Mushegh Harutyunyan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mushegh Harutyunyan has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Baojun Jiang
Washington University in St. Louis
1 shared publication Chakravarthi Narasimhan
Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63130
1 shared publication- Esma Koca
Imperial Business School, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom
1 shared publication - Wen Diao
College of Business, Shanghai Univerisity of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication - Wilfred Amaldoss
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (6) , 5131-5149
Pricing and Design of Pay-to-Win Add-Ons
In player-versus-player video games, players’ natural desire to win and avoid losing has created an opportunity for game developers to sell “pay-to-win” add-ons, digital items that give buyers a competitive advantage against other players. In this paper, we investigate the pricing and design of a pay-to-win add-on, its effect on the base game, and profit implications for the developer. When a large share of the players are less price sensitive and highly willing to buy the pay-to-win add-on, we find that, surprisingly, the developer may prefer not to introduce it. Further, when it is optimal to sell the add-on, the developer designs it to be less (more) powerful in games where players are highly (moderately) sensitive to losing. In practice, the developer may design rewards or penalties in the game to influence players’ sensitivities to winning and losing, respectively. Our findings suggest that when selling a pay-to-win add-on, the developer ideally prefers players’ loss sensitivity to be neither too high nor too low, whereas high win sensitivity tends to benefit the developer. The introduction of a pay-to-win add-on influences the optimal pricing and design of the base game. In particular, the developer decreases the base game price and may even sell it as a freemium. Despite the price reduction, investment in game quality may actually increase. From the players’ perspective, our analysis shows that the introduction of a pay-to-win add-on can actually improve player surplus. In an extension of our core model, we show that the developer may prefer to customize player-to-player matching probabilities based on ownership of the pay-to-win add-on, making players who own it more likely to be matched against nonowners. However, such customization is not always optimal, and under some market conditions, the developer may optimally abstain from customizing matching probabilities. In another extension, we show that the developer may benefit from setting a negative price for the base game; counterintuitively, player surplus does not increase from negative pricing. This paper was accepted by Raphael Thomadsen, marketing. Supplemental Material: The web appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04610 .
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (6) , 5131-5149
Pricing and Design of Pay-to-Win Add-Ons
In player-versus-player video games, players’ natural desire to win and avoid losing has created an opportunity for game developers to sell “pay-to-win” add-ons, digital items that give buyers a competitive advantage against other players. In this paper, we investigate the pricing and design of a pay-to-win add-on, its effect on the base game, and profit implications for the developer. When a large share of the players are less price sensitive and highly willing to buy the pay-to-win add-on, we find that, surprisingly, the developer may prefer not to introduce it. Further, when it is optimal to sell the add-on, the developer designs it to be less (more) powerful in games where players are highly (moderately) sensitive to losing. In practice, the developer may design rewards or penalties in the game to influence players’ sensitivities to winning and losing, respectively. Our findings suggest that when selling a pay-to-win add-on, the developer ideally prefers players’ loss sensitivity to be neither too high nor too low, whereas high win sensitivity tends to benefit the developer. The introduction of a pay-to-win add-on influences the optimal pricing and design of the base game. In particular, the developer decreases the base game price and may even sell it as a freemium. Despite the price reduction, investment in game quality may actually increase. From the players’ perspective, our analysis shows that the introduction of a pay-to-win add-on can actually improve player surplus. In an extension of our core model, we show that the developer may prefer to customize player-to-player matching probabilities based on ownership of the pay-to-win add-on, making players who own it more likely to be matched against nonowners. However, such customization is not always optimal, and under some market conditions, the developer may optimally abstain from customizing matching probabilities. In another extension, we show that the developer may benefit from setting a negative price for the base game; counterintuitively, player surplus does not increase from negative pricing. This paper was accepted by Raphael Thomadsen, marketing. Supplemental Material: The web appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04610 .
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 43 (6) , 1188-1203
Don’t Hurry, Be Happy! The Bright Side of Late Product Release
When a firm releases its product later than its competitor, the firm loses sales because many consumers prefer to buy the competitor’s product rather than wait for the firm’s product release. Therefore, in the absence of any late-mover advantages, conventional wisdom suggests that competing firms will release their products as soon as possible to avoid losing customers if they were to enter later. However, when the market evolves over time and consumers are forward-looking, we demonstrate that this intuition fails and propose a new explanation for why a firm may strategically release its product later than its competitor. Namely, a firm’s late entry can help alleviate price competition due to some consumers’ decisions to wait for the firm’s product release instead of buying a currently available product. We show that in markets where the growth rate is sufficiently high and differentiation between firms is not too low, the firm’s profit gain from alleviated price competition dominates its profit loss from reduced sales, making the firm better off by releasing its product later than the competitor. Surprisingly, when the fraction of consumers who enter the market relatively early increases, the firm may have even greater incentives to release its product late. Finally, we consider markets where firms are differentiated both horizontally and vertically, with one firm having a higher quality (or stronger brand image) than its competitor. We find that high level of vertical differentiation will induce both high- and low-quality firms to rush to the market, releasing their products in the early period. However, when vertical differentiation is moderately high, the high-quality firm may choose to release late, whereas the low-quality firm will prefer to release its product early. History: Anthony Dukes served as the senior editor for this article. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2023.0393 .
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 43 (6) , 1188-1203
Don’t Hurry, Be Happy! The Bright Side of Late Product Release
When a firm releases its product later than its competitor, the firm loses sales because many consumers prefer to buy the competitor’s product rather than wait for the firm’s product release. Therefore, in the absence of any late-mover advantages, conventional wisdom suggests that competing firms will release their products as soon as possible to avoid losing customers if they were to enter later. However, when the market evolves over time and consumers are forward-looking, we demonstrate that this intuition fails and propose a new explanation for why a firm may strategically release its product later than its competitor. Namely, a firm’s late entry can help alleviate price competition due to some consumers’ decisions to wait for the firm’s product release instead of buying a currently available product. We show that in markets where the growth rate is sufficiently high and differentiation between firms is not too low, the firm’s profit gain from alleviated price competition dominates its profit loss from reduced sales, making the firm better off by releasing its product later than the competitor. Surprisingly, when the fraction of consumers who enter the market relatively early increases, the firm may have even greater incentives to release its product late. Finally, we consider markets where firms are differentiated both horizontally and vertically, with one firm having a higher quality (or stronger brand image) than its competitor. We find that high level of vertical differentiation will induce both high- and low-quality firms to rush to the market, releasing their products in the early period. However, when vertical differentiation is moderately high, the high-quality firm may choose to release late, whereas the low-quality firm will prefer to release its product early. History: Anthony Dukes served as the senior editor for this article. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2023.0393 .
- 1 August 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (8) , 4541-4557
Pricing of Vice Goods for Goal-Driven Consumers
Research in psychology shows that consumption goals can help consumers avoid excessive consumption of vice goods and the associated long-term harm. In this paper, we propose a model of self-control with consumption goals and examine how goals moderate the behavior of consumers and the firm’s strategy. We find that consumers’ personal goals lead to a lower price for a less unhealthy product but a higher price for a more unhealthy product. Furthermore, even though personal goals reduce the sales of a product, the firm can be better off if consumers have goals rather than no goals. The improvement in the firm’s profits need not be at consumers’ expense. In fact, consumer welfare increases with personal goals. In some contexts, consumption is not driven by personal goals but shaped by social norms, such as the advice of experts or social groups. We find that, unlike personal goals, normative goals make consumers less sensitive to price and do not always improve consumer welfare. Furthermore, normative goals can hurt the firm’s profits in contexts in which personal goals could improve profits. Finally, we show that our framework with dynamically inconsistent preferences yields results that are consistent with alternative formulations of consumer self-control problems, such as the dual-self model of Thaler and Shefrin and the costly self-control model of Gul and Pesendorfer. This paper was accepted by Duncan Semester, marketing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4567 .
- 1 August 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (8) , 4541-4557
Pricing of Vice Goods for Goal-Driven Consumers
Research in psychology shows that consumption goals can help consumers avoid excessive consumption of vice goods and the associated long-term harm. In this paper, we propose a model of self-control with consumption goals and examine how goals moderate the behavior of consumers and the firm’s strategy. We find that consumers’ personal goals lead to a lower price for a less unhealthy product but a higher price for a more unhealthy product. Furthermore, even though personal goals reduce the sales of a product, the firm can be better off if consumers have goals rather than no goals. The improvement in the firm’s profits need not be at consumers’ expense. In fact, consumer welfare increases with personal goals. In some contexts, consumption is not driven by personal goals but shaped by social norms, such as the advice of experts or social groups. We find that, unlike personal goals, normative goals make consumers less sensitive to price and do not always improve consumer welfare. Furthermore, normative goals can hurt the firm’s profits in contexts in which personal goals could improve profits. Finally, we show that our framework with dynamically inconsistent preferences yields results that are consistent with alternative formulations of consumer self-control problems, such as the dual-self model of Thaler and Shefrin and the costly self-control model of Gul and Pesendorfer. This paper was accepted by Duncan Semester, marketing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4567 .
- 1 May 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 42 (3) , 569-588
Consumer Fairness Concerns and Dynamic Pricing in a Channel
Effect of consumer fairness concerns on wholesale and retail price dynamics and manufacturer and retailer profits.
- 1 May 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 42 (3) , 569-588
Consumer Fairness Concerns and Dynamic Pricing in a Channel
Effect of consumer fairness concerns on wholesale and retail price dynamics and manufacturer and retailer profits.