of votes for the moral transgression increases with the number of votes required for it. This effect persists when considering pivotal votes only, which eliminates opportunities to save on own moral costs and to rely instead on sufficiently many votes for the transgression by other group members. A series of novel treatments allows us to identify guilt sharing and preferences for consensual voting as empirically relevant and independent drivers of voting behavior.