Alexandria R. Stone
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Alexandria R. Stone has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Elizabeth J. Marsh
Duke University
2 shared publications - Brenda W. Yang
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience Duke University Durham North Carolina USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Wiley in Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 37 (2) , 399-408
Belief in COVID‐19 misinformation: Hopeful claims are rated as truer
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Wiley in Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 37 (2) , 399-408
Belief in COVID‐19 misinformation: Hopeful claims are rated as truer
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Wiley in Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 36 (5) , 1072-1082
Asymmetry in belief revision
Information can change: science advances, newspapers retract claims, and reccomendations shift. Successfully navigating the world requires updating and changing beliefs, a process that is sensitive to a person's motivation to change their beliefs as well as the credibility of the source providing the new information. Here, we report three studies that consistently identify an additional factor influencing belief revision. Specifically, we document an asymmetry in belief revision: people are better able to believe in a claim once thought to be false, as opposed to unbelieving something once believed to be true. We discuss how this finding integrates and extends prior research on social and cognitive contributions to belief revisions. This work has implications for understanding the widespread prevalence and persistence of false beliefs in contemporary societies.
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Wiley in Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 36 (5) , 1072-1082
Asymmetry in belief revision
Information can change: science advances, newspapers retract claims, and reccomendations shift. Successfully navigating the world requires updating and changing beliefs, a process that is sensitive to a person's motivation to change their beliefs as well as the credibility of the source providing the new information. Here, we report three studies that consistently identify an additional factor influencing belief revision. Specifically, we document an asymmetry in belief revision: people are better able to believe in a claim once thought to be false, as opposed to unbelieving something once believed to be true. We discuss how this finding integrates and extends prior research on social and cognitive contributions to belief revisions. This work has implications for understanding the widespread prevalence and persistence of false beliefs in contemporary societies.