Dezhang Kong
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Dezhang Kong has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chunming Wu
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
7 shared publications - Xiang Chen
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China
6 shared publications - Dong Zhang
Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fujian, China
5 shared publications - Xuan Liu
College of Information and Artificial Intelligence (College of Industrial Software), Yangzhou University, Yangzhou, China
5 shared publications - Qiumei Cheng
College of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
4 shared publications - Hongyan Liu
Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fujian, China
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 747-755
SketchScan: Harnessing Accurate and Low-Cost Multimodal Anomaly Detection in Blockchain Networks
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 747-755
Open AccessSketchScan: Harnessing Accurate and Low-Cost Multimodal Anomaly Detection in Blockchain Networks
- 6 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 210-217
StegoTrace: Registry-Scalable Authenticated Fingerprinting for Blockchain Node Logs
- 6 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 210-217
StegoTrace: Registry-Scalable Authenticated Fingerprinting for Blockchain Node Logs
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 12 (4) , 3177-3190
An Adaptive AQM Based on the Consecutive Change Detection in the Programmable Queue
With the rapid expansion of the Internet, the surge in data traffic, propelled by the exponential growth of network services and users, has heightened the risk of network congestion, security breaches, and system instability. Addressing these challenges presents stringent demands and novel complexities in queue management. However, prevailing solutions often rely heavily on average queue size thresholds while ignoring traffic variations. In this paper, CCD-AQM, an Adaptive Queue Management approach based on the Consecutive Change trend Detection in the queue size is proposed. Considering that today's programmable data plane offers promising ways for finer analysis of the queue in the hardware switches, we implement CCD-AQM on an RMT switch and analyze its resource usage. Large-scale simulations are conducted to evaluate CCD-AQM, showcasing its superior performance in queue management. The results demonstrate its ability to maintain low queue occupancy and high throughput while ensuring fairness among competing flows.
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 12 (4) , 3177-3190
An Adaptive AQM Based on the Consecutive Change Detection in the Programmable Queue
With the rapid expansion of the Internet, the surge in data traffic, propelled by the exponential growth of network services and users, has heightened the risk of network congestion, security breaches, and system instability. Addressing these challenges presents stringent demands and novel complexities in queue management. However, prevailing solutions often rely heavily on average queue size thresholds while ignoring traffic variations. In this paper, CCD-AQM, an Adaptive Queue Management approach based on the Consecutive Change trend Detection in the queue size is proposed. Considering that today's programmable data plane offers promising ways for finer analysis of the queue in the hardware switches, we implement CCD-AQM on an RMT switch and analyze its resource usage. Large-scale simulations are conducted to evaluate CCD-AQM, showcasing its superior performance in queue management. The results demonstrate its ability to maintain low queue occupancy and high throughput while ensuring fairness among competing flows.
- 3 December 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 33 (2) , 777-792
Elastically Scaling Control Channels in Network Measurement With Escala
In network measurement, data plane switches measure traffic and report events (e.g., heavy hitters) to the control plane via control channels. The control plane makes decisions to process events. However, current network measurement suffers from two problems. First, when traffic bursts occur, massive events are reported in a short time so that the control channels may be overloaded due to limited bandwidth capacity. Second, only a few events are reported in normal cases, making control channels underloaded and wasting network resources. In this paper, we propose $\mathsf{Escala}$ to provide the elastic scaling of control channels at runtime. The key idea is to dynamically migrate event streams among control channels to regulate the loads of these channels. $\mathsf{Escala}$ offers two components, including an $\mathsf{Escala}$ monitor that detects scaling situations based on realtime network statistics, and an optimization framework that makes scaling decisions to eliminate overload and underload situations. We have implemented a prototype of $\mathsf{Escala}$ on Tofino-based switches. Extensive experiments show that $\mathsf{Escala}$ achieves timely elastic scaling while preserving high application-level accuracy.
- 3 December 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 33 (2) , 777-792
Elastically Scaling Control Channels in Network Measurement With Escala
In network measurement, data plane switches measure traffic and report events (e.g., heavy hitters) to the control plane via control channels. The control plane makes decisions to process events. However, current network measurement suffers from two problems. First, when traffic bursts occur, massive events are reported in a short time so that the control channels may be overloaded due to limited bandwidth capacity. Second, only a few events are reported in normal cases, making control channels underloaded and wasting network resources. In this paper, we propose $\mathsf{Escala}$ to provide the elastic scaling of control channels at runtime. The key idea is to dynamically migrate event streams among control channels to regulate the loads of these channels. $\mathsf{Escala}$ offers two components, including an $\mathsf{Escala}$ monitor that detects scaling situations based on realtime network statistics, and an optimization framework that makes scaling decisions to eliminate overload and underload situations. We have implemented a prototype of $\mathsf{Escala}$ on Tofino-based switches. Extensive experiments show that $\mathsf{Escala}$ achieves timely elastic scaling while preserving high application-level accuracy.
- 22 November 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
- Vol. 23, 137-155
Toward Security-Enhanced In-Band Network Telemetry in Programmable Networks
In-band Network Telemetry (INT) is a widely used monitoring framework in modern large-scale networks. It provides packet-level visibility into network conditions by inserting telemetry data into packets, enabling unprecedented fine-grained network management. However, this mechanism also introduces new vulnerabilities that malicious attackers can exploit. In this paper, we present eight In-band Network Telemetry Manipulation Attacks that take advantage of INT’s weakness, demonstrating that attackers can cause severe damage with little effort by manipulating INT packets. To address this issue, we designed SecureINT, a security-enhanced INT prototype that provides encryption and integrity verification for INT packets. Specifically, SecureINT deploys Even-Mansour and SipHash for confidentiality and integrity, respectively. It also uses a zero-delay rotation mechanism, which enables administrators to dynamically change the version of the deployed Even-Mansour/SipHash running on programmable switches without the need to re-install new programs. In this way, SecureINT can provide lasting security for INT packets using the limited resources of programmable switches. According to the experiments, SecureINT can be deployed on programmable switches using a single pipeline. Besides, the overhead of the rotation mechanism running on the control plane is still minimal.
- 22 November 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
- Vol. 23, 137-155
Toward Security-Enhanced In-Band Network Telemetry in Programmable Networks
In-band Network Telemetry (INT) is a widely used monitoring framework in modern large-scale networks. It provides packet-level visibility into network conditions by inserting telemetry data into packets, enabling unprecedented fine-grained network management. However, this mechanism also introduces new vulnerabilities that malicious attackers can exploit. In this paper, we present eight In-band Network Telemetry Manipulation Attacks that take advantage of INT’s weakness, demonstrating that attackers can cause severe damage with little effort by manipulating INT packets. To address this issue, we designed SecureINT, a security-enhanced INT prototype that provides encryption and integrity verification for INT packets. Specifically, SecureINT deploys Even-Mansour and SipHash for confidentiality and integrity, respectively. It also uses a zero-delay rotation mechanism, which enables administrators to dynamically change the version of the deployed Even-Mansour/SipHash running on programmable switches without the need to re-install new programs. In this way, SecureINT can provide lasting security for INT packets using the limited resources of programmable switches. According to the experiments, SecureINT can be deployed on programmable switches using a single pipeline. Besides, the overhead of the rotation mechanism running on the control plane is still minimal.
- 3 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 9436-9451
rDefender: A Lightweight and Robust Defense Against Flow Table Overflow Attacks in SDN
The flow table is a critical component of Software-Defined Networking (SDN). However, flow tables’ limited capacity makes them highly vulnerable to flow table overflow attacks (FTOAs). Due to the low attack cost and highly flexible attack forms, it is hard to eradicate FTOAs. This paper addresses three unsolved problems for table security and proposes a robust defense accordingly. First, we reveal that the existing defenses with fixed defense speeds will cause severe packet loss when handling diverse traffic. We prove that deleting multiple rules can efficiently solve this problem and give a rigorous derivation to calculate the suitable deletion number according to the environment. Second, we illustrate that abnormal table occupancy squeezing is a constant characteristic of FTOAs regardless of attack forms. It can be used to identify attacked ports accurately in different scenarios. Third, we mathematically prove that random deletion can guarantee the continuous decrease of malicious flow rules after confirming attacked ports. It achieves fast speed and robust effectiveness in different environments. Based on these findings, we design rDefender, a robust and lightweight defense prototype. We evaluate its effect by designing diverse, powerful attacks and using real-world datasets and topology. The results demonstrate that it achieves the best overall performance compared to six existing mainstream defenses, providing stable security for switch flow tables.
- 3 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 9436-9451
rDefender: A Lightweight and Robust Defense Against Flow Table Overflow Attacks in SDN
The flow table is a critical component of Software-Defined Networking (SDN). However, flow tables’ limited capacity makes them highly vulnerable to flow table overflow attacks (FTOAs). Due to the low attack cost and highly flexible attack forms, it is hard to eradicate FTOAs. This paper addresses three unsolved problems for table security and proposes a robust defense accordingly. First, we reveal that the existing defenses with fixed defense speeds will cause severe packet loss when handling diverse traffic. We prove that deleting multiple rules can efficiently solve this problem and give a rigorous derivation to calculate the suitable deletion number according to the environment. Second, we illustrate that abnormal table occupancy squeezing is a constant characteristic of FTOAs regardless of attack forms. It can be used to identify attacked ports accurately in different scenarios. Third, we mathematically prove that random deletion can guarantee the continuous decrease of malicious flow rules after confirming attacked ports. It achieves fast speed and robust effectiveness in different environments. Based on these findings, we design rDefender, a robust and lightweight defense prototype. We evaluate its effect by designing diverse, powerful attacks and using real-world datasets and topology. The results demonstrate that it achieves the best overall performance compared to six existing mainstream defenses, providing stable security for switch flow tables.
- Open Access
- 16 June 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 13 (12) , 7210
Flow Table Saturation Attack against Dynamic Timeout Mechanisms in SDN
Software-defined networking (SDN) enables dynamic management and flexible network control by employing reactive rule installation. Due to high power consumption and cost, current OpenFlow switches only support a limited number of flow rules, which is a major limitation for deploying massive fine-grained policies. This bottleneck can be exploited by attackers to launch saturation attacks to overflow the flow table. Moreover, flow table overflow can occur in the absence of malicious attackers. To cope with this, researchers have developed many proposals to relieve the load under benign conditions. Among them, the dynamic timeout mechanism is one of the most effective solutions. We notice that when the SDN controller adopts dynamic timeouts, existing flow table saturation attacks can fail, or even expose the attackers, due to inaccurate inferring results. In this paper, we extract the common features of dynamic timeout strategies and propose an advanced flow table saturation attack. We explore the definition of flow rule lifetime and use a timing-based side-channel to infer the timeout of flow rules. Moreover, we leverage the dynamic timeout mechanisms to proactively interfere with the decision of timeout values and perform an attack. We conduct extensive experiments in various settings to demonstrate its effectiveness. We also notice that some replacement strategies work differently when the controller assigns dynamic timeouts. The experiment results show that the attack can incur significant network performance degradation and carry out the attack in a stealthy manner.
- 16 June 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 13 (12) , 7210
Open AccessFlow Table Saturation Attack against Dynamic Timeout Mechanisms in SDN
Software-defined networking (SDN) enables dynamic management and flexible network control by employing reactive rule installation. Due to high power consumption and cost, current OpenFlow switches only support a limited number of flow rules, which is a major limitation for deploying massive fine-grained policies. This bottleneck can be exploited by attackers to launch saturation attacks to overflow the flow table. Moreover, flow table overflow can occur in the absence of malicious attackers. To cope with this, researchers have developed many proposals to relieve the load under benign conditions. Among them, the dynamic timeout mechanism is one of the most effective solutions. We notice that when the SDN controller adopts dynamic timeouts, existing flow table saturation attacks can fail, or even expose the attackers, due to inaccurate inferring results. In this paper, we extract the common features of dynamic timeout strategies and propose an advanced flow table saturation attack. We explore the definition of flow rule lifetime and use a timing-based side-channel to infer the timeout of flow rules. Moreover, we leverage the dynamic timeout mechanisms to proactively interfere with the decision of timeout values and perform an attack. We conduct extensive experiments in various settings to demonstrate its effectiveness. We also notice that some replacement strategies work differently when the controller assigns dynamic timeouts. The experiment results show that the attack can incur significant network performance degradation and carry out the attack in a stealthy manner.
- 13 September 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 31 (2) , 904-919
Combination Attacks and Defenses on SDN Topology Discovery
The topology discovery service in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) provides the controller with a global view of the substrate network topology, allowing for central management of the entire network. Unfortunately, emerging topology attacks can poison the network topology and result in unforeseeable disasters. Although researchers have made great efforts to mitigate this problem, security hazards still exist. In this paper, we propose Invisible Assailant Attack (IAA), the first combination topology attack capable of injecting and maintaining fake links even when 12 existing defense strategies are deployed simultaneously. IAA consists of 14 attack phases that apply multiple attack strategies. Attackers skillfully disguise the attack traffic in each phase so that it looks like normal network traffic, and perform these phases in a well-planned sequence, thereby bypassing existing defenses step by step. To mitigate this attack, we propose a Route Path Verification (RPV) mechanism that orchestrates multiple defense strategies to identify fake links. According to the experiments, RPV can successfully detect IAA with low overhead: its detection completes within 1 ms while its per-flow storage consumption is only a few KB.
- 13 September 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 31 (2) , 904-919
Combination Attacks and Defenses on SDN Topology Discovery
The topology discovery service in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) provides the controller with a global view of the substrate network topology, allowing for central management of the entire network. Unfortunately, emerging topology attacks can poison the network topology and result in unforeseeable disasters. Although researchers have made great efforts to mitigate this problem, security hazards still exist. In this paper, we propose Invisible Assailant Attack (IAA), the first combination topology attack capable of injecting and maintaining fake links even when 12 existing defense strategies are deployed simultaneously. IAA consists of 14 attack phases that apply multiple attack strategies. Attackers skillfully disguise the attack traffic in each phase so that it looks like normal network traffic, and perform these phases in a well-planned sequence, thereby bypassing existing defenses step by step. To mitigate this attack, we propose a Route Path Verification (RPV) mechanism that orchestrates multiple defense strategies to identify fake links. According to the experiments, RPV can successfully detect IAA with low overhead: its detection completes within 1 ms while its per-flow storage consumption is only a few KB.