Samuel Camenzind

In Switzerland, approximately 1.2 million animals are used annually for scientific purposes. This number includes animals directly involved in experiments as well as those excluded due to factors like genotype, sex, or age —so-called “surplus animals”. While ethical debates in animal research have focused largely on the pain and suffering caused by procedures such as surgeries or injections, much less attention has been paid to moral issues raised bysurplus animals. These animals are typically housed under standard laboratory conditions and killed when deemed unnecessary. Although the Swiss Animal Welfare Act aims to protect the dignity and welfare of all sentient animals, standardhousing conditions and the killing by (legally) accepted methods are not considered a harm.In this paper, we argue that this oversight leads to an underestimation of the harms involved in animal research. We make three claims: (i) the death of research animals — whether used in experiments or not — should be recognized as a non-sentientist harm; (ii) since standard killing methods often cause pain or distress, the killing of (surplus) animals should be considered a sentientist harm; and (iii) standard housing conditions in research facilities frustrate animal interests and potentially negatively impact animal welfare and thus should be reassessed with regards to their potential sentientist and non-sentientist harms. Since surplus animals are affected by various harms, moral and legal consideration should be given to their housing and killing in research.

Background: The Federal Ethics Committee on Non‐Human Biotechnology (ECNH) of Switzerland is an independent expert committee appointed by the Federal Council and mandated to advise the federal authorities from an ethical perspective in the field of nonhuman biotechnology and gene technology. Due to recent developments in the field of xenotransplantation after the introduction of genome editing technologies, the ECNH has commissioned an expert report on the ethical questions of xenotransplantation with a focus on animal ethics. The subject of the inquiry is, in particular, if current developments in the field of xenotransplantation raise new questions regarding ethics in the nonhuman realm or if existing questions have to be re‐examined and answered anew.Methods: An interdisciplinary approach was applied to answer this question. Based on the latest empirical results from medicine and biotechnology, xenotransplantation is analyzed and evaluated with reference to the dignity of the creature (Würde der Kreatur)—which is defined in the Swiss Federal Constitution—and the dignity of animals (Tierwürde) that is stipulated in the Swiss Animal Welfare Act and the Federal Act on Non‐Human Gene Technology, as well as contemporary positions in the ethics of the human–animal relationship.Results: The report concludes that genome editing for xenotransplantation does not generate any qualitatively new ethical issues concerning ethics in the nonhuman realm.However, contemporary biotechnological developments must be taken as an opportunity to discuss existing ethical issues in an urgent and intensified manner, particularly regarding the significance of animals' moral standing. The lack of consideration of animal‐related aspects and the neglect of current developments and the state of the art of animal ethics in the recent discussion about xenotransplantation is a scientific, ethical, and political issue because animals are most negatively affected by xenotransplantation. This is especially relevant because the contemporary state of the art in animal ethics tends to consider and protect animals more strongly than in the past.

Can nonhuman animals be used for the benefit of humans in a scientifically and morally justified manner and, if yes, how? Based on our own experiences as scholars from various academic backgrounds, we argue that this question can only be answered as an interdisciplinary and international endeavor, considering insights from research ethics and animal ethics as well as scientific and legal aspects. The aim of this article is to contribute to the foundation of the emerging field of animal research ethics. In doing so, we describe the following seven phases of animal research experiments: ethical, legal and social presumptions (phase 0), planning (phase I), review (phase II), conduct of experiments (phase III), publication/dissemination (phase IV), further exploitation of results (phase V), and evaluation (phase VI). In total, 20 key ethical, legal, and practical challenges that an ethical framework for the use of animals in research needs to address are identified and analyzed. Finally, we characterize the following four meta-challenges and opportunities associated with animal research ethics as a field: (1) moral pluralism, (2) the integration of views and positions outside the laboratory, (3) international plurality of conduct, standards, and legal norms, and (4) interdisciplinary education.

The Animal Rights View (ARV) has to be understood as a close interrelation between philosophical, ethical and political doctrines. Historically and politically the ARV can be seen as an expansion of human rights as for instance mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), to sentient animals in general and not human animals only. Having its origin in the 18th and 19th centuries, it aims to protect sentient animals from specific human use, such as hunting, human entertainment in zoos and circuses, or harmful animal research. The presented position in this chapter is an egalitarian sentientist animal rights position that claims that every sentient being should be granted three basic, individual rights – the right of freedom, right of defence and the right to assistance. Its political and philosophical background will be outlined first, followed by the evaluation of the three presented cases with the normative standards of ARV. It will be shown that the ARV would strongly limit the use of animals within scientific research.

Over the past fifty years numerous ethical and political traditions, and positions and sub-positions, have emerged in the fields of animal and environmental ethics. In combination with inconsistent terminology and axiological variation, this has made it difficult for both novices and professional scholars to maintain an overview of these fields. Referring to the preliminary work of Kenneth Goodpaster, William Frankena and Kirsten Schmidt, this paper describes and explains a workable 3D method in which advantageous use is made of three dimensions in ethical argumentation: “moral considerability”, “moral significance” and “moral practice”. The method is a useful research tool for at least three reasons: it allows us to systematically analyze, reconstruct, compare and criticize different normative positions in animal and environmental ethics; it helps ethical theorists to reflect on, and define, their distinctive positions; and it leads to the construction and development of a moral position with the desirable qualities of clarity, transparency, comprehensibility and completeness. First, the 3D method is introduced, and its historical context and origins outlined. Then the three dimensions of the method (moral considerability, moral significance, and moral practice) and their interrelations are considered. The paper concludes with some critical remarks and discusses the limits of the method.

William Russell and Rex Burch's 3Rs principles were developed 1959 before animal ethics emerged as a scientific discipline in the 1970s and before many ground-breaking developments in modern biotechnology, such as genetic engineering. From this starting point we sought to analyse the normative foundations of the 3Rs principles in contemporary terms and concepts of animal ethics. After establishing the normative groundwork of the 3Rs, we will look at their practical implications within the context of present-day biotechnology. To this end, we shall investigate whether the genetic disenhancement of research animals to limit their ability to feel pain (GPD) complies with the original 3Rs principles. We use GPD as a practical example, since it is being discussed today as a promising way of solving one of the key moral issues raised by animal research, notably animal pain and suffering. By discussing GPD in the context of the 3Rs we aim also not only to gain insights into whether GPD is compatible with one or more of the 3Rs, but also to develop a better understanding of the specific normative foundation of the 3Rs principles and the conceptual limitations and practical implications of that foundation. We argue that reducing moral concerns about animal research to those that are intelligible within a sentientist framework (eg harm and suffering), as the 3Rs do, represents an oversimplification of the moral issues involved. We suggest that interference with abilities, instrumentalisation, flourishing, and death are all important aspects of animal ethics requiring consideration.

Criticism of Kant’s position on our moral relationship with animals dates back to the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and Leonard Nelson, but historically Kantian scholars have shown limited interest in the human-animal relationship as such. This situation changed in the mid-1990s with the arrival of several publications arguing for the direct moral considerability of animals within the Kantian ethical framework. Against this, another contemporary Kantian approach has continued to defend Kant’s indirect duty view. In this approach it is argued, first, that it is impossible to establish direct duties to animals, and second, that this is also unnecessary because the Kantian notion that we have indirect duties to animals has far-reaching practical consequences and is to that extent adequate. This paper explores the argument of the far-reaching duties regarding animals in Kant’s ethics and seeks to show that Kantians underestimate essential differences between Kant and his rivals today (i.e., proponents of animal rights and utilitarians) on a practical and fundamental level. It also argues that Kant’s indirect duty view has not been defended convincingly: the defence tends to neglect theory-immanent problems in Kant’s ethics connected with unfounded value assumptions and unconvincing arguments for the denial of animals’ moral status. However, it is suggested that although the human-animal relationship was not a central concern of Kant’s, examination of the animal question within the framework of Kant’s ethics helps us to develop conceptual clarity about his duty concept and the limitations of the reciprocity argument.