Michelle Y. Lu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Michelle Y. Lu has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Song Lin
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
2 shared publications - T. Tony Ke
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
2 shared publications Jiwoong Shin
Yale School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
Brand-Neutral Content Marketing and Endogenous Search Prominence
Brand-neutral content marketing attracts consumers by addressing category-level needs without directly promoting the brand. Although this may position a firm as consumers’ first point of inquiry, it leaves consumers only partially informed about brand fit. Rivals can exploit this gap by providing brand-specific information. Using a game-theoretic framework, we examine when content marketing generates endogenous search prominence and how the resulting search dynamics shape competitive communication strategies. We show that content marketing can provide a counterintuitive competitive edge: by shaping the information structure of consumer search, it influences rival pricing incentives, giving rise to asymmetric communication equilibria sustained by an information–exploitation tradeoff that governs profit allocation between the prominent gatekeeper and the non-prominent follower. When prices cannot be credibly committed, exploitation permanently dominates and content marketing becomes the unique equilibrium strategy. Brand strength and appeal breadth further determine which firm adopts content marketing.
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
Brand-Neutral Content Marketing and Endogenous Search Prominence
Brand-neutral content marketing attracts consumers by addressing category-level needs without directly promoting the brand. Although this may position a firm as consumers’ first point of inquiry, it leaves consumers only partially informed about brand fit. Rivals can exploit this gap by providing brand-specific information. Using a game-theoretic framework, we examine when content marketing generates endogenous search prominence and how the resulting search dynamics shape competitive communication strategies. We show that content marketing can provide a counterintuitive competitive edge: by shaping the information structure of consumer search, it influences rival pricing incentives, giving rise to asymmetric communication equilibria sustained by an information–exploitation tradeoff that governs profit allocation between the prominent gatekeeper and the non-prominent follower. When prices cannot be credibly committed, exploitation permanently dominates and content marketing becomes the unique equilibrium strategy. Brand strength and appeal breadth further determine which firm adopts content marketing.
- Top Cited Papers
- 15 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Information Design of Online Platforms
We study how an online platform strategically uses information to both guide consumer search and influence sellers’ targeted advertising. Our model unifies personalized recommendations and targeted ads under an information design framework. We illustrate a fundamental tradeoff facing the platform between improving match efficiency and extracting seller surplus by inducing their competition for prominence. The optimal information design may be socially inefficient because it balances the tradeoff by limiting consumer search and mixing the matched product with a long tail of unmatched ones for recommendation. This implies that sponsored targeted advertising on retail platforms may introduce match inefficiency. This paper was accepted by Greg Shaffer, marketing. Funding: T. T. Ke acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72422003 and 72394395] and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grant 14503122].
- 15 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Top Cited PapersInformation Design of Online Platforms
We study how an online platform strategically uses information to both guide consumer search and influence sellers’ targeted advertising. Our model unifies personalized recommendations and targeted ads under an information design framework. We illustrate a fundamental tradeoff facing the platform between improving match efficiency and extracting seller surplus by inducing their competition for prominence. The optimal information design may be socially inefficient because it balances the tradeoff by limiting consumer search and mixing the matched product with a long tail of unmatched ones for recommendation. This implies that sponsored targeted advertising on retail platforms may introduce match inefficiency. This paper was accepted by Greg Shaffer, marketing. Funding: T. T. Ke acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72422003 and 72394395] and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grant 14503122].
- Open Access
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 912
Information Design of Online Platforms
We consider the strategic use of information by an online platform to both guide consumers' search through product recommendations and influence sellers' targeted advertising decision. Drawing on Bayesian persuasion, we posit that the platform can design a public signal that influences the beliefs of both consumers and sellers. Upon observing the signal, a consumer can conduct a sequential search with perfect recall among the sellers. After visiting a seller, the consumer observes the product price and whether the product is a match or not. Sellers set prices and decide how much to bid in an ad auction for each consumer, where the winner is granted a prominent position. The consumer can obtain the price and match information of the seller in the prominent position at no cost, but incur search cost to visit additional sellers.
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 912
Open AccessInformation Design of Online Platforms
We consider the strategic use of information by an online platform to both guide consumers' search through product recommendations and influence sellers' targeted advertising decision. Drawing on Bayesian persuasion, we posit that the platform can design a public signal that influences the beliefs of both consumers and sellers. Upon observing the signal, a consumer can conduct a sequential search with perfect recall among the sellers. After visiting a seller, the consumer observes the product price and whether the product is a match or not. Sellers set prices and decide how much to bid in an ad auction for each consumer, where the winner is granted a prominent position. The consumer can obtain the price and match information of the seller in the prominent position at no cost, but incur search cost to visit additional sellers.
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 37 (3) , 382-402
A Model of Two-Sided Costly Communication for Building New Product Category Demand
When a firm introduces a radical innovation, consumers are unaware of the product’s uses and benefits. Moreover, consumers are unsure of whether they even need the product. In this situation, we consider the role of marketing communication as generating consumers’ need recognition and thus market demand for a novel product. In particular, we model marketing communication as a two-sided process that involves both firms’ and consumers’ costly efforts to transmit and assimilate a novel product concept. When the marketing communication takes on a two-sided process, we study a firm’s different information disclosure strategies for its radical innovation. We find that sharing innovation, instead of extracting a higher rent by keeping the idea secret, can be optimal. A firm may benefit from the presence of a competitor and its communication effort. The innovator can share its innovation so that competitors can also benefit, which encourages rivals to enter the market. The presence of such competition guarantees a higher surplus for consumers, which can induce greater consumer effort in a two-sided communication process. Moreover, the increased consumer effort, in turn, prompts complementarity in the communication process and lessens the potential free-riding effect in communication between firms. Additionally, it encourages the rival firm to exert more effort, especially when the role of consumers becomes more important. Sharing innovation with a rival serves as a mechanism to induce more efforts in a two-sided communication process. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1071 .
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 37 (3) , 382-402
A Model of Two-Sided Costly Communication for Building New Product Category Demand
When a firm introduces a radical innovation, consumers are unaware of the product’s uses and benefits. Moreover, consumers are unsure of whether they even need the product. In this situation, we consider the role of marketing communication as generating consumers’ need recognition and thus market demand for a novel product. In particular, we model marketing communication as a two-sided process that involves both firms’ and consumers’ costly efforts to transmit and assimilate a novel product concept. When the marketing communication takes on a two-sided process, we study a firm’s different information disclosure strategies for its radical innovation. We find that sharing innovation, instead of extracting a higher rent by keeping the idea secret, can be optimal. A firm may benefit from the presence of a competitor and its communication effort. The innovator can share its innovation so that competitors can also benefit, which encourages rivals to enter the market. The presence of such competition guarantees a higher surplus for consumers, which can induce greater consumer effort in a two-sided communication process. Moreover, the increased consumer effort, in turn, prompts complementarity in the communication process and lessens the potential free-riding effect in communication between firms. Additionally, it encourages the rival firm to exert more effort, especially when the role of consumers becomes more important. Sharing innovation with a rival serves as a mechanism to induce more efforts in a two-sided communication process. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1071 .