Adriana Sanabria Borbon

The globalized and distributed semiconductor supply chain exposes the integrated circuits to security threats. These threats can target the circuit functionality, the secret data processed by the circuit, or the design’s intellectual property (IP). Multiple commercial devices include dedicated hardware root-of-trust for performing security tasks. These approaches protect digital circuits but ignore the vulnerabilities of analog circuits. Recently, researchers have proposed techniques to protect the IP of analog circuits. This tutorial systematizes the knowledge of analog IP protection. It gives an overview of the reported threat models, defense techniques, and attacks targeting analog/RF circuits.

Similar to digital circuits, analog and mixed-signal (AMS) circuits are also susceptible to supply-chain attacks, such as piracy, overproduction, and Trojan insertion. However, unlike digital circuits, the supply-chain security of AMS circuits is less explored. In this work, we propose to perform "logic-locking" on the digital section of the AMS circuits. The idea is to make the analog design intentionally suffer from the effects of process variations, which impede the operation of the circuit. Only on applying the correct key, the effect of process variations are mitigated, and the analog circuit performs as desired. To this end, we render certain components in the analog circuit configurable. We propose an analysis to dictate which components need to be configurable to maximize the effect of an incorrect key. We conduct our analysis on the bandpass filter (BPF), low-noise amplifier (LNA), and low-dropout voltage regulator LDO) for both correct and incorrect keys to the locked optimizer. We also show experimental results for our technique on a BPF. We also analyze the effect of aging on our locking technique to ensure the reliability of the circuit with the correct key.

Similar to digital circuits, analog circuits are also susceptible to supply-chain attacks. There are several analog locking techniques proposed to combat these supply-chain attacks. However, there exists no elaborate evaluation procedure to estimate the resilience offered by these techniques. Evaluating analog defenses requires the usage of non-Boolean variables, such as bias current and gain. Hence, in this work, we evaluate the resilience of the analog-only locks and analog and mixed-signal (AMS) locks using satisfiability modulo theories (SMTs). We demonstrate our attack on five analog locking techniques and three AMS locking techniques. The attack is demonstrated on commonly used circuits, such as bandpass filter (BPF), low-noise amplifier (LNA), and low-dropout (LDO) voltage regulator. Attack results on analog-only locks show that the attacker, knowing the required bias current or voltage range, can determine the key. Likewise, knowing the protected input patterns (PIPs), the attacker can determine the key to unlock the AMS locks. We then extend our attack to break the existing analog camouflaging technique.

In this paper, a built-in self-test and in situ analog circuit optimization platform is proposed and characterized. By integrating a fully digital optimization engine and self-test circuits along with circuits-under-optimization (CUO), this platform can automatically find an operating point that makes a good balance among multiple competing characteristic goals. Therefore, the arbitrary linear time-invariant CUO can be optimized even when there are large process-voltage-temperature variations and aging effects of devices. This platform is analyzed to determine the required accuracy of its building blocks in terms of noise and linearity. The feasibility of this platform is proved by a case study utilizing a Tow-Thomas bandpass biquad.