Yonghae Kim
Research Subjects
Yonghae Kim has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hyesoon Kim
Georgia Institute of Technology
3 shared publications - Anurag Kar
School of Computer Science, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
2 shared publications - Jaekyu Lee
ARM Research, Austin, TX, USA
2 shared publications - Jaewon Lee
School of Computer Science, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
2 shared publications Dongwook Kang
Cyber Security Research Division, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication- Euna Kim
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 May 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 13, 86308-86322
Efficient Hardware-Assisted Heap Memory Safety for Embedded RISC-V Systems
In recent years, memory safety issues in embedded environments have garnered significant attention, with spatial and temporal memory violations in heap memory emerging as critical security threats. To address these challenges, this paper proposes an efficient tag-based memory verification system specifically designed for RISC-V in-order processors. The proposed system integrates a Heap Check Cache (HC-Cache), FIFO Buffer, and Store Head Buffer/Clear Head Buffer (SHB/CHB) with a replay mechanism at the hardware level to minimize performance overhead. On the software side, it incorporates extended RISC-V ISA instructions and a modified Newlib C library to automate metadata management and tag generation without requiring additional modifications to user applications. The system was implemented on an FPGA platform using the Xilinx VC707 board. The implementation results indicate a 16.07% increase in LUTs and a 58.25% increase in Flip-Flops, while maintaining minimal overhead for BRAM (0.66%) and LUTRAM (0.99%). Performance evaluations using workloads such as Mibench, Olden, and SPEC2006 demonstrated a significantly lower average performance overhead compared to previous work. Furthermore, verification using the NIST Juliet Test Suite 1.3 revealed that the system successfully detected 100% of heap-related vulnerabilities, including 1,924 heap-based overflows, 803 double-free errors, and 394 use-after-free errors. These results demonstrate that the proposed system provides high security and performance efficiency, even in resource-constrained embedded environments.
- 16 May 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 13, 86308-86322
Open AccessEfficient Hardware-Assisted Heap Memory Safety for Embedded RISC-V Systems
In recent years, memory safety issues in embedded environments have garnered significant attention, with spatial and temporal memory violations in heap memory emerging as critical security threats. To address these challenges, this paper proposes an efficient tag-based memory verification system specifically designed for RISC-V in-order processors. The proposed system integrates a Heap Check Cache (HC-Cache), FIFO Buffer, and Store Head Buffer/Clear Head Buffer (SHB/CHB) with a replay mechanism at the hardware level to minimize performance overhead. On the software side, it incorporates extended RISC-V ISA instructions and a modified Newlib C library to automate metadata management and tag generation without requiring additional modifications to user applications. The system was implemented on an FPGA platform using the Xilinx VC707 board. The implementation results indicate a 16.07% increase in LUTs and a 58.25% increase in Flip-Flops, while maintaining minimal overhead for BRAM (0.66%) and LUTRAM (0.99%). Performance evaluations using workloads such as Mibench, Olden, and SPEC2006 demonstrated a significantly lower average performance overhead compared to previous work. Furthermore, verification using the NIST Juliet Test Suite 1.3 revealed that the system successfully detected 100% of heap-related vulnerabilities, including 1,924 heap-based overflows, 803 double-free errors, and 394 use-after-free errors. These results demonstrate that the proposed system provides high security and performance efficiency, even in resource-constrained embedded environments.
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 22 (2) , 117-120
Hardware-Assisted Code-Pointer Tagging for Forward-Edge Control-Flow Integrity
Software attacks typically operate by overwriting control data, such as a return address and a function pointer, and hijacking the control flow of a program. To prevent such attacks, a number of control-flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been proposed. Nevertheless, most prior work finds difficulties in serving two ends: performance and security. In particular, protecting forward edges, i.e., indirect calls, remains challenging to solve without trading off one for another. In this work, we propose Code-Pointer Tagging (CPT), a novel dynamic CFI solution combined with cryptographic protection. Our key observation is that a pointer's message authentication code (MAC) can be associated with the pointer's CFI label used for CFI checks. We find that such an approach not only enables a space-efficient control-flow graph (CFG) storage but also achieves highly-efficient CFI checks performed along with implicit pointer authentication. To enable CPT, we implement lightweight compiler and hardware support. We prototype our design in an FPGA-accelerated RISC-V hardware simulation platform and conduct full-system-level evaluations. Our results show that CPT incurs a 1.2% average slowdown on the SPEC CPU C/C++ benchmarks while providing effective layered hardening on forward-edge CFI.
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 22 (2) , 117-120
Hardware-Assisted Code-Pointer Tagging for Forward-Edge Control-Flow Integrity
Software attacks typically operate by overwriting control data, such as a return address and a function pointer, and hijacking the control flow of a program. To prevent such attacks, a number of control-flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been proposed. Nevertheless, most prior work finds difficulties in serving two ends: performance and security. In particular, protecting forward edges, i.e., indirect calls, remains challenging to solve without trading off one for another. In this work, we propose Code-Pointer Tagging (CPT), a novel dynamic CFI solution combined with cryptographic protection. Our key observation is that a pointer's message authentication code (MAC) can be associated with the pointer's CFI label used for CFI checks. We find that such an approach not only enables a space-efficient control-flow graph (CFG) storage but also achieves highly-efficient CFI checks performed along with implicit pointer authentication. To enable CPT, we implement lightweight compiler and hardware support. We prototype our design in an FPGA-accelerated RISC-V hardware simulation platform and conduct full-system-level evaluations. Our results show that CPT incurs a 1.2% average slowdown on the SPEC CPU C/C++ benchmarks while providing effective layered hardening on forward-edge CFI.
- 16 May 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 22 (1) , 53-56
Mitigating Timing-Based NoC Side-Channel Attacks With LLC Remapping
Recent CPU microarchitectural attacks utilize contention over the NoC to mount covert and side-channel attacks on multicore CPUs and leak information from victim applications. We propose NoIR, a dynamic LLC slice selection mechanism using slice remapping to obfuscate interconnect contention patterns. NoIR reduces contention variance by 92.18% and mean IPC degradation due to cache invalidation is limited to 7.38% for SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks for a 1000-access threshold. While previous defenses focused on redesigning the NoC and routing algorithms, we show that a top-down system-level approach can significantly raise the bar for a NoC security vulnerability with minimal modifications to the NoC hardware.
- 16 May 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 22 (1) , 53-56
Mitigating Timing-Based NoC Side-Channel Attacks With LLC Remapping
Recent CPU microarchitectural attacks utilize contention over the NoC to mount covert and side-channel attacks on multicore CPUs and leak information from victim applications. We propose NoIR, a dynamic LLC slice selection mechanism using slice remapping to obfuscate interconnect contention patterns. NoIR reduces contention variance by 92.18% and mean IPC degradation due to cache invalidation is limited to 7.38% for SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks for a 1000-access threshold. While previous defenses focused on redesigning the NoC and routing algorithms, we show that a top-down system-level approach can significantly raise the bar for a NoC security vulnerability with minimal modifications to the NoC hardware.
- Open Access
- 11 June 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-41
Securing GPU via region-based bounds checking
Graphics processing units (GPUs) have become essential general-purpose computing platforms to accelerate a wide range of workloads, such as deep learning, scientific, and high-performance computing (HPC) applications. However, recent memory corruption attacks, such as buffer overflow, exposed security vulnerabilities in GPUs. We demonstrate that out-of-bounds writes are reproducible on an Nvidia GPU, which can enable other security attacks. We propose GPUShield, a hardware-software cooperative region-based bounds-checking mechanism, to improve GPU memory safety for global, local, and heap memory buffers. To achieve effective protection, we update the GPU driver to assign a random but unique ID to each buffer and local variable and store individual bounds information in the bounds table allocated in the global memory. The proposed hardware performs efficient bounds checking by indexing the bounds table with unique IDs. We further reduce the bounds-checking overhead by utilizing compile-time bounds analysis, workgroup/warp-level bounds checking, and GPU-specific address mode. Our performance evaluations show that GPUShield incurs little performance degradation across 88 CUDA benchmarks on the Nvidia GPU architecture and 17 OpenCL benchmarks on the Intel GPU architecture with a marginal hardware overhead.
- 11 June 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-41
Open AccessSecuring GPU via region-based bounds checking
Graphics processing units (GPUs) have become essential general-purpose computing platforms to accelerate a wide range of workloads, such as deep learning, scientific, and high-performance computing (HPC) applications. However, recent memory corruption attacks, such as buffer overflow, exposed security vulnerabilities in GPUs. We demonstrate that out-of-bounds writes are reproducible on an Nvidia GPU, which can enable other security attacks. We propose GPUShield, a hardware-software cooperative region-based bounds-checking mechanism, to improve GPU memory safety for global, local, and heap memory buffers. To achieve effective protection, we update the GPU driver to assign a random but unique ID to each buffer and local variable and store individual bounds information in the bounds table allocated in the global memory. The proposed hardware performs efficient bounds checking by indexing the bounds table with unique IDs. We further reduce the bounds-checking overhead by utilizing compile-time bounds analysis, workgroup/warp-level bounds checking, and GPU-specific address mode. Our performance evaluations show that GPUShield incurs little performance degradation across 88 CUDA benchmarks on the Nvidia GPU architecture and 17 OpenCL benchmarks on the Intel GPU architecture with a marginal hardware overhead.