YXYang Xu

Yang Xu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yang Xu has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Implementing Target‐Based Deferred Payments in Crowdfunding: A Signaling Perspective

    by Jiancheng Lyu, Yang Xu, Mabel C. Chou

    In reward‐based crowdfunding, asymmetric information about product quality can hinder both fundraising success and post‐campaign sales. To mitigate this problem, Belavina (2020) introduces a target‐based deferred payment mechanism, which withholds any funds raised above a prespecified funding target until the creator delivers the promised product to backers. This paper develops a game‐theoretic signaling model to analyze how this mechanism influences strategic behavior in crowdfunding campaigns. The analysis reveals that target‐based deferred payments not only lower the signaling costs for high‐quality creators but also reshape their optimal signaling strategies. Specifically, when the fixed setup cost of producing a high‐quality product is relatively low, high‐quality creators optimally signal their type by offering low reward prices. Conversely, when the fixed setup cost is high, setting a high funding target becomes the dominant separating strategy. The paper further examines alternative formulations of the deferred payment mechanism and offers practical guidance for creators on designing campaigns that credibly signal product quality.

  • Open Access

    Sustainable Trade Credit Access: The Role of Digital Transformation Under the Resource Dependence Theory

    by Yang Xu, Yun Che, Xu Tian, Shuai Zhang, Yu Zhang

    This paper constructs a two-way fixed effects model using data from 4623 Chinese A-share listed enterprises from 2011 to 2022, confirming that firm digital transformation can enhance access to sustainable trade credit. Specifically, for every 1% increase in the standard deviation of digital transformation, the trade credit obtained by enterprises increases by 2.14% in relation to their average value. We employed instrumental variable (IV) and propensity score matching (PSM) methods, utilizing the Broadband China pilot policy as a quasi-natural experiment to conduct a multi-period propensity score matching-difference in differences (PSM-DID) analysis to address potential issues of reverse causality and sample selection bias. Mechanism analysis indicates that the diversification of supplier structures, R&D innovation, and market share facilitated by digitalization are three main channels. This effect is particularly significant in state-owned enterprises, mature enterprises, and those with higher social trust. Finally, the study also found that the spillover effects of digital transformation encourage client enterprises to allocate credit resources to downstream firms, thereby promoting the sustainable development of supply chain finance. Furthermore, the digital transformation primarily alleviates short-term credit challenges for enterprises and reduces their reliance on bank credit.


  • Culture and effectiveness of distance restriction policies: evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic

    by Yang Xu, Chen Dong, Wenjing Shao

    Natural disasters bring indelible negative impacts to human beings, and people usually adopt somepost hocstrategies to alleviate such impacts. However, the same strategies may have different effects in different countries (or regions), which is rarely paid attention by the academic community. In the context of COVID-19, we examine the effect of distance restriction policies (DRP) on reducing human mobility and thus inhibiting the spread of the virus. By establishing a multi-period difference-in-differences model to analyse the unique panel dataset constructed by 44 countries, we show that DRP does significantly reduce mobility, but the effectiveness varies from country to country. We built a moderating effect model to explain the differences from the cultural perspective and found that DRP can be more effective in reducing human mobility in countries with a lower indulgence index. The results remain robust when different sensitivity analyses are performed. Our conclusions call for governments to adapt their policies to the impact of disasters rather than copy each other.


  • Open Access

    The cost bearing mechanism for advertising in a capital-constrained supply chain

    by Hongping Li, Han Zheng, Yang Xu, Wen Song

    With rising market competition, increasing numbers of firms are launching advertising to attract customers and promote product sales. The increase in operating costs caused by advertising places greater pressure on small retail businesses that are prone to capital shortages, leading them to seek financing from upstream firms. However, in the financing process, upstream and downstream firms may not be able to acquire all of one another’s real information, which inevitably has a significant impact on their operating strategies. By constructing a Stackelberg game, this paper studies the effects of information asymmetry on the retailer’s initial capital and the manufacturer’s financing rate on their advertising strategies. We find that in the symmetric information scenario, when the advertising cost coefficient is low, manufacturer advertising is the superior strategy and increases the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits and social welfare; when it is moderate, retailer advertising is the superior policy; but when it is high, retailer advertising is more beneficial for the manufacturer’s profit and social welfare but is more unfavorable for the retailer’s profit. In addition, information asymmetry on the manufacturer’s financing rate affects the advertising strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer, but information asymmetry on the retailer’s initial capital fails. Additionally, we further extend the model to the Nash game scenario and cooperative advertising scenario and draw some different conclusions. This study contributes to the literature by analyzing the advertising strategies of the retailer and the manufacturer with asymmetric financing information, and guides the design of advertising strategies for companies in practice.


  • Third‐party logistics firm's technology investment and financing options in platform‐based supply chain with 4PL service

    by Gongbing Bi, Fuli Shen, Yang Xu

    In practice, capital‐constrained third‐party logistics (3PL) firms usually obtain bank financing (BF) to invest in logistics technology to enhance the consumer shopping experience. The emergence of financial innovation has prompted the adoption of alternative financing modes by 3PLs, including e‐commerce platform financing (EPF) and fourth‐party logistics financing (4PF). To clarify the differences among the three financing modes at the operational management level, we develop a Stackelberg game model to capture the strategic interactions between the 3PL and creditors. We examine a platform‐based supply chain where a manufacturer sells products through an e‐commerce platform to consumers, with the logistics services for the supply chain provided by the 3PL and fourth‐party logistics (4PL) firms. The analysis results reveal that the equilibrium interest rates under EPF and 4PF share a similar pattern regarding the logistics service cost coefficient, the commission rate, and the 4PL service fee. The difference is that under EPF (4PF), the logistics service level increases in the commission rate (4PL service fee) but decreases under the other financing strategy. Furthermore, the 3PL is inclined to invest in logistics technology only when the fixed investment cost is low, and these financing modes are complementary rather than alternative. The 3PL and manufacturer can benefit from 4PF (BF) when the logistics service cost coefficient is large and the market size is small (large); otherwise, EPF can enhance their profits. We also find that when the opportunity costs of capital are homogeneous, both the 4PL and the platform are consistently willing to act as financiers themselves. However, when considering heterogeneity in the opportunity costs of capital, they may be reluctant to provide financing. Each financing mode may achieve Pareto improvements under specific conditions. Finally, we also analyze the impact of technology R&D risks and endogenous 4PL service fee, yielding some valuable insights.


  • Platform contract selection and coordination contract design in reward-based crowdfunding

    by Yang Xu, Qiang Zhou, Xu Wang, Hongping Li

    As a new financing method, crowdfunding has alleviated the capital pressure for start-ups, and has attracted extensive attention of scholars. As an intermediary, crowdfunding platforms obtain benefits from providing services. However, the way of charging commission fees still remains a problem for platforms. This paper investigates the impacts of three service contracts, i.e., revenue sharing contract, per-unit fee contract, and fixed fee contract on the creator and platform. Using backward induction, we derive equilibrium results and get some conclusions. First, we find that under fixed fee contract, due to the trade-off between commission fee and crowdfunding success probability, the platform can only make decisions according to first-order conditions, and get partial profits from the creator. This contradicts the traditional view that the fixed fee contract allows leaders to get all the follower's profits in a stackelberg game. Further, we find that compared with revenue sharing contract and per-unit fee contract, the fixed fee contract is mostly although, not always worse (better) for the platform and system (the creator). Third, in the case of consumer homogeneity, we prove the equivalence of revenue sharing contract and per unit fee contract. However, we find that the efficiency of revenue sharing contract decreases when quality is endogenous, while when consumers are heterogeneous, the advantage of per unit fee contract for the platform decreases. In addition, we design a two-part tariff contract and prove that it can achieve coordination when the platform bears partial fixed cost. The two-part tariff contract can simultaneously improve the benefits of all parties with the appropriate parameters.


  • Pricing strategy and product quality design with platform-investment

    by Xiujing Dang, Yang Xu, Gongbing Bi, Lei Qin

    With the development of business, more consumers are quality sensitive and improving the product quality becomes particularly important. We mainly discuss two investment strategies: retailer-investment and platform-investment. Compared with non-investment case, only if consumer sensitivity is not too high, it is profitable for the retailer to select retailer-investment. When both retailer-investment and platform-investment are viable, the choice of investment mechanism depends on the profit-sharing ratio. Particularly, if the ratio is within a certain range, the optimal investment strategy is platform-investment, achieving a triple-win outcome. Besides, to effectively alleviate the contradiction between the retailer's moral hazard problem and the sustainable value-added effect of platform-investment, we further research the contract term. These results give us some meaningful management inspirations in investment mechanism.