Mohammad Ali Nassiri Abrishamchi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mohammad Ali Nassiri Abrishamchi has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Anazida Zainal
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia
2 shared publications - Abdullah M. Albarrak
Department of Computer Science, College of Computer and Information Sciences, Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, Riyadh 11432, Saudi Arabia
1 shared publication - Fuad Abdulgaleel Abdoh Ghaleb
Department of Computer Science, Birmingham City University, Birmingham B4 7XG, UK
1 shared publication - Sultan Noman Qasem
Computer Science Department, College of Computer and Information Sciences, Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU), Riyadh 11432, Saudi Arabia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 154-167
Review of Smart Home Privacy-Protecting Strategies from a Wireless Eavesdropping Attack
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 154-167
Review of Smart Home Privacy-Protecting Strategies from a Wireless Eavesdropping Attack
- Open Access
Smart Home Privacy Protection Methods against a Passive Wireless Snooping Side-Channel Attack
Smart home technologies have attracted more users in recent years due to significant advancements in their underlying enabler components, such as sensors, actuators, and processors, which are spreading in various domains and have become more affordable. However, these IoT-based solutions are prone to data leakage; this privacy issue has motivated researchers to seek a secure solution to overcome this challenge. In this regard, wireless signal eavesdropping is one of the most severe threats that enables attackers to obtain residents’ sensitive information. Even if the system encrypts all communications, some cyber attacks can still steal information by interpreting the contextual data related to the transmitted signals. For example, a “fingerprint and timing-based snooping (FATS)” attack is a side-channel attack (SCA) developed to infer in-home activities passively from a remote location near the targeted house. An SCA is a sort of cyber attack that extracts valuable information from smart systems without accessing the content of data packets. This paper reviews the SCAs associated with cyber–physical systems, focusing on the proposed solutions to protect the privacy of smart homes against FATS attacks in detail. Moreover, this work clarifies shortcomings and future opportunities by analyzing the existing gaps in the reviewed methods.
Open AccessSmart Home Privacy Protection Methods against a Passive Wireless Snooping Side-Channel Attack
Smart home technologies have attracted more users in recent years due to significant advancements in their underlying enabler components, such as sensors, actuators, and processors, which are spreading in various domains and have become more affordable. However, these IoT-based solutions are prone to data leakage; this privacy issue has motivated researchers to seek a secure solution to overcome this challenge. In this regard, wireless signal eavesdropping is one of the most severe threats that enables attackers to obtain residents’ sensitive information. Even if the system encrypts all communications, some cyber attacks can still steal information by interpreting the contextual data related to the transmitted signals. For example, a “fingerprint and timing-based snooping (FATS)” attack is a side-channel attack (SCA) developed to infer in-home activities passively from a remote location near the targeted house. An SCA is a sort of cyber attack that extracts valuable information from smart systems without accessing the content of data packets. This paper reviews the SCAs associated with cyber–physical systems, focusing on the proposed solutions to protect the privacy of smart homes against FATS attacks in detail. Moreover, this work clarifies shortcomings and future opportunities by analyzing the existing gaps in the reviewed methods.