Leslie A. Howe
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The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
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Research Interests
Latest Publications
- 16 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 157-170
Human Rights, Goods and Preferences in Sport
- 27 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 53 (2) , 202-215
Women, autonomy and sport: different situations, different dangers
A number of authors have argued the value of dangerous (or ‘risk’) sport.1 I shall argue here the value of these sports for women specifically, and that their value for women is complex and strongl...
- 27 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 53 (2) , 202-215
Women, autonomy and sport: different situations, different dangers
A number of authors have argued the value of dangerous (or ‘risk’) sport.1 I shall argue here the value of these sports for women specifically, and that their value for women is complex and strongl...
- 14 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 51 (2) , 177-190
On not being alone in lonely places: preferences, goods, and aesthetic-ethical conflict in nature sports
- 14 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 51 (2) , 177-190
On not being alone in lonely places: preferences, goods, and aesthetic-ethical conflict in nature sports
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Wiley in The Philosophical Forum
- Vol. 53 (3) , 195-206
Bullshit as a practical strategy for self‐deceptive narrators
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Wiley in The Philosophical Forum
- Vol. 53 (3) , 195-206
Bullshit as a practical strategy for self‐deceptive narrators
- 27 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
- Vol. 14 (4) , 496-510
Altering the Narrative of Champions: Recognition, Excellence, Fairness, and Inclusion
This paper is an examination of the concept of recognition and its connection with identity and respect. This is related to the question of how women are or are not adequately recognised or respected for their achievements in sport and whether eliminating sex segregation in sport is a solution. This will require an analysis of the concept of excellence in sport, as well as the relationship between fairness and inclusion in an activity that is fundamentally about bodily movement. I argue that attempts to address the problem of women’s recognition in sport need to do so in ways that neither eliminate sport as a fairness-regulated system for developing individual excellence in bodily movement nor that prevent women’s achievement of sporting excellence, with the regard that belongs to them. Doing this requires us to decide whether sport is about champions or about individual excellence.
- 27 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
- Vol. 14 (4) , 496-510
Altering the Narrative of Champions: Recognition, Excellence, Fairness, and Inclusion
This paper is an examination of the concept of recognition and its connection with identity and respect. This is related to the question of how women are or are not adequately recognised or respected for their achievements in sport and whether eliminating sex segregation in sport is a solution. This will require an analysis of the concept of excellence in sport, as well as the relationship between fairness and inclusion in an activity that is fundamentally about bodily movement. I argue that attempts to address the problem of women’s recognition in sport need to do so in ways that neither eliminate sport as a fairness-regulated system for developing individual excellence in bodily movement nor that prevent women’s achievement of sporting excellence, with the regard that belongs to them. Doing this requires us to decide whether sport is about champions or about individual excellence.
- 6 May 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 37 (5) , 764-780
Bad Faith, Bad Behaviour, and Role Models
I argue that athletes should neither be taken as role models nor present themselves as such. Indeed, they should resist any attempt to take them as such on the grounds that seeing athletes (or other celebrities) as role models abrogates the existential and ethical responsibilities of both parties. Whether one takes on the role of being a model to others or whether one chooses to model one’s own behaviour on that of another, except in respect of the development of technical skill, one engages in bad faith and fails to act in an existentially ethical way. To this end, I consider the inclination to influence and admiration, as well as self‐respect, agency, motivation, and envy. I argue that while celebrity sportspersons and similar others do not have duties that others do not have just by virtue of their notoriety alone, they may have situational responsibilities commensurate with their social reach. More importantly, however, since social influence is not a transformation of inert matter, there are also responsibilities belonging to their audiences, those who merely observe and those who choose to imitate
- 6 May 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 37 (5) , 764-780
Bad Faith, Bad Behaviour, and Role Models
I argue that athletes should neither be taken as role models nor present themselves as such. Indeed, they should resist any attempt to take them as such on the grounds that seeing athletes (or other celebrities) as role models abrogates the existential and ethical responsibilities of both parties. Whether one takes on the role of being a model to others or whether one chooses to model one’s own behaviour on that of another, except in respect of the development of technical skill, one engages in bad faith and fails to act in an existentially ethical way. To this end, I consider the inclination to influence and admiration, as well as self‐respect, agency, motivation, and envy. I argue that while celebrity sportspersons and similar others do not have duties that others do not have just by virtue of their notoriety alone, they may have situational responsibilities commensurate with their social reach. More importantly, however, since social influence is not a transformation of inert matter, there are also responsibilities belonging to their audiences, those who merely observe and those who choose to imitate
- 17 September 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 47 (1) , 142-146
Philosophy and Nature Sports
- 17 September 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 47 (1) , 142-146
Philosophy and Nature Sports
- 28 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 46 (3) , 437-453
Not everything is a contest: sport, nature sport, and friluftsliv
A difficulty in defining what is and what is not a sport is that the would-be definer oft times comes to the task with the aim of including a favoured exemplar or of excluding a despised pretender. I shall offer no high road here, as I will be deliberately making the case for the inclusion as sport of activities that some would deny as such, though I hope in doing so to demonstrate some problems with a prevalent account of what makes or unmakes sport. The purpose here is more critical than constructive; whether or not the activities whose part I take are sports or not is of less concern to this author than how we understand sport–those who, for example, ski or paddle in remote places will still do so whether or not what they do is ‘sport’ or not. Nevertheless, given a conviction that our concepts ought to accurately reflect the world to which they refer and, ultimately, help to shape, I will also offer a number of considerations for sport taxonomy.
- 28 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 46 (3) , 437-453
Not everything is a contest: sport, nature sport, and friluftsliv
A difficulty in defining what is and what is not a sport is that the would-be definer oft times comes to the task with the aim of including a favoured exemplar or of excluding a despised pretender. I shall offer no high road here, as I will be deliberately making the case for the inclusion as sport of activities that some would deny as such, though I hope in doing so to demonstrate some problems with a prevalent account of what makes or unmakes sport. The purpose here is more critical than constructive; whether or not the activities whose part I take are sports or not is of less concern to this author than how we understand sport–those who, for example, ski or paddle in remote places will still do so whether or not what they do is ‘sport’ or not. Nevertheless, given a conviction that our concepts ought to accurately reflect the world to which they refer and, ultimately, help to shape, I will also offer a number of considerations for sport taxonomy.
- 26 October 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
- Vol. 13 (1) , 94-106
Intensity and the Sublime: Paying Attention to Self and Environment in Nature Sports
This paper responds to Kevin Krein’s claim in (2015) that the particular value of nature sports over traditional ones is that they offer intensity of sport experience in dynamic interaction between an athlete and natural features. He denies that this intensity is derived from competitive conflict of individuals and denies that nature sport derives its value from internal conflict within the athlete who carries out the activity. This paper responds directly to Krein by analysing ‘intensity’ in sport in terms of the relationship between attention and reflection and the interaction between self and environment. I reply directly to Krein’s rejection of self-competition as based on a mischaracterisation of internal struggle and argue that the weighing of incompatible desires does not involve a fragmented self. I argue that the unique intensity to which Krein refers is strongly comparable to the Kantian conception of the sublime and explore how sublime experience fits Krein’s account and outline some serious problems that such an ideal of experience poses for nature sport.
- 26 October 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
- Vol. 13 (1) , 94-106
Intensity and the Sublime: Paying Attention to Self and Environment in Nature Sports
This paper responds to Kevin Krein’s claim in (2015) that the particular value of nature sports over traditional ones is that they offer intensity of sport experience in dynamic interaction between an athlete and natural features. He denies that this intensity is derived from competitive conflict of individuals and denies that nature sport derives its value from internal conflict within the athlete who carries out the activity. This paper responds directly to Krein by analysing ‘intensity’ in sport in terms of the relationship between attention and reflection and the interaction between self and environment. I reply directly to Krein’s rejection of self-competition as based on a mischaracterisation of internal struggle and argue that the weighing of incompatible desires does not involve a fragmented self. I argue that the unique intensity to which Krein refers is strongly comparable to the Kantian conception of the sublime and explore how sublime experience fits Krein’s account and outline some serious problems that such an ideal of experience poses for nature sport.
- 15 June 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 44 (3) , 300-314
Simulation, seduction, and bullshit: cooperative and destructive misleading
This paper refines a number of theoretical distinctions relevant to deceptive play, in particular the difference between merely misleading actions and types of simulation commonly considered beyond the pale, such as diving. To do so, I rely on work in the philosophy of language about conversational convention and implicature, the distinction between lying and misleading, and their relation to concepts of seduction and bullshit. The paper works through a number of possible solutions to the question of what is wrong with simulation and its difference from strategic fouling, including the argument that games and their rules operate like contracts. I conclude that the wrongness lies in the injustice of unfair advantage gained through actions that silence opposition by resort to unanswerable play.
- 15 June 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
- Vol. 44 (3) , 300-314
Simulation, seduction, and bullshit: cooperative and destructive misleading
This paper refines a number of theoretical distinctions relevant to deceptive play, in particular the difference between merely misleading actions and types of simulation commonly considered beyond the pale, such as diving. To do so, I rely on work in the philosophy of language about conversational convention and implicature, the distinction between lying and misleading, and their relation to concepts of seduction and bullshit. The paper works through a number of possible solutions to the question of what is wrong with simulation and its difference from strategic fouling, including the argument that games and their rules operate like contracts. I conclude that the wrongness lies in the injustice of unfair advantage gained through actions that silence opposition by resort to unanswerable play.