Jean-Baptiste Tondji
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jean-Baptiste Tondji has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Roland Pongou
8 shared publicationsBertrand Tchantcho
2 shared publicationsGhislain Herman Demeze-Jouatsa
Stylink Gmbh, Münster, Germany
2 shared publications- Maroula Khraiche
Dept. of Economics, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg, Texas, USA
2 shared publications - André Varella Mollick
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
1 shared publication - Armando R. Lopez-Velasco
Department of Economics The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Edinburg Texas USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Authenticity considerations in strategic games
We develop a framework in which individuals value material outcomes and authenticity. Authenticity has two components: selfcongruence, the alignment between actions and underlying values, and recognition accuracy, the extent to which observers correctly interpret that alignment. Self-congruence can operate as an internal commitment device, while recognition creates belief-dependent incentives. We characterize equilibrium robustness, large-stakes limits, and welfare effects. An application to apologies shows how costs and beliefs determine whether actions reveal motives and why observed behavior alone need not identify its informational content or welfare consequences.
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAuthenticity considerations in strategic games
We develop a framework in which individuals value material outcomes and authenticity. Authenticity has two components: selfcongruence, the alignment between actions and underlying values, and recognition accuracy, the extent to which observers correctly interpret that alignment. Self-congruence can operate as an internal commitment device, while recognition creates belief-dependent incentives. We characterize equilibrium robustness, large-stakes limits, and welfare effects. An application to apologies shows how costs and beliefs determine whether actions reveal motives and why observed behavior alone need not identify its informational content or welfare consequences.
- Open Access
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Competition with Shared Profits: A Theory of Coopetition
Competition and cooperation often coexist in modern markets, yet economic theory has largely treated them separately. We develop a general theory of coopetition in which firms compete in output while sharing realized industry profits through a contribution-based rule grounded in efficiency, productivity, and marginal responsiveness. Embedding this rule into a differentiated-product Cournot oligopoly yields a pure-strategy equilibrium---the coopetition equilibrium---under minimal assumptions, without standard restrictions on demand or costs. We identify a reciprocal externalities condition under which the coopetition and Cournot equilibria coincide, implying that Cournot competition is robust to contribution-based redistribution of industry profits. Otherwise, firms maximize their contributions to industry revenue, so coopetition may either intensify or soften competition depending on revenue externalities. We further show that reciprocal externalities are equivalent to linear inverse demand in homogeneous-good markets. Finally, when firms' actions exhibit strategic complementarities, the contribution-based allocation belongs to the oligopolistic core---a new solution concept capturing profit allocations that are immune to ex post renegotiation.
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCompetition with Shared Profits: A Theory of Coopetition
Competition and cooperation often coexist in modern markets, yet economic theory has largely treated them separately. We develop a general theory of coopetition in which firms compete in output while sharing realized industry profits through a contribution-based rule grounded in efficiency, productivity, and marginal responsiveness. Embedding this rule into a differentiated-product Cournot oligopoly yields a pure-strategy equilibrium---the coopetition equilibrium---under minimal assumptions, without standard restrictions on demand or costs. We identify a reciprocal externalities condition under which the coopetition and Cournot equilibria coincide, implying that Cournot competition is robust to contribution-based redistribution of industry profits. Otherwise, firms maximize their contributions to industry revenue, so coopetition may either intensify or soften competition depending on revenue externalities. We further show that reciprocal externalities are equivalent to linear inverse demand in homogeneous-good markets. Finally, when firms' actions exhibit strategic complementarities, the contribution-based allocation belongs to the oligopolistic core---a new solution concept capturing profit allocations that are immune to ex post renegotiation.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Legitimacy-Sensitive Technological Competition
We investigate how consumer perceptions of the social acceptability of technological implementation and organizational governance practices shape firms' incentives to adopt advanced technologies. Consumers care about prices, productive efficiency, and whether technological transition is implemented through transparent, accountable, and worker-inclusive organizational arrangements. Firms pursue innovation to escape competition, but socially contested technologies may face legitimacy discounts that reduce innovation rents. Acting as complements under mild conditions, governance and competition jointly determine innovation incentives, market outcomes, and welfare. We illustrate the theory using firm-level data on AI-related disclosure, organizational legitimacy, and financial performance for publicly traded U.S. firms. Consistent with the model's predictions, firms with stronger legitimacypreserving organizational arrangements exhibit more favorable economic outcomes during AI-related technological transformation, particularly along labor-relational dimensions. The empirical patterns suggest that stronger governance and organizational legitimacy may substantially increase the economic value of technological innovation.
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLegitimacy-Sensitive Technological Competition
We investigate how consumer perceptions of the social acceptability of technological implementation and organizational governance practices shape firms' incentives to adopt advanced technologies. Consumers care about prices, productive efficiency, and whether technological transition is implemented through transparent, accountable, and worker-inclusive organizational arrangements. Firms pursue innovation to escape competition, but socially contested technologies may face legitimacy discounts that reduce innovation rents. Acting as complements under mild conditions, governance and competition jointly determine innovation incentives, market outcomes, and welfare. We illustrate the theory using firm-level data on AI-related disclosure, organizational legitimacy, and financial performance for publicly traded U.S. firms. Consistent with the model's predictions, firms with stronger legitimacypreserving organizational arrangements exhibit more favorable economic outcomes during AI-related technological transformation, particularly along labor-relational dimensions. The empirical patterns suggest that stronger governance and organizational legitimacy may substantially increase the economic value of technological innovation.
- 6 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 126
Rationing to avoid conflict: A centralized assignment problem
- 6 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 126
Rationing to avoid conflict: A centralized assignment problem
- Open Access
- 6 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Competition with Shared Profits: A Theory of Coopetition
Competition and cooperation often coexist in modern markets, yet economic theory has largely treated them separately. We develop a general theory of coopetition in which firms compete in output while sharing realized industry profits through a contribution-based rule grounded in efficiency, productivity, and marginal responsiveness. Embedding this rule into a differentiated-product Cournot oligopoly yields a pure-strategy equilibrium - the coopetition equilibrium - under minimal assumptions, without standard restrictions on demand or costs. We identify a reciprocal externalities condition under which the coopetition and Cournot equilibria coincide, implying that Cournot competition is robust to contribution-based redistribution of industry profits. Otherwise, firms maximize their contributions to industry revenue, so coopetition may either intensify or soften competition depending on revenue externalities. We further show that reciprocal externalities are equivalent to linear inverse demand in homogeneous-good markets. Finally, when firms' actions exhibit strategic complementarities, the contribution-based allocation belongs to the oligopolistic core - a new solution concept capturing profit allocations that are immune to ex post renegotiation.
- 6 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCompetition with Shared Profits: A Theory of Coopetition
Competition and cooperation often coexist in modern markets, yet economic theory has largely treated them separately. We develop a general theory of coopetition in which firms compete in output while sharing realized industry profits through a contribution-based rule grounded in efficiency, productivity, and marginal responsiveness. Embedding this rule into a differentiated-product Cournot oligopoly yields a pure-strategy equilibrium - the coopetition equilibrium - under minimal assumptions, without standard restrictions on demand or costs. We identify a reciprocal externalities condition under which the coopetition and Cournot equilibria coincide, implying that Cournot competition is robust to contribution-based redistribution of industry profits. Otherwise, firms maximize their contributions to industry revenue, so coopetition may either intensify or soften competition depending on revenue externalities. We further show that reciprocal externalities are equivalent to linear inverse demand in homogeneous-good markets. Finally, when firms' actions exhibit strategic complementarities, the contribution-based allocation belongs to the oligopolistic core - a new solution concept capturing profit allocations that are immune to ex post renegotiation.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Authenticity Considerations in Strategic Games
We develop a framework in which individuals value both material outcomes and authenticity. The latter is captured through selfcongruence (the alignment between actions and underlying values) and social recognition (the extent to which others correctly infer that alignment). Self-congruence can act as an internal commitment device that alters equilibrium behavior, while recognition concerns independently affect incentives. Our analysis identifies welfare effects arising from both equilibrium selection and the accurate recognition of motives. The model provides a tractable way to incorporate authenticity into strategic interaction.
- 1 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAuthenticity Considerations in Strategic Games
We develop a framework in which individuals value both material outcomes and authenticity. The latter is captured through selfcongruence (the alignment between actions and underlying values) and social recognition (the extent to which others correctly infer that alignment). Self-congruence can act as an internal commitment device that alters equilibrium behavior, while recognition concerns independently affect incentives. Our analysis identifies welfare effects arising from both equilibrium selection and the accurate recognition of motives. The model provides a tractable way to incorporate authenticity into strategic interaction.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
AI Adoption, Externalities, and Digital Sovereignty
We develop a tractable model of technology adoption in which firms benefit from productivity gains while generating labor displacement and non-market externalities. A regulator designs a technology tax to align private and social incentives. We show that laissez-faire leads to excessive adoption, whereas a Pigouvian tax decentralizes the socially optimal level. Worker responses, primarily through skill upgrading and retraining, shape both equilibrium outcomes and policy effectiveness. Extensions highlight how regulatory oversight, funded by tax revenues, can mitigate damages and promote optimal adoption. The framework provides a tractable setting to study technology policy in environments characterized by uncertainty, distributional tensions, and scale-dependent risks.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAI Adoption, Externalities, and Digital Sovereignty
We develop a tractable model of technology adoption in which firms benefit from productivity gains while generating labor displacement and non-market externalities. A regulator designs a technology tax to align private and social incentives. We show that laissez-faire leads to excessive adoption, whereas a Pigouvian tax decentralizes the socially optimal level. Worker responses, primarily through skill upgrading and retraining, shape both equilibrium outcomes and policy effectiveness. Extensions highlight how regulatory oversight, funded by tax revenues, can mitigate damages and promote optimal adoption. The framework provides a tractable setting to study technology policy in environments characterized by uncertainty, distributional tensions, and scale-dependent risks.
- Open Access
- 14 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Growth at the Border: Recent Investment and Job Creation in the Rio Grande Valley
In this brief, we examine the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) as a deeply integrated cross-border economy shaped by manufacturing complementarities with northern Mexico and by evolving patterns of investment, employment, and wages. Recent growth has generated substantial job creation, but employment remains concentrated in comparatively low-paying service occupations. At the same time, emerging investments in industry and technology point to gradual economic diversification and the potential expansion of higher-value-added activities in the region.
- 14 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGrowth at the Border: Recent Investment and Job Creation in the Rio Grande Valley
In this brief, we examine the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) as a deeply integrated cross-border economy shaped by manufacturing complementarities with northern Mexico and by evolving patterns of investment, employment, and wages. Recent growth has generated substantial job creation, but employment remains concentrated in comparatively low-paying service occupations. At the same time, emerging investments in industry and technology point to gradual economic diversification and the potential expansion of higher-value-added activities in the region.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The use (and misuse) of tariffs in North America: A new trade war?
Trade wars may have started. At the time this report was published, the Trump administration had threatened, then paused, a 25 percent tariff on Canadian and Mexican goods. Before the pause, Mexico and Canada were preparing retaliatory tariffs. After the pause, Trump ordered a 25 percent import tax on all steel and aluminum entering the United States (US) to start in March 2025 and announced a plan for reciprocal tariffs on US trading partners. In this brief, we document the different perspectives and economic consequences of North American trade wars and beyond.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe use (and misuse) of tariffs in North America: A new trade war?
Trade wars may have started. At the time this report was published, the Trump administration had threatened, then paused, a 25 percent tariff on Canadian and Mexican goods. Before the pause, Mexico and Canada were preparing retaliatory tariffs. After the pause, Trump ordered a 25 percent import tax on all steel and aluminum entering the United States (US) to start in March 2025 and announced a plan for reciprocal tariffs on US trading partners. In this brief, we document the different perspectives and economic consequences of North American trade wars and beyond.