Christopher Register
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Christopher Register has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brian David Earp
National University of Singapore
5 shared publications - Julian Savulescu
National University of Singapore
4 shared publications - Cristina Voinea
Uehiro Oxford Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
3 shared publications Sebastian Porsdam Mann
3 shared publications- Julian J. Koplin
Monash University
2 shared publications Julian Savulescu
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Neuroethics
- Vol. 19 (2) , 42
Digital Life Models and Transformative Choices: Could AI Simulations of Individual Minds (AI SIMs) Help us Make Important Life Decisions More Rationally and Authentically?
The article advances the idea of "digital life models" to assist with difficult personal decisions, including those that can change an individual in profound ways. We propose that if personalized AI simulations can model how an individual's life might unfold under different conditions, this could help the individual better understand the likelihoods and expected subjective value of these possible outcomes. It remains to be seen whether these digital life models are technically feasible, given fundamental challenges in modeling psychological complexity, person-environment interactions, and value change. Ethical concerns include data privacy, cultural bias, and the risk of improperly shaping user decisions. Acknowledging these limitations, we argue that digital life models, if successfully developed, could in principle enhance rational and authentic decision-making in the face of potentially transformative change.
- 15 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Neuroethics
- Vol. 19 (2) , 42
Open AccessDigital Life Models and Transformative Choices: Could AI Simulations of Individual Minds (AI SIMs) Help us Make Important Life Decisions More Rationally and Authentically?
The article advances the idea of "digital life models" to assist with difficult personal decisions, including those that can change an individual in profound ways. We propose that if personalized AI simulations can model how an individual's life might unfold under different conditions, this could help the individual better understand the likelihoods and expected subjective value of these possible outcomes. It remains to be seen whether these digital life models are technically feasible, given fundamental challenges in modeling psychological complexity, person-environment interactions, and value change. Ethical concerns include data privacy, cultural bias, and the risk of improperly shaping user decisions. Acknowledging these limitations, we argue that digital life models, if successfully developed, could in principle enhance rational and authentic decision-making in the face of potentially transformative change.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 12 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
The Sorrows of Young Chatbot Users: Harm and Responsibility in Human-AI Relationships
This paper argues that interactions with chatbots are a form of engaging with fictional characters; so, by comparing chatbots with novels and video games as mediums of fictional engagement, we can gain a clearer understanding of who, if anyone, is responsible when users’ interactions with chatbots lead to self-harm or harm to others. We explore the differences between novels, video games, and chatbots across four dimensions: the degree of creators’ control over the content and user experience, the nature of the fictional world, the type of engagement each medium fosters, and the structure of the engagement experience. We take a minimal account of what it takes to be morally responsible and consider how responsibility can be assigned when engagement with fictional worlds results in harm caused to or by users. We argue that because AI companies have some control over chatbots after public release, and because they can monitor user engagement, they are morally responsible when chatbot use leads to harm, even if they can’t perfectly control chatbots’ outputs. In the last section, we point to what AI companies can do to mitigate chatbots’ negative influence on users.
- 12 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe Sorrows of Young Chatbot Users: Harm and Responsibility in Human-AI Relationships
This paper argues that interactions with chatbots are a form of engaging with fictional characters; so, by comparing chatbots with novels and video games as mediums of fictional engagement, we can gain a clearer understanding of who, if anyone, is responsible when users’ interactions with chatbots lead to self-harm or harm to others. We explore the differences between novels, video games, and chatbots across four dimensions: the degree of creators’ control over the content and user experience, the nature of the fictional world, the type of engagement each medium fosters, and the structure of the engagement experience. We take a minimal account of what it takes to be morally responsible and consider how responsibility can be assigned when engagement with fictional worlds results in harm caused to or by users. We argue that because AI companies have some control over chatbots after public release, and because they can monitor user engagement, they are morally responsible when chatbot use leads to harm, even if they can’t perfectly control chatbots’ outputs. In the last section, we point to what AI companies can do to mitigate chatbots’ negative influence on users.
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (12) , 95-99
Digital Life Models and the Genomic Knowledge Paradox: A Proposal for AI-Assisted Reflection in Genetic Decision-Making
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (12) , 95-99
Digital Life Models and the Genomic Knowledge Paradox: A Proposal for AI-Assisted Reflection in Genetic Decision-Making
- Open Access
- 18 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1-28
Privacy and Human-AI Relationships
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents such as chatbots and personal AI assistants are increasingly popular. These technologies raise new privacy concerns beyond those posed by other AI systems or information technologies. For example, anthropomorphic features of AI chatbots may invite users to disclose more information with these systems than they would otherwise, especially when users interact with chatbots in relationship-like ways. In this paper, we aim to develop a framework for assessing the distinctive privacy ramifications of AI agents, especially as humans begin to interact with them in relationship-like ways. In particular, we draw from prominent theories of privacy and results from human relational psychology to better understand how AI agents may affect human behavior and the flow of personal information. We then assess how these effects could bear on eight distinct values of privacy, such as autonomy, the value of forming and maintaining relationships, security from harm, and more.
- 18 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1-28
Open AccessPrivacy and Human-AI Relationships
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents such as chatbots and personal AI assistants are increasingly popular. These technologies raise new privacy concerns beyond those posed by other AI systems or information technologies. For example, anthropomorphic features of AI chatbots may invite users to disclose more information with these systems than they would otherwise, especially when users interact with chatbots in relationship-like ways. In this paper, we aim to develop a framework for assessing the distinctive privacy ramifications of AI agents, especially as humans begin to interact with them in relationship-like ways. In particular, we draw from prominent theories of privacy and results from human relational psychology to better understand how AI agents may affect human behavior and the flow of personal information. We then assess how these effects could bear on eight distinct values of privacy, such as autonomy, the value of forming and maintaining relationships, security from harm, and more.
- Open Access
- 26 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 182 (11-12) , 3225-3246
Individuating artificial moral patients
We may create artificial intelligence (AI) systems that matter morally for their own sake and thus are moral patients. In that case, we would have reasons to treat them well and avoid treating them badly. How we should treat AI moral patients depends in part on how they are to be individuated, that is, how they should be counted and identified, at a time and over time. If we don’t know how to individuate them, then we won’t know how we should treat them. In turn, we face several moral risks. After describing four types of moral risks posed by the individuation question, I discuss why individuating AI patients is harder than individuating human persons, diagnosing why existing theories of personal identity do not address these risks.
- 26 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 182 (11-12) , 3225-3246
Open AccessIndividuating artificial moral patients
We may create artificial intelligence (AI) systems that matter morally for their own sake and thus are moral patients. In that case, we would have reasons to treat them well and avoid treating them badly. How we should treat AI moral patients depends in part on how they are to be individuated, that is, how they should be counted and identified, at a time and over time. If we don’t know how to individuate them, then we won’t know how we should treat them. In turn, we face several moral risks. After describing four types of moral risks posed by the individuation question, I discuss why individuating AI patients is harder than individuating human persons, diagnosing why existing theories of personal identity do not address these risks.
- Open Access
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 38 (7) , 3340-3383
Psychedelics beyond medicine: Treatment, enhancement, hype, consent, and the limits of medicalization
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 38 (7) , 3340-3383
Open AccessPsychedelics beyond medicine: Treatment, enhancement, hype, consent, and the limits of medicalization
- Open Access
- 14 August 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Philosophers' Imprint
- Vol. 25
The Depth of the Body
A person's body is extended in space, and parts of their body occupy spatial regions. In that way, the body has a dimension of breadth in space. Yet, there is another, less appreciated dimension of the body: its depth. Roughly speaking, the depth of the body is the level of abstraction of its parts. Characteristically, and in particular for moral purposes, the depth of the body is rather high-level. Low-level objects and properties, such as individual molecules, do not really fall within the purview of the moral body--the body as it figures in various morally significant rights and interests. As I will argue, the depth of the body becomes more salient and relevant when people come to have partly digital embodiments, such as when brain-computer interfaces are integrated into their bodily processes. The dimension of depth, it turns out, is crucial for properly understanding the moral significance of brain-computer interfaces. Here, I develop a theory of depth to complement existing theories of the body and use it to improve our understanding of the purview of bodily rights and interests.
- 14 August 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Philosophers' Imprint
- Vol. 25
Open AccessThe Depth of the Body
A person's body is extended in space, and parts of their body occupy spatial regions. In that way, the body has a dimension of breadth in space. Yet, there is another, less appreciated dimension of the body: its depth. Roughly speaking, the depth of the body is the level of abstraction of its parts. Characteristically, and in particular for moral purposes, the depth of the body is rather high-level. Low-level objects and properties, such as individual molecules, do not really fall within the purview of the moral body--the body as it figures in various morally significant rights and interests. As I will argue, the depth of the body becomes more salient and relevant when people come to have partly digital embodiments, such as when brain-computer interfaces are integrated into their bodily processes. The dimension of depth, it turns out, is crucial for properly understanding the moral significance of brain-computer interfaces. Here, I develop a theory of depth to complement existing theories of the body and use it to improve our understanding of the purview of bodily rights and interests.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by F1000 Research Ltd in Wellcome Open Research
- Vol. 10
Psychedelics as moral bioenhancers: Protocol for a scoping review of ethical arguments for and against
Background Moral bioenhancement typically refers to the deliberate use of drugs or biotechnologies, potentially alongside other practices, to attempt to improve oneself morally. In addition to general concerns regarding moral self-bioenhancement, the possibility of using psychedelic substances for such purposes raises distinct ethical questions. As a first step in analysing these questions, we intend to perform a scoping review of the existing arguments for and against the use of psychedelics as moral bioenhancers. We will focus primarily on voluntary use by individuals, although voluntary use by couples or small groups will be considered. The present contribution is a protocol for this scoping review. Methods Our scoping review will adhere to the Joanna Briggs Institute methodology, which involves five stages: (1) identifying the research question, (2) developing the search strategy, (3) setting inclusion criteria, (4) extracting data, and (5) presenting and analysing the results. We will include both published and unpublished sources if they explicitly present ethical arguments for or against the voluntary use of psychedelics as intentional moral bioenhancers in adults. We will search for relevant studies in Embase, MEDLINE, Web of Science, Google Scholar, The National Library of Medicine, the Cumulated Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature, Philosopher’s Index, the Bioethics Literature Database, EthxWeb, PhilPapers, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Philosopher’s Index, EBSCO, BASE, and WorldCat. Sources will be excluded if (a) the full text is inaccessible, (b) the main text is in a language other than English, or (c) the focus is not primarily on ethical arguments (for example, focusing primarily on the clinical use of psychedelics for treatment). Two raters will independently assess all articles for eligibility, with disagreements to be resolved with a third reviewer. Data from eligible articles will be charted using a standardised data extraction form. The data will be analysed following PRISMA-ScR guidelines.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by F1000 Research Ltd in Wellcome Open Research
- Vol. 10
Open AccessPsychedelics as moral bioenhancers: Protocol for a scoping review of ethical arguments for and against
Background Moral bioenhancement typically refers to the deliberate use of drugs or biotechnologies, potentially alongside other practices, to attempt to improve oneself morally. In addition to general concerns regarding moral self-bioenhancement, the possibility of using psychedelic substances for such purposes raises distinct ethical questions. As a first step in analysing these questions, we intend to perform a scoping review of the existing arguments for and against the use of psychedelics as moral bioenhancers. We will focus primarily on voluntary use by individuals, although voluntary use by couples or small groups will be considered. The present contribution is a protocol for this scoping review. Methods Our scoping review will adhere to the Joanna Briggs Institute methodology, which involves five stages: (1) identifying the research question, (2) developing the search strategy, (3) setting inclusion criteria, (4) extracting data, and (5) presenting and analysing the results. We will include both published and unpublished sources if they explicitly present ethical arguments for or against the voluntary use of psychedelics as intentional moral bioenhancers in adults. We will search for relevant studies in Embase, MEDLINE, Web of Science, Google Scholar, The National Library of Medicine, the Cumulated Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature, Philosopher’s Index, the Bioethics Literature Database, EthxWeb, PhilPapers, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Philosopher’s Index, EBSCO, BASE, and WorldCat. Sources will be excluded if (a) the full text is inaccessible, (b) the main text is in a language other than English, or (c) the focus is not primarily on ethical arguments (for example, focusing primarily on the clinical use of psychedelics for treatment). Two raters will independently assess all articles for eligibility, with disagreements to be resolved with a third reviewer. Data from eligible articles will be charted using a standardised data extraction form. The data will be analysed following PRISMA-ScR guidelines.
- 1 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-24
Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity
- 1 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-24
Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity
- 10 October 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 74 (3) , 920-940
How to Explain the Importance of Persons
We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite problem.
- 10 October 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 74 (3) , 920-940
How to Explain the Importance of Persons
We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite problem.