AEAlkistis Elliott-Graves

Alkistis Elliott-Graves

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Alkistis Elliott-Graves has a total of 43 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Individualised niches: an integrative conceptual framework across behaviour, ecology, and evolution

    by Oliver Krüger, Jaime Anaya‐Rojas, Mitja Back, Barbara Caspers, Nayden Chakarov, Melanie Dammhahn, Alkistis Elliott‐Graves, Claudia Fricke, Jürgen Gadau, Joseph I. Hoffman, et al.

    Individuals differ. While seemingly trivial, this insight has nevertheless led to paradigm shifts, as three key fields of organismal biology have seen marked changes in key concepts over the past few decades. In animal behaviour, it has become increasingly recognised that behavioural differences among individuals can be stable over time and across contexts, giving rise to the concept of animal personalities. In ecology, attention has similarly shifted towards variation in the ecological niches occupied by species, populations and individuals, giving rise to the concept of niche specialisation or individual niche variation. In evolutionary biology, where individual variation has always been central, there is a growing awareness of the complex and dynamic ways in which individuals interact with the environment to produce unique phenotypes. Additionally, recent theoretical and empirical research suggests that fitness landscapes are not only complex, with multiple fitness peaks, but might even be more accurately described as constantly shifting ‘fitness seascapes’, where the fitness peak that an individual can reach – whether local or global – depends on its genotype and its interaction with the environment. Moreover, the previous distinction between ecological and evolutionary timescales is being replaced by a more integrative view that recognises that evolution can occur on ecological timeframes. These shifting perspectives over the past two decades underscore the need for a more integrated conceptual framework that transcends disciplines. While in behaviour, ecology and evolution, the concept of individualisation has contributed to major scientific progress, sufficient cross‐fertilisation is still lacking. Here, we propose a new conceptual unification: the individualised niche. By merging the niche concept with the fitness concept, new explanatory power for both ecological and evolutionary processes emerges.


  • Studying Individuality in Behavioral Ecology: Overcoming Epistemic Challenges

    by Rose Trappes, Alkistis Elliott-Graves, Marie I. Kaiser

    Behavioral ecologists have recently begun to study individuality, that is, individual differences and uniqueness in phenotypic traits and in ecological relations. However, individuality is an unusual object of research. Using an ethnographic case study of individuality research in behavioral ecology, we analyze concerns that behavioral ecologists express about their ability to study individuality. We argue that these concerns stem from two epistemic challenges: the variation-noise challenge and the generalization challenge. First, individuality is difficult to distinguish from noise, as standard practices lump variation between individuals together with noise. Second, individuality is difficult to capture in generalizations, as they typically involve ignoring idiosyncratic factors. We examine how these challenges shape research practices in behavioral ecology, leading to epistemic strategies for studying individuality via alternative approaches to measurement, experimentation, and generalization.


  • Open Access

    Reevaluating Heterogeneity in Evidence Synthesis

    by Alkistis Elliott-Graves

    Evidence synthesis has recently seen an enormous increase across many different scientific disciplines. Despite its popularity, it has also been the subject of significant criticism. One of the main critiques of evidence synthesis is the existence and treatment of heterogeneity between primary studies. The aim of this article is to reexamine heterogeneity in evidence synthesis, including perspectives from evolutionary biology, ecology, and conservation. I argue that while some of the critiques of heterogeneity remain valid, there are contexts where it is much less problematic. Furthermore, I propose that heterogeneity can be useful because analyzing it can provide valuable information.


  • Open Access

    Re-evaluating heterogeneity in evidence synthesis

    by Alkistis Elliott-Graves

    Evidence Synthesis, in the form of systematic review and meta-analysis, has seen an enormous increase in recent years, across many different scientific disciplines. However, philosophers have paid comparatively little attention to evidence synthesis, while the majority of analyses are predominantly negative and focus primarily on the use of meta-analysis in medicine. One of the main critiques of evidence synthesis is the existence and treatment of heterogeneity between primary studies. The aim of this paper is to re-examine heterogeneity in evidence synthesis, including perspectives from evolutionary biology, ecology and conservation. I argue that while some of the critiques of heterogeneity remain valid, there are contexts where heterogeneity is much less problematic than has been portrayed and can even be useful, as analysing it can provide valuable information, which ultimately increases the quality of the synthesis.

  • Open Access

    Studying Individuality in Behavioural Ecology: Overcoming Epistemic Challenges

    by Rose Trappes, Alkistis Elliott-Graves, Marie I. Kaiser

    Behavioural ecologists have recently begun to study individuality, that is, individual differences and uniqueness in phenotypic traits and in ecological relations. However, individuality is an unusual object of research. Using an ethnographic case study of individuality research in behavioural ecology, we analyse concerns that behavioural ecologists express about their ability to study individuality. We argue that these concerns stem from two epistemic challenges: the variation-noise challenge and the generalisation challenge. First, individuality is difficult to distinguish from noise, as standard practices lump variation between individuals together with noise. Second, individuality is difficult to capture in generalisations, as they typically involve ignoring idiosyncratic factors. We examine how these challenges shape research practices in behavioural ecology, leading to epistemic strategies for studying individuality via alternative approaches to measurement, experimentation, and generalisation.

  • Open Access

    Looking beyond Popper: how philosophy can be relevant to ecology

    by Tina Heger, Alkistis Elliot‐Graves, Marie I. Kaiser, Katie H. Morrow, William Bausman, Gregory P. Dietl, Carsten F. Dormann, David J. Gibson, James Griesemer, Yuval Itescu, et al.

    Current workflows in academic ecology rarely allow an engagement of ecologists with philosophers, or with contemporary philosophical work. We argue that this is a missed opportunity for enriching ecological reasoning and practice, because many questions in ecology overlap with philosophical questions and with current topics in contemporary philosophy of science. One obstacle to a closer connection and collaboration between the fields is the limited awareness of scientists, including ecologists, of current philosophical questions, developments and ideas. In this article, we aim to overcome this obstacle and trigger more collaborations between ecologists and philosophers. First, we provide an overview of philosophical research relevant to ecologists. Second, we use examples to demonstrate that many ecological questions have a philosophical dimension and point to related philosophical work. We elaborate on one example – the debate around the appropriate level of complexity of ecological models – to show in more detail how philosophy can enrich ecology. Finally, we provide suggestions for how to initiate collaborative projects involving both ecologists and philosophers.


  • What sort of a science is Ecology?

    by Alkistis Elliott-Graves

    Ecologists have frequently questioned the concepts, methods and philosophical foundations of their science, often finding them wanting. In this chapter we show that these misgivings stem from a picture of science based on philosophical accounts that were popular for most of the 20th century. However, this picture is outdated, as it does not accurately describe all scientific practice, especially in sciences such as ecology that deal with complex systems. We outline some ways in which ecological systems are complex, including system heterogeneity and the entanglement of social and ethical values, and show how this affects ecological research, for example by creating difficulties for generalisations, predictions and interventions. We then provide an alternative account of science based on newer philosophical views. Rather than dismissing Ecology as an immature science, we argue that it is a challenging but ultimately rewarding science.

  • Open Access

    What are general models about?

    by Alkistis Elliott-Graves

    Models provide scientists with knowledge about target systems. An important group of models are those that are called general. However, what exactly is meant by generality in this context is somewhat unclear. The aim of this paper is to draw out a distinction between two notions of generality that has implications for scientific practice. Some models are general in the sense that they apply to many systems in the world and have many particular targets. Another sense is captured by models that are aimed at understanding the fundamental or underlying dynamics of a phenomenon, as opposed to how it manifests in each particular case. They have non-specific, i.e. generic targets. While both notions of generality and genericness are legitimate and correspond to different aspects of scientific practice, they must be distinguished. Failing to do so obscures the danger of overgeneralisation faced by general models and facilitates the illegitimate use of generic models as general models. This can lead to a reduction of the explanatory and predictive power of both.