Yoav Roll

Over the past three decades, right-wing populism has steadily risen to prominence across the world. Yet a crucial socio-economic context for its development - the household and its underlying gender dynamics - remains under-explored in research on right-wing populism. This study investigates how the income, level of education, and class within cohabiting couples in the Netherlands, shape their support for right-wing populism through three diverse predictors, ranging from behavioural to attitudinal: voting for right-wing populist [RWP] parties, aim to vote for RWP parties, and sympathy towards RWP parties. Four models are tested to explain these relationships: male dominance, sharing, individual, and economic dominance models. Based on previous studies focusing on non-RWP parties, I expected the individual model for men and the sharing model for women to provide the best fit. Using data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences, this paper utilises diagonal reference models [DRM], for men and women separately, to trace the relative influence of the respondent and their partner on their RWP support. As far as I know, DRM has never been used to predict support for RWP parties. As expected, gender differences are evident. However, the data show, contrary to expectation, that the sharing model provides the best fit for men, while the individual model provides the best fit for women when it comes to income and education. Regarding class, as expected, the sharing model provides the best fit for women. The implications of these findings are discussed in light of the diverse characteristics of the economic standing predictors and the different facets of RWP support tested. As women increasingly join the workforce and occupy diverse roles, the ways in which men and women perceive their economic circumstances - particularly within households - diverge significantly. These findings highlight the importance of accounting for household context and gender dynamics in understanding the rise of right-wing populism in developed democracies such as the Netherlands.

The global rise of right‐wing populist [RWP] parties presents a major political concern. RWP parties' voters tend to be citizens who have either experienced or fear economic deprivation. Income change constitutes a viable measure of this deprivation. However, previous contributions examining effects of income change on support for RWP parties have yielded diverging conclusions. This paper challenges previous findings by incorporating considerations of gender and within‐household inequality. We hypothesise a negative relationship between, on the one hand, personal and household income change and, on the other hand, sympathy towards RWP parties. Furthermore, we expect to find a stronger association between personal income change and RWP sympathy among men. Moreover, we expect the relationship between household income change and RWP sympathy to differ between genders. Finally, we hypothesise that this gender disparity can be interpreted by considering who contributes most to the household income. All these hypotheses are grounded in gender socialisation and economic dominance theories. Analysing Dutch LISS longitudinal data spanning from 2007 to 2021 (N = 7,801, n = 43,954) through fixed‐effects multilevel linear regression models enables us to address various competing explanations. It appears that only for men, personal income change is negatively linked with sympathies towards RWP parties. However, considering who is the highest earner within households reveals that women are also affected by their personal income change if they earn the highest income. For both men and women, household income change is negatively linked with sympathies towards RWP parties. These results lend partial support to both the socialisation and economic dominance theories. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The rise of right-wing populist [RWP] parties around the world is a major political issue. RWP parties' voters tend to be citizens who experienced economic deprivation, or face the risk of deprivation. Income change is a possible way of measuring this deprivation. However, previous contributions that had examined the effect of income change on support of RWP parties diverge in their conclusions. This paper challenges previous findings by taking into account gender. Women and men diverge in their political behaviour, even in cases where they share the same economic properties, particularly regarding support of RWP parties. Our research questions are (1) whether economic relative deprivation leads to changing attitudes towards RWP parties, and (2) whether this effect is different between men and women? We hypothesize a negative relationship between personal and household income change, both dynamic (compared to previous income, measured in absolute income change) and relative (compared with others’ income in that year), and sympathy towards RWP parties. We also expect income change for men to be more influential for their attitudes towards RWP parties. We implement fixed-effects multilevel linear regression models on individual-level Dutch LISS longitudinal data collected between 2007 and 2022 (N = 7,801, n = 44,076). This panel design allows establishing temporal order and accounting for competing explanations. We find that only for men, personal income change, both dynamic and relative, is negatively and causally linked with sympathies towards RWP parties. For both men and women, we find that dynamic household income change, but not relative, is negatively and causally linked with sympathies towards RWP parties. Implications are discussed.

Despite the steady increase in the number of women who join the labor force, there are still substantial cross-country variations in both women’s labor force participation and gender-linked occupational inequality. Utilizing micro-data from 47 countries (circa 2013) obtained from the Luxembourg Income Study, we examine the extent to which globalization and each of its three components (economic, social and political) affect gender-based economic inequality. In particular, we investigate the effect of globalization on two outcomes: women’s labor force participation and women’s relative odds of obtaining high-income, high-status jobs. The findings show, first, that social globalization is more consequential for gender inequality in the labor market than either economic or political globalization. Second, while social globalization increases women’s labor force participation, it reduces women’s relative odds of obtaining lucrative, high-status jobs. The findings are discussed in light of the comparative literature on gender-based inequality.