WHWei He

Wei He

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Wei He has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • WhistleBlower: A System-Level Empirical Study on RowHammer

    by Wei He, Zhi Zhang, Yueqiang Cheng, Wenhao Wang, Wei Song, Yansong Gao, Qifei Zhang, Kang Li, Dongxi Liu, Surya Nepal

    With frequent software-induced activations on DRAM rows, bit flips can occur on their physically adjacent rows (i.e., RowHammer). Existing studies leverage FPGA platforms to characterize RowHammer, which have identified key factors that contribute to RowHammer bit flips, e.g., data pattern. As the FPGA-based studies have removed the interference of the OS and the memory controller, their findings on the identified contributing factors do not always work as reported in a real-world computing system, resulting in negative effects on system-level RowHammer attacks and defenses. In this paper, we carry out a system-level empirical study on factors from both the software side and the DRAM side that contribute to RowHammer. We conduct the study on 33 DRAM modules including both DDR4 and DDR3, with 292 DRAM chips from various vendors. Our experimental results from the software side show that some prior findings about existing factors are inconsistent with our observations, thus not applicable to a real-world system. Also, we contribute to identifying one new factor that effectively affects RowHammer bit flips. Our DRAM-side results identify three types of new contributing factors and indicate that DRAM modules are more vulnerable if they achieve better performance and lower power consumption. Particularly, Intel XMP, intended for improving DRAM performance, might be abused for RowHammer attacks.


  • Implicit Hammer: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Rowhammer Through Implicit Accesses

    by Zhi Zhang, Wei He, Yueqiang Cheng, Wenhao Wang, Yansong Gao, Dongxi Liu, Kang Li, Surya Nepal, Anmin Fu, Yi Zou

    Rowhammer is a hardware vulnerability in DRAM memory, where repeated access to hammer rows can induce bit flips in neighboring victim rows . Being a hardware vulnerability, rowhammer bypasses all the system memory protection, allowing adversaries to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of data. Rowhammer attacks have shown to enable privilege escalation, sandbox escape, and cryptographic key disclosures. A key requirement of all existing rowhammer attacks is that an attacker must have access to at least part of an exploitable hammer row. We term such rowhammer attacks as Explicit Hammer. Recently, several proposals suggest leveraging the spatial proximity between the accessed hammer rows and the location of the victim rows for a defense against rowhammer. These all aim to deny the attacker's permission to access hammer rows near sensitive data, thus defeating explicit hammer-based attacks. In this paper, we question the core assumption underlying these defenses. We present Implicit Hammer, a confused-deputy attack that causes accesses to hammer rows that the attacker is not allowed to access. It is a paradigm shift in rowhammer attacks since it crosses privilege boundary to stealthily rowhammer an inaccessible row by implicit DRAM accesses. Such accesses are achieved by abusing inherent features of modern hardware and/or software. We propose a generic model to rigorously formalize the necessary conditions to initiate implicit hammer and explicit hammer, respectively. Compared to explicit hammer, implicit hammer can defeat the advanced software-only defenses, stealthy in hiding itself and hard to be mitigated. To demonstrate the practicality of implicit hammer, we have created two implicit hammer's instances, called PThammer and SyscallHammer. Specifically, PThammer exploits the page-table-walk process of modern processors, inducing the processor to generate frequent accesses to protected memory locations. SyscallHammer exploits system call handler routine of OS kernels to implicitly access kernel memory.