Pan-Yang Su
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Pan-Yang Su has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chinmay Maheshwari
Johns Hopkins University
1 shared publication - Hamsa Balakrishnan
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA
1 shared publication - Hung-Yu Wei
National Taiwan University
1 shared publication - Kuang-Hsun Lin
Graduate Institute of Communication Engineering, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
1 shared publication - Maria G. Mendoza
Mechanical Engineering, UC Berkeley
1 shared publication - Sanjit A. Seshia
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Journal on Autonomous Transportation Systems
- Vol. 2 (4) , 1-34
Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms for Coordinating Airspace Usage in Advanced Air Mobility
Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations are expected to transform air transportation while challenging current air traffic management practices. By introducing a novel market-based mechanism, we address the problem of on-demand allocation of capacity-constrained airspace to AAM vehicles with heterogeneous and private valuations. We model airspace and air infrastructure as a collection of contiguous regions (or sectors) with constraints on the number of vehicles that simultaneously enter, stay, or exit each region. Vehicles request access to airspace with trajectories spanning multiple regions at different times. We use the graph structure of our airspace model to formulate the allocation problem as a path allocation problem on a time-extended graph. To ensure that the cost information of AAM vehicles remains private, we introduce a novel mechanism that allocates each vehicle a budget of “air-credits” (an artificial currency) and anonymously charges prices for traversing the edges of the time-extended graph. We seek to compute a competitive equilibrium that ensures that: (i) capacity constraints are satisfied, (ii) a strictly positive resource price implies that the sector capacity is fully utilized, and (iii) the allocation is integral and optimal for each AAM vehicle given current prices, without requiring access to individual vehicle utilities. However, a competitive equilibrium with integral allocations may not always exist. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence and computation of a fractional-competitive equilibrium, where allocations can be fractional. Building on these theoretical insights, we propose a distributed, iterative, two-step algorithm that: (1) computes a fractional competitive equilibrium, and (2) derives an integral allocation from this equilibrium. We validate the effectiveness of our approach in allocating trajectories for the emerging urban air mobility service of drone delivery.
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Journal on Autonomous Transportation Systems
- Vol. 2 (4) , 1-34
Open AccessPrivacy-Preserving Mechanisms for Coordinating Airspace Usage in Advanced Air Mobility
Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations are expected to transform air transportation while challenging current air traffic management practices. By introducing a novel market-based mechanism, we address the problem of on-demand allocation of capacity-constrained airspace to AAM vehicles with heterogeneous and private valuations. We model airspace and air infrastructure as a collection of contiguous regions (or sectors) with constraints on the number of vehicles that simultaneously enter, stay, or exit each region. Vehicles request access to airspace with trajectories spanning multiple regions at different times. We use the graph structure of our airspace model to formulate the allocation problem as a path allocation problem on a time-extended graph. To ensure that the cost information of AAM vehicles remains private, we introduce a novel mechanism that allocates each vehicle a budget of “air-credits” (an artificial currency) and anonymously charges prices for traversing the edges of the time-extended graph. We seek to compute a competitive equilibrium that ensures that: (i) capacity constraints are satisfied, (ii) a strictly positive resource price implies that the sector capacity is fully utilized, and (iii) the allocation is integral and optimal for each AAM vehicle given current prices, without requiring access to individual vehicle utilities. However, a competitive equilibrium with integral allocations may not always exist. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence and computation of a fractional-competitive equilibrium, where allocations can be fractional. Building on these theoretical insights, we propose a distributed, iterative, two-step algorithm that: (1) computes a fractional competitive equilibrium, and (2) derives an integral allocation from this equilibrium. We validate the effectiveness of our approach in allocating trajectories for the emerging urban air mobility service of drone delivery.
- 29 November 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Broadcasting
- Vol. 69 (1) , 246-263
Priority-Aware Resource Allocation for 5G mmWave Multicast Broadcast Services
5G Multicast Broadcast Services (MBS) are viewed as a promising 5G New Radio (NR) application, as standardization begins in 3GPP Release 17. With MBS, one next generation Node B (gNB) delivers data to multiple user equipments (UE) simultaneously, thus improving spectrum efficiency. Millimeter wave (mmWave) beamforming further enhances system performance by focusing signals in a dedicated direction. However, despite the advantages, we identify three issues of multicast with beamforming techniques. First, link directionality causes the gNB to transmit data over the beams sequentially, resulting in a combinatorial resource allocation problem. Confronting this beam scheduling issue, we develop an optimization algorithm that obtains an optimal solution in polynomial time. Second, UEs may falsely report their valuations over beam resources to gain more utility. Under this scenario, the gNB cannot allocate the resources to those in need due to the lack of accurate UE information. Therefore, we propose a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction-based mechanism to incentivize the UEs to reveal their valuations over resources truthfully. This mechanism guarantees solution efficiency and maximizes social welfare. Third, as 3GPP standards allow for different priorities for different multicast flows, and video content providers distinguish between ordinary and premium UEs, we take UE priority into account. In this regard, we extend the valuation-based mechanism to a multi-priority one. Finally, the mathematical analysis validates some desirable properties of the proposed scheme, such as incentive-compatibility. Simulation results also justify our superior performance in the 5G MBS system compared with other resource allocation schemes.
- 29 November 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Broadcasting
- Vol. 69 (1) , 246-263
Priority-Aware Resource Allocation for 5G mmWave Multicast Broadcast Services
5G Multicast Broadcast Services (MBS) are viewed as a promising 5G New Radio (NR) application, as standardization begins in 3GPP Release 17. With MBS, one next generation Node B (gNB) delivers data to multiple user equipments (UE) simultaneously, thus improving spectrum efficiency. Millimeter wave (mmWave) beamforming further enhances system performance by focusing signals in a dedicated direction. However, despite the advantages, we identify three issues of multicast with beamforming techniques. First, link directionality causes the gNB to transmit data over the beams sequentially, resulting in a combinatorial resource allocation problem. Confronting this beam scheduling issue, we develop an optimization algorithm that obtains an optimal solution in polynomial time. Second, UEs may falsely report their valuations over beam resources to gain more utility. Under this scenario, the gNB cannot allocate the resources to those in need due to the lack of accurate UE information. Therefore, we propose a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction-based mechanism to incentivize the UEs to reveal their valuations over resources truthfully. This mechanism guarantees solution efficiency and maximizes social welfare. Third, as 3GPP standards allow for different priorities for different multicast flows, and video content providers distinguish between ordinary and premium UEs, we take UE priority into account. In this regard, we extend the valuation-based mechanism to a multi-priority one. Finally, the mathematical analysis validates some desirable properties of the proposed scheme, such as incentive-compatibility. Simulation results also justify our superior performance in the 5G MBS system compared with other resource allocation schemes.