Yongjin Ma
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yongjin Ma has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Changbing Tang
Zhejiang Normal University
1 shared publication - Feilong Lin
Zhejiang Normal University
1 shared publication - Shengnan Xia
College of Mathematics and Computer Science, Zhejiang Normal Univeristy, Jinhua, Zhejiang China
1 shared publication - Xinghuo Yu
RMIT University
1 shared publication - Zhongyu Chen
School of Computer Science and Technology Zhejiang Normal University 321004 Jinhua P. R. China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 April 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
- Vol. 69 (7) , 6856-6868
A Bayesian Game Based Vehicle-to-Vehicle Electricity Trading Scheme for Blockchain-Enabled Internet of Vehicles
With ever increasing people's awareness of low carbon and environmental protection, electric vehicles are gradually gaining wide popularity. However, the driving endurance of the electric vehicle is the biggest shortage that hinders the fully acceptance of this new vehicle technology. To deal with this shortage, this paper proposed a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) electricity trading scheme based on Bayesian game pricing in blockchain-enabled Internet of vehicles (BIoV). Specifically, the Bayesian game is adopted for pricing in the distributed BIoV with incomplete information sharing. The optimal pricing under the linear strategic equilibrium has been obtained which maximizes the utilities of both sides of electricity transaction. The transaction volume is determined from the formulated convex problem that maximizes the social welfare. Then, the pricing game is implemented by the dedicated smart contract. Blockchain guarantees its trustworthiness, security, and reliability. Finally, the experimental results show that referring to the benchmark of static game with complete information, the proposed Bayesian game with incomplete information can achieve approximate satisfaction of users. The degree of approximation can reach to 98% when the pricing ranges of buyers and sellers are close. Moreover, the proposed scheme has great advantages over the static game with complete information in terms of communication overhead and timeliness in the decentralized IoVs.
- 27 April 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
- Vol. 69 (7) , 6856-6868
A Bayesian Game Based Vehicle-to-Vehicle Electricity Trading Scheme for Blockchain-Enabled Internet of Vehicles
With ever increasing people's awareness of low carbon and environmental protection, electric vehicles are gradually gaining wide popularity. However, the driving endurance of the electric vehicle is the biggest shortage that hinders the fully acceptance of this new vehicle technology. To deal with this shortage, this paper proposed a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) electricity trading scheme based on Bayesian game pricing in blockchain-enabled Internet of vehicles (BIoV). Specifically, the Bayesian game is adopted for pricing in the distributed BIoV with incomplete information sharing. The optimal pricing under the linear strategic equilibrium has been obtained which maximizes the utilities of both sides of electricity transaction. The transaction volume is determined from the formulated convex problem that maximizes the social welfare. Then, the pricing game is implemented by the dedicated smart contract. Blockchain guarantees its trustworthiness, security, and reliability. Finally, the experimental results show that referring to the benchmark of static game with complete information, the proposed Bayesian game with incomplete information can achieve approximate satisfaction of users. The degree of approximation can reach to 98% when the pricing ranges of buyers and sellers are close. Moreover, the proposed scheme has great advantages over the static game with complete information in terms of communication overhead and timeliness in the decentralized IoVs.