Haoyuan Li
Research Subjects
Haoyuan Li has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hua Chen
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications - Huilong Jiang
State Key Lab of Processors, Institute of Computing Technology, CAS, Beijing, China, Beijing, China
1 shared publication Jian Wang
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication- Jian Wang
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication Weiqiong Cao
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication- Weiqiong Cao
Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 781-804
Secret in OnePiece: Single-Bit Fault Attack on Kyber
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 781-804
Secret in OnePiece: Single-Bit Fault Attack on Kyber
- 23 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 42 (8) , 2461-2474
Easily Overlooked Vulnerability in Implementation: Practical Fault Attack on ECDSA Round Counter
ECC is a widely used public key cryptosystem. Though it has good theoretical security, it is still vulnerable to some physical attacks due to the implementation weakness. To resist the attacks, a number of physical countermeasures have been proposed. However, there are still some implementation vulnerabilities that may be overlooked, leading to more practical and effective attacks. In this paper, we construct a new fault attack on round counter which is a component of scalar multiplications in ECDSA. The attack is divided into two parts. In the first part, the partial bits of nonce in each signature can be recovered by the fault injection on round counter. In the second part, an efficient lattice attack can be constructed to recover the private key by combining the recovered bits. Compared with other lattice-based fault attacks, our attack has the advantage of practicability and effectiveness. Especially it has less requirement of moment precision and wide applicability of scalar multiplications, which is the critical factors for practicability and effectiveness. To verify the strength of our attack, we carry on the laser injection experiments respectively on an AVR MCU(ATmega163L) and a Kintex-7 FPGA(XC7K325T). The experiment results verify the practicability and effectiveness of the attack in both software and hardware platform. Finally, we also propose two directions for efficient countermeasures against our attack.
- 23 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Vol. 42 (8) , 2461-2474
Easily Overlooked Vulnerability in Implementation: Practical Fault Attack on ECDSA Round Counter
ECC is a widely used public key cryptosystem. Though it has good theoretical security, it is still vulnerable to some physical attacks due to the implementation weakness. To resist the attacks, a number of physical countermeasures have been proposed. However, there are still some implementation vulnerabilities that may be overlooked, leading to more practical and effective attacks. In this paper, we construct a new fault attack on round counter which is a component of scalar multiplications in ECDSA. The attack is divided into two parts. In the first part, the partial bits of nonce in each signature can be recovered by the fault injection on round counter. In the second part, an efficient lattice attack can be constructed to recover the private key by combining the recovered bits. Compared with other lattice-based fault attacks, our attack has the advantage of practicability and effectiveness. Especially it has less requirement of moment precision and wide applicability of scalar multiplications, which is the critical factors for practicability and effectiveness. To verify the strength of our attack, we carry on the laser injection experiments respectively on an AVR MCU(ATmega163L) and a Kintex-7 FPGA(XC7K325T). The experiment results verify the practicability and effectiveness of the attack in both software and hardware platform. Finally, we also propose two directions for efficient countermeasures against our attack.