HZHang Zhang

Hang Zhang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Hang Zhang has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    A Situation-Based Adaptive Defense Framework For IIoT Using Hierarchical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

    by Xingke Zhu, Zhiyong Zhang, Xinghui Zhu, Kejing Zhao, Hang Zhang, Zhongya Zhang

    The deep convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) exposes Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems to complex cross-layer attacks. However, traditional defense methods are mostly designed for a single domain and rely on static or rule-based mechanisms, making them ineffective in capturing cross-layer attack evolution and coordinating adaptive responses. Therefore, this article proposes a Situation-Based Hierarchical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (Situ-HMARL) adaptive defense framework, which formulates defense strategies based on real-time global industrial situations and proactively enhances the resilience of IIoT systems. Firstly, a three-stage industrial situational awareness architecture is proposed to continuously fuse heterogeneous data from the IT and OT layers into a structured Global Industrial Situation Vector (GISV), which serves as a unified global observation space for defense decision-making. Secondly, a lightweight Moving Target Defense (MTD) mechanism is designed to adaptively trigger IP-hopping based on the global industrial situation, thereby reducing overhead while preserving system availability. On this basis, a two-level Hierarchical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (HMARL) framework is developed to decouple perception, decision-making, and enforcement. Low-level agents perform real-time local situational perception and execute defense actions, while a high-level agent reasons over the global industrial situation to generate coordinated defense strategies that minimize system losses. Extensive experiments conducted on the Cyber Operations Research Gym (CybORG) platform validate that the proposed framework effectively mitigates cross-layer attacks and significantly improves the availability of IIoT systems.


  • A Multi-Point Collaborative Defense Method Against Unknown Attacks for Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems

    by Yue Wang, Zhiyong Zhang, Zhongya Zhang, Hang Zhang

    As industrial cyber-physical systems (CPS) become increasingly interconnected and attack methods diversify, industrial equipment remains vulnerable to unknown attacks, potentially causing severe consequences. Traditional single-point defense solutions struggle to counter rapidly emerging unknown threats and fail to meet the practical security and reliability demands of industrial environments. To overcome this limitation, this paper proposes a multi-point collaborative defense framework for unknown attacks for CPS. For single-point defense, a unified unknown attack detection model is deployed to perform independent detection and identification, completing preliminary judgment. In multi-point scenarios, a blockchain-based collaborative defense framework is constructed. When any local detection model identifies an unknown attack, it will initiate a collaborative request via the blockchain. Other collaborative nodes will independently verify the attack and generate a final verdict. A dynamic trust evaluation mechanism has also been designed to assess the trustworthiness and weighting of nodes, thereby effectively suppressing interference from malicious nodes and ensuring the robustness of the collaborative process. Meanwhile, through the model's self-evolution mechanism, continuously optimize the local detection model by using collaboratively validated unknown attack samples to achieve model updates. Experimental results demonstrate that this framework effectively defends against unknown attacks, significantly enhancing detection capabilities and overall system defense levels.


  • A Novel Quantitative Risk Assessment Model for Industrial Control Systems Integrating the Cyber–Physical Domain

    by Ying Zhou, Zhiyong Zhang, Kefeng Fan, Mingyan Wang, Ke Cheng, Zhongya Zhang, Hang Zhang

    The tight cyber–physical coupling in industrial control system (ICS) makes it vulnerable to attacks, where attackers can exploit system vulnerabilities to cross domain boundaries, causing significant losses. A novel quantitative risk assessment framework for ICS is proposed, integrating both the cyber domain and the physical domain to address potential risk assessment issues. First, an entropy-weighted technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution method introducing triangular fuzzy numbers is proposed to solve the vulnerability index for multiattribute decision making to obtain the a prior probability. Second, the risk propagation mechanism of complex network topology and device interaction under ICS was studied, and the posterior probability model based on susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered was designed to dynamically capture the propagation characteristics of risks in the network. Finally, the safety loss level is defined based on standard criteria to achieve quantitative risk assessment of ICS. The proposed risk assessment model was experimentally validated on the SWaT testbed, with results confirming its feasibility and effectiveness.


  • Open Access

    Countering AC Load Redistribution Attacks in Smart Grids: The Role of Moving Target Defense in a Defense-Attack Game

    by Bo Liu, Hongyu Wu, Hang Zhang

    Load redistribution attacks (LRAs) are a type of false data injection attack that disrupts the normal operation of the power grid by redistributing load. While most LRAs in the literature are based on the DC model, this paper proposes an LRA in the AC model using incomplete network information. To defend against the proposed LRA, the paper proposes using Moving Target Defense (MTD) to actively invalidate the attackers’ knowledge. A zero-sum defense-attack game is formulated between MTD and LRA to select an MTD operating range optimally, considering the trade-off between attack detection effectiveness and the extra operation cost. The paper defines a new payoff function as an expected incremental operation cost, consisting of the defense cost, attack cost, and attack mitigation capability. A Nash Equilibrium of the game provides optimal strategies for selecting the MTD operating range. Simulation results on the modified IEEE 14-bus system demonstrate the effectiveness of MTD in detecting the proposed LRA. The paper shows that MTD not only detects ongoing LRAs but also prevents the construction of such attacks by using the proposed game theoretical framework. The proposed approach highlights the role of MTD in enhancing the cybersecurity of power grids against LRAs.


  • Matrix-Completion-Based False Data Injection Attacks Against Machine Learning Detectors

    by Bo Liu, Hongyu Wu, Qihui Yang, Hang Zhang, Yajing Liu, Yingchen Zhang

    False data injection (FDI) attacks can manipulate power system measurements, leading to system economic losses and security issues. Although machine-learning (ML) detectors can effectively detect FDI attacks, the current methods used to construct FDI attacks do not take into account the presence of ML detectors. To tackle this problem, we propose novel convex matrix-completion-based FDI (MC-FDI) attacks on DC and AC power flow models from an attacker’s perspective, accounting for the temporal correlation between compromised and historical measurements. The proposed attacks minimize the nuclear norm of the compromised measurement matrix to make the compromised measurement consistent with the historical measurements, and also maximize the L1-norm of the incremental voltage angle to ensure a sufficient negative impact on the power system operation. Moving target defense (MTD) is proposed to detect the proposed MC-FDI attacks from the defender’s standpoint. The idea is to actively change the line impedance to corrupt the spatial and temporal correlation of the compromised measurements in the MC-FDI attacks. Numerical results on the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems show the stealthiness of the proposed attacks to both the Chi-square detector and ML detectors as well as the efficacy of MTD in detecting the MC-FDI attacks.


  • Voltage Stability Constrained Moving Target Defense Against Net Load Redistribution Attacks

    by Hang Zhang, Bo Liu, Xuebo Liu, Anil Pahwa, Hongyu Wu

    Moving target defense (MTD) using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices is a promising defense strategy to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against the power system state estimation. However, all existing studies myopically perturb the reactance of D-FACTS lines without considering the system voltage stability. In this paper, we first illustrate voltage instability induced by MTDs in a three-bus system. To address this issue, we further propose a novel MTD framework that explicitly considers system voltage stability by using continuation power flow and voltage stability indices. We mathematically derive the sensitivity matrix of voltage stability index to line impedance, on which an optimization problem for maximizing voltage stability index is formulated. This framework is tested on the IEEE 14-bus and the IEEE 118-bus transmission systems, in which net load redistribution attacks are launched by sophisticated attackers. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed framework in circumventing the voltage instability while maintaining the detection effectiveness of MTD. We conduct case studies with and without the proposed framework under different MTD planning and operational methods. The impacts of the proposed two methods on attack detection effectiveness and system economic metrics are also revealed.