Pieter Balcaen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Pieter Balcaen has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Cind Du Bois
Department of Economics, Management and Leadership, Royal Military Academy, Brussels, Belgium
5 shared publicationsCaroline Buts
The Vrije Universiteit Brussel Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Elsene, Belgium
4 shared publications- Caroline Buts
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
1 shared publication - Cind Du Bois
Department of Economics, Management and Leadership, Royal Military Academy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
1 shared publication - Marnix Provoost
Netherlands Defense Academy
1 shared publication Olesya Tkacheva
Prof. Dr. Olesya Tkacheva is Assistant Professor at the Brussels School of Governance Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Elsene, Belgium
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defense & Security Analysis
- Vol. 42 (3) , 1-26
Strategic victory over tactical success: a Clausewitzian analysis of Russian strategy in Ukraine
- 27 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defense & Security Analysis
- Vol. 42 (3) , 1-26
Strategic victory over tactical success: a Clausewitzian analysis of Russian strategy in Ukraine
- 30 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 36 (1) , 20-35
Unemployment and Military Labour Supply: A Study on Belgian Data for the Period 2005-2020
- 30 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 36 (1) , 20-35
Unemployment and Military Labour Supply: A Study on Belgian Data for the Period 2005-2020
- 9 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 102, 101968
The effect of disinformation about COVID-19 on consumer confidence: Insights from a survey experiment
- 9 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 102, 101968
The effect of disinformation about COVID-19 on consumer confidence: Insights from a survey experiment
- 2 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
- Vol. 35 (1) , 11-29
The Design of Russia’s Economic Warfare Against Ukraine
This article provides a case study on the use of economic tools within the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ by looking at the Ukrainian-Russian conflict of 2014. The article makes the over-arching connection between discussions regarding the strategic use of Russian gas prices, trade manipulation, and debt leveraging. We further look at the macro-economic consequences of waging war in the country’s most industrialized zone. This article contributes to the literature by focusing exhaustively on the economic instruments used by Russia to weaken its opponent. We provide estimates regarding the scope of these modes of coercion by relying on a wide series of economic data. Extensive research indicates the difficulty to quantify the exact effects stemming from these instruments.
- 2 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
- Vol. 35 (1) , 11-29
The Design of Russia’s Economic Warfare Against Ukraine
This article provides a case study on the use of economic tools within the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ by looking at the Ukrainian-Russian conflict of 2014. The article makes the over-arching connection between discussions regarding the strategic use of Russian gas prices, trade manipulation, and debt leveraging. We further look at the macro-economic consequences of waging war in the country’s most industrialized zone. This article contributes to the literature by focusing exhaustively on the economic instruments used by Russia to weaken its opponent. We provide estimates regarding the scope of these modes of coercion by relying on a wide series of economic data. Extensive research indicates the difficulty to quantify the exact effects stemming from these instruments.
- 17 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 34 (2) , 142-159
Sharing the Burden of Hybrid Threats: Lessons from the Economics of Alliances
This article discusses the effects of the changing (hybrid) conflict environment on the burden sharing debate. We discuss the actions taken by both the alliance as the member states in repelling these threats, arguing that this mainly produces security outputs that are private or impure public. As the burden sharing literature currently lacks notions of hybrid threats, we believe the current modelling to be ill-suited to provide reliable assessments of member states’ burden sharing behaviour. We address this void by adjusting the Joint Product Model, extending a country’s security activities to a more inclusive ‘whole of government (WoG) approach’. We depart from this WoG model to stress the challenges associated with comparing the contributions of member states in countering these threats. This leads us to dispute the use of aggregate military expenditures as a main variable to measure a country’s degree of free riding. More and other types of (non-military) variables and proxy-indexes should be taken into account. The same remark goes for estimating the benefit-burden concordance within this framework of permanent non-linear state competition.
- 17 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 34 (2) , 142-159
Sharing the Burden of Hybrid Threats: Lessons from the Economics of Alliances
This article discusses the effects of the changing (hybrid) conflict environment on the burden sharing debate. We discuss the actions taken by both the alliance as the member states in repelling these threats, arguing that this mainly produces security outputs that are private or impure public. As the burden sharing literature currently lacks notions of hybrid threats, we believe the current modelling to be ill-suited to provide reliable assessments of member states’ burden sharing behaviour. We address this void by adjusting the Joint Product Model, extending a country’s security activities to a more inclusive ‘whole of government (WoG) approach’. We depart from this WoG model to stress the challenges associated with comparing the contributions of member states in countering these threats. This leads us to dispute the use of aggregate military expenditures as a main variable to measure a country’s degree of free riding. More and other types of (non-military) variables and proxy-indexes should be taken into account. The same remark goes for estimating the benefit-burden concordance within this framework of permanent non-linear state competition.
- Open Access
The Hybridisation of Conflict: A Prospect Theoretic Analysis
Revisionist actors are increasingly operationalising a broad number of non-violent threats in their quest to change the status quo, popularly described as hybrid conflict. From a defensive point of view, this proliferation of threats compels nations to make difficult choices in terms of force posture and composition. We examine the choice process associated with this contemporary form of state competition by modelling the interactions between two actors, i.e., a defender and a challenger. As these choices are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, we study the choice from the framework of prospect theory. This behavioural–economic perspective indicates that the defender will give a higher weight and a higher subjective value to conventional threats, inducing a higher vulnerability in the domain of hybrid deterrence. As future conflict will increasingly involve choice dilemmas, we must balance threats according to their probability of occurrence and their consequences. This article raises awareness regarding our cognitive biases when making these choices.
Open AccessThe Hybridisation of Conflict: A Prospect Theoretic Analysis
Revisionist actors are increasingly operationalising a broad number of non-violent threats in their quest to change the status quo, popularly described as hybrid conflict. From a defensive point of view, this proliferation of threats compels nations to make difficult choices in terms of force posture and composition. We examine the choice process associated with this contemporary form of state competition by modelling the interactions between two actors, i.e., a defender and a challenger. As these choices are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, we study the choice from the framework of prospect theory. This behavioural–economic perspective indicates that the defender will give a higher weight and a higher subjective value to conventional threats, inducing a higher vulnerability in the domain of hybrid deterrence. As future conflict will increasingly involve choice dilemmas, we must balance threats according to their probability of occurrence and their consequences. This article raises awareness regarding our cognitive biases when making these choices.
- 2 January 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 33 (1) , 26-41
A Game-theoretic Analysis of Hybrid Threats
For decades, the concept of deterrence and the fear for nuclear confrontation withheld large powers from waging aggression against each other. Recent technological developments and the growing interconnectedness however allowed some states to find ways to challenge the West by using so called ‘hybrid threats’. This way of waging war entails the synchronized use of a broad spectrum of instruments that are well-designed to stay below the thresholds of detection, attribution and retaliation. Combining these (relatively cheap) threats with conventional military hard power confronts the liberal democracies with a difficult choice in terms of defence budget allocation. Whereas arms race stability in the conventional and nuclear domain leads to a peaceful stalemate, this article demonstrates that adding hybrid threats to the spectrum of state power projection leads to a gradual shift of the power balance. While hybrid threats have been extensively studied within the international relations literature, we are (to the best of our knowledge) the first to study these changing security paradigms from a defence economic point of view. Moreover, this article is the first to represent this increasingly complicated state power competition in a game theoretic framework.
- 2 January 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 33 (1) , 26-41
A Game-theoretic Analysis of Hybrid Threats
For decades, the concept of deterrence and the fear for nuclear confrontation withheld large powers from waging aggression against each other. Recent technological developments and the growing interconnectedness however allowed some states to find ways to challenge the West by using so called ‘hybrid threats’. This way of waging war entails the synchronized use of a broad spectrum of instruments that are well-designed to stay below the thresholds of detection, attribution and retaliation. Combining these (relatively cheap) threats with conventional military hard power confronts the liberal democracies with a difficult choice in terms of defence budget allocation. Whereas arms race stability in the conventional and nuclear domain leads to a peaceful stalemate, this article demonstrates that adding hybrid threats to the spectrum of state power projection leads to a gradual shift of the power balance. While hybrid threats have been extensively studied within the international relations literature, we are (to the best of our knowledge) the first to study these changing security paradigms from a defence economic point of view. Moreover, this article is the first to represent this increasingly complicated state power competition in a game theoretic framework.