Elena Grossfeld
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Elena Grossfeld has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Huw Dylan
King’s College London
4 shared publications - David V. Gioe
King’s College London
2 shared publications Daniela Richterova
1 shared publication- Magda Long
University of Nottingham
1 shared publication Patrick Bury
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Dialogues on Digital Society
- Vol. 1 (3) , 407-412
Revisionist future: Russia's assault on large language models, the distortion of collective memory, and the politics of eternity
This article explores how Russian disinformation networks exploit large language models (LLMs) to advance what Timothy Snyder, in his book The Road to Unfreedom , describes as ‘the politics of eternity’ – a worldview that replaces progress with cyclical narratives of national victimhood and mythologised pasts, thereby legitimising authoritarian permanence. Drawing parallels with Orwell's concept of manipulated social memory in 1984 , the article examines how the contamination of AI training data represents a new phase in information warfare. Unlike traditional propaganda, tainted datasets embed lasting distortions in digital memory, subtly reshaping how societies understand history and truth. By examining examples of LLM manipulation, the article shows how such systems are used to amplify the Kremlin's message and narrative, and to erode fact-based discourse. This technological evolution reveals how modern information infrastructures are being weaponised to fragment shared reality and thereby to weaken the potential for political resistance.
- 29 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Dialogues on Digital Society
- Vol. 1 (3) , 407-412
Open AccessRevisionist future: Russia's assault on large language models, the distortion of collective memory, and the politics of eternity
This article explores how Russian disinformation networks exploit large language models (LLMs) to advance what Timothy Snyder, in his book The Road to Unfreedom , describes as ‘the politics of eternity’ – a worldview that replaces progress with cyclical narratives of national victimhood and mythologised pasts, thereby legitimising authoritarian permanence. Drawing parallels with Orwell's concept of manipulated social memory in 1984 , the article examines how the contamination of AI training data represents a new phase in information warfare. Unlike traditional propaganda, tainted datasets embed lasting distortions in digital memory, subtly reshaping how societies understand history and truth. By examining examples of LLM manipulation, the article shows how such systems are used to amplify the Kremlin's message and narrative, and to erode fact-based discourse. This technological evolution reveals how modern information infrastructures are being weaponised to fragment shared reality and thereby to weaken the potential for political resistance.
- Open Access
- 22 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- p. 1-25
Unveiling Russian intelligence failures in the Ukraine conflict: a strategic culture perspective
- 22 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- p. 1-25
Open AccessUnveiling Russian intelligence failures in the Ukraine conflict: a strategic culture perspective
- 7 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The RUSI Journal
- Vol. 170 (4) , 88-90
The Russian Way of Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Coercion, and War
- 7 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The RUSI Journal
- Vol. 170 (4) , 88-90
The Russian Way of Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Coercion, and War
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 28 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The RUSI Journal
- Vol. 169 (5) , 10-21
Russian Sabotage in the Gig-Economy Era
Fires. Cyber attacks. Destroyed subsea communications and defence industry cables. Power outages at major airports. Trains delayed in strange circumstances. Sometimes it is hard to know exactly whe...
- 28 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The RUSI Journal
- Vol. 169 (5) , 10-21
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessRussian Sabotage in the Gig-Economy Era
Fires. Cyber attacks. Destroyed subsea communications and defence industry cables. Power outages at major airports. Trains delayed in strange circumstances. Sometimes it is hard to know exactly whe...
- Open Access
- 14 June 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 27 (2) , 510-528
The Autocrat’s Indispensable Service: How Russian Intelligence secured Vladimir Putin’s Regime after failing him in Ukraine
Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft – war – before Russia’s 2022 (re)invasion of Ukraine but has since somewhat recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article complements our previous article in this journal, The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War , which examined the systemic roots of Russia’s intelligence failure in early 2022. In this follow-on article exploring Russian intelligence’s traditional areas of (relative) competence in the period following the full-scale invasion, we consider the categories of espionage, sanctions evasion, active measures, and repression, and conclude that Putin’s security and intelligence organs have reasserted themselves with terrible vigour, domestically and internationally. Despite notable failings – and some flaps – they have been indispensable to Putin by securing his regime, at least through mid-2024.
- 14 June 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 27 (2) , 510-528
Open AccessThe Autocrat’s Indispensable Service: How Russian Intelligence secured Vladimir Putin’s Regime after failing him in Ukraine
Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft – war – before Russia’s 2022 (re)invasion of Ukraine but has since somewhat recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article complements our previous article in this journal, The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War , which examined the systemic roots of Russia’s intelligence failure in early 2022. In this follow-on article exploring Russian intelligence’s traditional areas of (relative) competence in the period following the full-scale invasion, we consider the categories of espionage, sanctions evasion, active measures, and repression, and conclude that Putin’s security and intelligence organs have reasserted themselves with terrible vigour, domestically and internationally. Despite notable failings – and some flaps – they have been indispensable to Putin by securing his regime, at least through mid-2024.
- Open Access
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-30
Russia’s Declining Satellite Reconnaissance Capabilities and Its Implications for Security and International Stability
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-30
Open AccessRussia’s Declining Satellite Reconnaissance Capabilities and Its Implications for Security and International Stability
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 29 December 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 25 (3) , 385-404
The autocrat’s intelligence paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War
Autocratic leaders rely on intelligence machineries for regime and personal security. They often manage large, powerful, unaccountable organisations, which they hold close. But, despite their close relationship with - and reliance upon - intelligence, autocrats also frequently struggle to use it to enhance decision-making and foreign policy, and consequently suffer avoidable intelligence failures. This article argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is illustrative of this broader, though understudied, pattern of autocratic mismanagement of strategic intelligence. The invasion was both spurred and accompanied by a catastrophic intelligence failure, the responsibility for which rests with Vladimir Putin, the arbiter of a system with limited capacity to offer dispassionate strategic assessments. His failure is characteristic of autocratic regimes assessing foreign developments, including Putin’s Soviet predecessors. This article contributes to the emerging scholarship on intelligence in autocratic regimes by examining Putin’s use of intelligence in the Ukraine War in the context of the broader literature on intelligence and decision.
- 29 December 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 25 (3) , 385-404
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe autocrat’s intelligence paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis)management of Russian strategic assessment in the Ukraine War
Autocratic leaders rely on intelligence machineries for regime and personal security. They often manage large, powerful, unaccountable organisations, which they hold close. But, despite their close relationship with - and reliance upon - intelligence, autocrats also frequently struggle to use it to enhance decision-making and foreign policy, and consequently suffer avoidable intelligence failures. This article argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is illustrative of this broader, though understudied, pattern of autocratic mismanagement of strategic intelligence. The invasion was both spurred and accompanied by a catastrophic intelligence failure, the responsibility for which rests with Vladimir Putin, the arbiter of a system with limited capacity to offer dispassionate strategic assessments. His failure is characteristic of autocratic regimes assessing foreign developments, including Putin’s Soviet predecessors. This article contributes to the emerging scholarship on intelligence in autocratic regimes by examining Putin’s use of intelligence in the Ukraine War in the context of the broader literature on intelligence and decision.