Natalia Criado
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Natalia Criado has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jazon Szabo
King’s College London
3 shared publications - Jose Such
INGENIO (CSIC-UPV), Valencia, Spain
3 shared publications - Sanjay Modgil
King’s College London
3 shared publications - Marc Serramia
King’s College London
1 shared publication - Michael Luck
King's College London
1 shared publication - William Seymour
Department of Informatics King's College London UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (18) , 19948-19955
Moral Uncertainty and the Problem of Fanaticism
While there is universal agreement that agents ought to act ethically, there is no agreement as to what constitutes ethical behaviour. To address this problem, recent philosophical approaches to `moral uncertainty' propose aggregation of multiple ethical theories to guide agent behaviour. However, one of the foundational proposals for aggregation - Maximising Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) - has been criticised as being vulnerable to fanaticism; the problem of an ethical theory dominating agent behaviour despite low credence (confidence) in said theory. Fanaticism thus undermines the `democratic' motivation for accommodating multiple ethical perspectives. The problem of fanaticism has not yet been mathematically defined. Representing moral uncertainty as an instance of social welfare aggregation, this paper contributes to the field of moral uncertainty by 1) formalising the problem of fanaticism as a property of social welfare functionals and 2) providing non-fanatical alternatives to MEC, i.e. Highest k-trimmed Mean and Highest Median.
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (18) , 19948-19955
Open AccessMoral Uncertainty and the Problem of Fanaticism
While there is universal agreement that agents ought to act ethically, there is no agreement as to what constitutes ethical behaviour. To address this problem, recent philosophical approaches to `moral uncertainty' propose aggregation of multiple ethical theories to guide agent behaviour. However, one of the foundational proposals for aggregation - Maximising Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) - has been criticised as being vulnerable to fanaticism; the problem of an ethical theory dominating agent behaviour despite low credence (confidence) in said theory. Fanaticism thus undermines the `democratic' motivation for accommodating multiple ethical perspectives. The problem of fanaticism has not yet been mathematically defined. Representing moral uncertainty as an instance of social welfare aggregation, this paper contributes to the field of moral uncertainty by 1) formalising the problem of fanaticism as a property of social welfare functionals and 2) providing non-fanatical alternatives to MEC, i.e. Highest k-trimmed Mean and Highest Median.
- Open Access
Moral Uncertainty and the Problem of Fanaticism
While there is universal agreement that agents ought to act ethically, there is no agreement as to what constitutes ethical behaviour. To address this problem, recent philosophical approaches to `moral uncertainty' propose aggregation of multiple ethical theories to guide agent behaviour. However, one of the foundational proposals for aggregation - Maximising Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) - has been criticised as being vulnerable to fanaticism; the problem of an ethical theory dominating agent behaviour despite low credence (confidence) in said theory. Fanaticism thus undermines the `democratic' motivation for accommodating multiple ethical perspectives. The problem of fanaticism has not yet been mathematically defined. Representing moral uncertainty as an instance of social welfare aggregation, this paper contributes to the field of moral uncertainty by 1) formalising the problem of fanaticism as a property of social welfare functionals and 2) providing non-fanatical alternatives to MEC, i.e. Highest k-trimmed Mean and Highest Median.
Open AccessMoral Uncertainty and the Problem of Fanaticism
While there is universal agreement that agents ought to act ethically, there is no agreement as to what constitutes ethical behaviour. To address this problem, recent philosophical approaches to `moral uncertainty' propose aggregation of multiple ethical theories to guide agent behaviour. However, one of the foundational proposals for aggregation - Maximising Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) - has been criticised as being vulnerable to fanaticism; the problem of an ethical theory dominating agent behaviour despite low credence (confidence) in said theory. Fanaticism thus undermines the `democratic' motivation for accommodating multiple ethical perspectives. The problem of fanaticism has not yet been mathematically defined. Representing moral uncertainty as an instance of social welfare aggregation, this paper contributes to the field of moral uncertainty by 1) formalising the problem of fanaticism as a property of social welfare functionals and 2) providing non-fanatical alternatives to MEC, i.e. Highest k-trimmed Mean and Highest Median.
- Open Access
Predicting Privacy Preferences for Smart Devices as Norms
Smart devices, such as smart speakers, are becoming ubiquitous, and users expect these devices to act in accordance with their preferences. In particular, since these devices gather and manage personal data, users expect them to adhere to their privacy preferences. However, the current approach of gathering these preferences consists in asking the users directly, which usually triggers automatic responses failing to capture their true preferences. In response, in this paper we present a collaborative filtering approach to predict user preferences as norms. These preference predictions can be readily adopted or can serve to assist users in determining their own preferences. Using a dataset of privacy preferences of smart assistant users, we test the accuracy of our predictions.
Open AccessPredicting Privacy Preferences for Smart Devices as Norms
Smart devices, such as smart speakers, are becoming ubiquitous, and users expect these devices to act in accordance with their preferences. In particular, since these devices gather and manage personal data, users expect them to adhere to their privacy preferences. However, the current approach of gathering these preferences consists in asking the users directly, which usually triggers automatic responses failing to capture their true preferences. In response, in this paper we present a collaborative filtering approach to predict user preferences as norms. These preference predictions can be readily adopted or can serve to assist users in determining their own preferences. Using a dataset of privacy preferences of smart assistant users, we test the accuracy of our predictions.
- 11 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 383-402
Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Reasoning for Value Alignment
- 11 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 383-402
Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Reasoning for Value Alignment