SSSahasrajit Sarmasarkar

Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Multi-Selection for Recommendation Systems

    by Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar, Zhihao Jiang, Ashish Goel, Aleksandra Korolova, Kamesh Munagala

    We present the construction of a multi-selection model to answer differentially private queries in the context of recommendation systems. The server sends back multiple recommendations and a ``local model'' to the user, which the user can run locally on its device to select the item that best fits its private features. We study a setup where the server uses a deep neural network (trained on the Movielens 25M dataset as the ground truth for movie recommendation. In the multi-selection paradigm, the average recommendation utility is approximately 97\% of the optimal utility (as determined by the ground truth neural network) while maintaining a local differential privacy guarantee with $ε$ ranging around 1 with respect to feature vectors of neighboring users. This is in comparison to an average recommendation utility of 91\% in the non-multi-selection regime under the same constraints.

  • Open Access

    Differential Privacy with Multiple Selections

    by Ashish Goel, Zhihao Jiang, Aleksandra Korolova, Kamesh Munagala, Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar

    We consider the setting where a user with sensitive features wishes to obtain a recommendation from a server in a differentially private fashion. We propose a ``multi-selection'' architecture where the server can send back multiple recommendations and the user chooses one from these that matches best with their private features. When the user feature is one-dimensional -- on an infinite line -- and the accuracy measure is defined w.r.t some increasing function $\mathfrak{h}(.)$ of the distance on the line, we precisely characterize the optimal mechanism that satisfies differential privacy. The specification of the optimal mechanism includes both the distribution of the noise that the user adds to its private value, and the algorithm used by the server to determine the set of results to send back as a response and further show that Laplace is an optimal noise distribution. We further show that this optimal mechanism results in an error that is inversely proportional to the number of results returned when the function $\mathfrak{h}(.)$ is the identity function.

  • Open Access

    A Mechanism for Participatory Budgeting With Funding Constraints and Project Interactions

    by Mohak Goyal, Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar, Ashish Goel

    Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters. Also, the outcomes of PB in practice are subject to various minimum/maximum funding constraints on 'types' of projects. We propose a novel preference elicitation scheme for PB which allows voters to express how their utilities from projects within 'groups' interact. We consider preference aggregation done under minimum and maximum funding constraints on 'types' of projects, where a project can have multiple type labels as long as this classification can be defined by a 1-laminar structure (henceforth called 1-laminar funding constraints). Overall, we extend the Knapsack voting model of Goel et al. [26] in two ways - enriching the preference elicitation scheme to include project interactions and generalizing the preference aggregation scheme to include 1-laminar funding constraints. We show that the strategyproofness results of Goel et al. [26] for Knapsack voting continue to hold under 1-laminar funding constraints. Moreover, when the funding constraints cannot be described by a 1-laminar structure, strategyproofness does not hold. Although project interactions often break the strategyproofness, we study a special case of vote profiles where truthful voting is a Nash equilibrium under substitution project interactions. We then study the computational complexity of preference aggregation. Social welfare maximization under project interactions is NP-hard. As a workaround for practical instances, we give a fixed parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm for social welfare maximization with respect to the maximum number of projects in a group when the overall budget is specified in a fixed number of bits.

  • On Gradient Coding With Partial Recovery

    by Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar, V. Lalitha, Nikhil Karamchandani

    We consider a generalization of the gradient coding framework where a dataset is divided across n workers and each worker transmits to a master node one or more linear combinations of the gradients over its assigned data subsets. Unlike the conventional framework which requires the master node to recover the sum of the gradients over all the data subsets in the presence of straggler workers, we relax the goal to computing the sum of at least some α fraction of the gradients. We begin by deriving a lower bound on the computation load of any scheme and also propose two strategies which achieve this lower bound, albeit at the cost of high communication load and a number of data partitions which can be polynomial in n . We then propose schemes based on cyclic assignment which utilize n data partitions and have a lower communication load. When each worker transmits a single linear combination, we prove lower bounds on the computation load of any scheme using n data partitions. Finally, we describe a class of schemes which achieve different intermediate operating points for the computation and communication load and provide simulation results to demonstrate the empirical performance of our schemes.