Junjiao Liu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Junjiao Liu has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Limin Sun
Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications - Guangjun Wu
Chinese Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication - Hong Li
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Hui Wen
State Key Laboratory of Polymer Science and Technology, Changchun Institute of Applied Chemistry
1 shared publication - Jiawei Sun
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication - Jiawei Sun
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 393-406
HINCDG: Multi-Meta-Path Graph Auto-Encoders for Mining of Weak Association Malicious Domains
- 30 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 393-406
HINCDG: Multi-Meta-Path Graph Auto-Encoders for Mining of Weak Association Malicious Domains
- 21 December 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 19 (3) , 2054-2069
ShadowPLCs: A Novel Scheme for Remote Detection of Industrial Process Control Attacks
Industrial Control System (ICS) security has become increasingly important as attacks targeting ICSs are more prominent. Although many off-the-shelf industrial network intrusion detection mechanisms have been presented in the past, attackers have always found unique disguisable ways to bypass detections and disrupt actual industrial control processes. To mitigate this deficiency, we present a novel scheme for the detection of industrial process control attacks, called SHADOWPLCS. Specifically, the scheme first automatically analyzes the PLC control code, then extracts key parameters of the PLCs including valid register addresses, valid range of values, and control logic rules as a basis for evaluating attacks. The attack behavior is detected in real-time from different perspectives through active communication with PLCs and passive monitoring of the network traffic. We implemented a prototype system with Siemens S7-300 series PLCs as a case study. Our scheme was evaluated using two Siemens S7-300 PLCs deployed on a gas pipeline network platform. Experiments demonstrate that the presented scheme can accurately detect process control attacks in real-time without affecting the normal operations of PLCs. Compared with the other four representative detection models, our scheme has better detection performance with detection accuracy of 97.3%.
- 21 December 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 19 (3) , 2054-2069
ShadowPLCs: A Novel Scheme for Remote Detection of Industrial Process Control Attacks
Industrial Control System (ICS) security has become increasingly important as attacks targeting ICSs are more prominent. Although many off-the-shelf industrial network intrusion detection mechanisms have been presented in the past, attackers have always found unique disguisable ways to bypass detections and disrupt actual industrial control processes. To mitigate this deficiency, we present a novel scheme for the detection of industrial process control attacks, called SHADOWPLCS. Specifically, the scheme first automatically analyzes the PLC control code, then extracts key parameters of the PLCs including valid register addresses, valid range of values, and control logic rules as a basis for evaluating attacks. The attack behavior is detected in real-time from different perspectives through active communication with PLCs and passive monitoring of the network traffic. We implemented a prototype system with Siemens S7-300 series PLCs as a case study. Our scheme was evaluated using two Siemens S7-300 PLCs deployed on a gas pipeline network platform. Experiments demonstrate that the presented scheme can accurately detect process control attacks in real-time without affecting the normal operations of PLCs. Compared with the other four representative detection models, our scheme has better detection performance with detection accuracy of 97.3%.