Alexandre Poirrier
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Alexandre Poirrier has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Laurent Cailleux
Direction Gnrale de lArmement, Bruz, France
3 shared publications- Thomas Clausen
Department of Computer Science, cole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France
3 shared publications - Benjamin Dowling
King's College London
1 shared publication - Felix Günther
IBM Research Europe - Zurich, Rüschlikon, Switzerland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Formal Security of Zero Trust Architectures
Sécurité Formelle des Architectures Zéro Confiance: La sécurité des systèmes d'information repose traditionnellement sur le modèle de sécurité du périmètre, qui compartimentalise le réseau en différents périmètres isolés qui regroupent les ressources. Un système accède à un périmètre en s'authentifiant, et une fois au sein d'un périmètre, il est implicitement considéré comme étant de confiance, jouissant d'un accès non restreint à toutes les ressources de ce périmètre. Cependant, de nombreuses attaques envers les architectures périmétriques ont montré les limites de cette confiance. De plus, la transformation des systèmes d'information, par exemple l'émergence des services en nuage (cloud services), le télétravail ou l'usage de prestataires, a remis en cause la vision d'un réseau monolithique de confiance. Ainsi, un nouveau paradigme de sécurité a émergé, appelé zéro confiance. Fondé sur le principe "ne jamais faire confiance, toujours vérifier", ce paradigme transforme la notion de périmètre, en établissant un ensemble de principes de sécurité reposant sur une autorisation contextuelle et dynamique. Cependant, mettre en œuvre une architecture zéro confiance pose de nombreux défis, en particulier car il n'existe pas de définition claire du paradigme zéro confiance.Dans ce contexte, cette thèse explore comment développer un cadre pratique et formel pour raisonner sur la sécurité des systèmes d'information. Tout d'abord, une étude approfondie du modèle zéro confiance est conduite, puis une taxonomie des technologies et architectures zéro confiance existantes est établie, ce qui permet une compréhension exhaustive du paradigme zéro confiance. Cela mène à la création d'une méthode d'évaluation des architectures, qui permet également d'identifier des lacunes dans la recherche sur le zéro confiance. Cette thèse propose plusieurs contributions pour combler ces lacunes, afin d'améliorer l'état de l'art pour le zéro confiance. Ces améliorations sont intégrées au sein d'un démonstrateur d'architecture zéro confiance, illustrant comment une architecture zéro confiance peut être complémentée par de nouvelles technologies pour améliorer sa maturité. Enfin, cette thèse prend du recul et évalue comment le paradigme zéro confiance répond aux problèmes de sécurité auxquels font face les entreprises, démontrant qu'il n'est pas suffisant seul pour protéger les données et services sensibles.
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Formal Security of Zero Trust Architectures
Sécurité Formelle des Architectures Zéro Confiance: La sécurité des systèmes d'information repose traditionnellement sur le modèle de sécurité du périmètre, qui compartimentalise le réseau en différents périmètres isolés qui regroupent les ressources. Un système accède à un périmètre en s'authentifiant, et une fois au sein d'un périmètre, il est implicitement considéré comme étant de confiance, jouissant d'un accès non restreint à toutes les ressources de ce périmètre. Cependant, de nombreuses attaques envers les architectures périmétriques ont montré les limites de cette confiance. De plus, la transformation des systèmes d'information, par exemple l'émergence des services en nuage (cloud services), le télétravail ou l'usage de prestataires, a remis en cause la vision d'un réseau monolithique de confiance. Ainsi, un nouveau paradigme de sécurité a émergé, appelé zéro confiance. Fondé sur le principe "ne jamais faire confiance, toujours vérifier", ce paradigme transforme la notion de périmètre, en établissant un ensemble de principes de sécurité reposant sur une autorisation contextuelle et dynamique. Cependant, mettre en œuvre une architecture zéro confiance pose de nombreux défis, en particulier car il n'existe pas de définition claire du paradigme zéro confiance.Dans ce contexte, cette thèse explore comment développer un cadre pratique et formel pour raisonner sur la sécurité des systèmes d'information. Tout d'abord, une étude approfondie du modèle zéro confiance est conduite, puis une taxonomie des technologies et architectures zéro confiance existantes est établie, ce qui permet une compréhension exhaustive du paradigme zéro confiance. Cela mène à la création d'une méthode d'évaluation des architectures, qui permet également d'identifier des lacunes dans la recherche sur le zéro confiance. Cette thèse propose plusieurs contributions pour combler ces lacunes, afin d'améliorer l'état de l'art pour le zéro confiance. Ces améliorations sont intégrées au sein d'un démonstrateur d'architecture zéro confiance, illustrant comment une architecture zéro confiance peut être complémentée par de nouvelles technologies pour améliorer sa maturité. Enfin, cette thèse prend du recul et évalue comment le paradigme zéro confiance répond aux problèmes de sécurité auxquels font face les entreprises, démontrant qu'il n'est pas suffisant seul pour protéger les données et services sensibles.
- 21 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Proceedings of the IEEE
- Vol. 113 (1) , 5-39
Is Trust Misplaced? A Zero-Trust Survey
Information technology (IT) security has been, and largely is, based on compartmentalization. To implement compartmentalization, system access privileges are granted depending on the topological location of systems, grouped into perimeters, with network mechanisms (firewalls, VLANs, ) enforcing isolation between perimeters, thus implicitly trusting systems based on their location. However, history has shown that such trust is misplaced. This has led to the emergence of an alternative paradigm, called zero trust. After contextualizing the history of IT and the emergence of zero trust for securing networks, this article presents a taxonomy of zero trust models and architectures, summarizing the goals and core principles of zero trust. Furthermore, an in-depth description of state-of-the-art technologies and methods, for transforming perimeter-based architectures to mature zero-trust architectures, is provided. This article presents a formalization of zero trust and of optimal zero-trust architectures, to which traditional architectures migrate, as well as a method for positioning migrating architectures relative to this ideal of zero trust, with as purpose of enabling a clearer understanding of the benefits and risks induced by a migration to zero trust. Finally, this article analyses the benefits, and drawbacks, of zero trust, focusing on the security properties granted by zero trust, as well as the vulnerabilities introduced.
- 21 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Proceedings of the IEEE
- Vol. 113 (1) , 5-39
Is Trust Misplaced? A Zero-Trust Survey
Information technology (IT) security has been, and largely is, based on compartmentalization. To implement compartmentalization, system access privileges are granted depending on the topological location of systems, grouped into perimeters, with network mechanisms (firewalls, VLANs, ) enforcing isolation between perimeters, thus implicitly trusting systems based on their location. However, history has shown that such trust is misplaced. This has led to the emergence of an alternative paradigm, called zero trust. After contextualizing the history of IT and the emergence of zero trust for securing networks, this article presents a taxonomy of zero trust models and architectures, summarizing the goals and core principles of zero trust. Furthermore, an in-depth description of state-of-the-art technologies and methods, for transforming perimeter-based architectures to mature zero-trust architectures, is provided. This article presents a formalization of zero trust and of optimal zero-trust architectures, to which traditional architectures migrate, as well as a method for positioning migrating architectures relative to this ideal of zero trust, with as purpose of enabling a clearer understanding of the benefits and risks induced by a migration to zero trust. Finally, this article analyses the benefits, and drawbacks, of zero trust, focusing on the security properties granted by zero trust, as well as the vulnerabilities introduced.
- 14 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Vol. 43 (6) , 2113-2125
Building a Zero Trust Federation
Zero trust is a security paradigm whose fundamental philosophy is that every access to a resource must be explicitly verified, without assuming trust based on origin or identity. In a federated environment composed of multiple domains, ensuring zero trust guarantees for accessing shared resources is a challenge, as information on requesters is generated by their originating domain, yet requires explicit verification from the domain owning the resource. This paper proposes a method for federating zero trust architectures, ensuring the preservation of zero trust guarantees when accessing federated resources. The proposed approach relies on remote attestation, enabling continuous authentication and monitoring of requesters, without requiring intrusive software installations on every device within the federation. Moreover, this paper proposes a proof-of-concept architecture that combines several open-source products, to build an architecture with advanced zero trust maturity level. The feasibility of the proposed federation method is demonstrated through this proof-of-concept, providing detailed information on the federation procedure and its implementation.
- 14 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Vol. 43 (6) , 2113-2125
Building a Zero Trust Federation
Zero trust is a security paradigm whose fundamental philosophy is that every access to a resource must be explicitly verified, without assuming trust based on origin or identity. In a federated environment composed of multiple domains, ensuring zero trust guarantees for accessing shared resources is a challenge, as information on requesters is generated by their originating domain, yet requires explicit verification from the domain owning the resource. This paper proposes a method for federating zero trust architectures, ensuring the preservation of zero trust guarantees when accessing federated resources. The proposed approach relies on remote attestation, enabling continuous authentication and monitoring of requesters, without requiring intrusive software installations on every device within the federation. Moreover, this paper proposes a proof-of-concept architecture that combines several open-source products, to build an architecture with advanced zero trust maturity level. The feasibility of the proposed federation method is demonstrated through this proof-of-concept, providing detailed information on the federation procedure and its implementation.
- Open Access
- 30 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 405-410
An Interoperable Zero Trust Federated Architecture for Tactical Systems
In military and tactical missions, operational needs can require different domains and nations in a coalition to federate, to facilitate sharing of resource between domains. On the other hand, data and services need to be protected against unauthorized access. The zero trust paradigm provides principles for securing data and services, based on fine-grain compartmentalization of resources and least-privileged access policies. In zero trust architectures, every access to a resource is verified, without relying on implicit trust between the requester and the resource. However, state-of-the-art federation procedures weaken the zero trust security guarantees, as information on requesters, belonging to one domain, cannot be verified by another domain offering a resource. Therefore, access inherently relies on trust between domains, which contradicts zero trust principles.This paper presents a novel technique to create a zero trust federation, in which every access to a resource is explicitly verified, without trusting federation partners. In particular, due to the power constraints on devices composing tactical architectures, the presented solution does not require invasive software to be installed in requester devices.
- 30 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 405-410
Open AccessAn Interoperable Zero Trust Federated Architecture for Tactical Systems
In military and tactical missions, operational needs can require different domains and nations in a coalition to federate, to facilitate sharing of resource between domains. On the other hand, data and services need to be protected against unauthorized access. The zero trust paradigm provides principles for securing data and services, based on fine-grain compartmentalization of resources and least-privileged access policies. In zero trust architectures, every access to a resource is verified, without relying on implicit trust between the requester and the resource. However, state-of-the-art federation procedures weaken the zero trust security guarantees, as information on requesters, belonging to one domain, cannot be verified by another domain offering a resource. Therefore, access inherently relies on trust between domains, which contradicts zero trust principles.This paper presents a novel technique to create a zero trust federation, in which every access to a resource is explicitly verified, without trusting federation partners. In particular, due to the power constraints on devices composing tactical architectures, the presented solution does not require invasive software to be installed in requester devices.
- 22 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 361-381
Continuous Authentication in Secure Messaging
- 22 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 361-381
Continuous Authentication in Secure Messaging