Micah Goldblum
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Micah Goldblum has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Tom Goldstein
University of Maryland
3 shared publications - Hossein Souri
Johns Hopkins University, USA
2 shared publications - Samuel Dooley
University of Maryland, USA and Abacus.AI, USA
2 shared publications - Steven Reich
University of Maryland, USA
2 shared publications Tom Goldstein
Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
2 shared publications- Valeriia Cherepanova
University of Maryland, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Image Processing
- Vol. 32 (10577149) , 6346-6358
Towards Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Image and Video Transformers
The transferability of adversarial examples across different convolutional neural networks (CNNs) makes it feasible to perform black-box attacks, resulting in security threats for CNNs. However, fewer endeavors have been made to investigate transferable attacks for vision transformers (ViTs), which achieve superior performance on various computer vision tasks. Unlike CNNs, ViTs establish relationships between patches extracted from inputs by the self-attention module. Thus, adversarial examples crafted on CNNs might hardly attack ViTs. To assess the security of ViTs comprehensively, we investigate the transferability across different ViTs in both untargetd and targeted scenarios. More specifically, we propose a Pay No Attention (PNA) attack, which ignores attention gradients during backpropagation to improve the linearity of backpropagation. Additionally, we introduce a PatchOut/CubeOut attack for image/video ViTs. They optimize perturbations within a randomly selected subset of patches/cubes during each iteration, preventing over-fitting to the white-box surrogate ViT model. Furthermore, we maximize the L2 norm of perturbations, ensuring that the generated adversarial examples deviate significantly from the benign ones. These strategies are designed to be harmoniously compatible. Combining them can enhance transferability by jointly considering patch-based inputs and the self-attention of ViTs. Moreover, the proposed combined attack seamlessly integrates with existing transferable attacks, providing an additional boost to transferability. We conduct experiments on ImageNet and Kinetics-400 for image and video ViTs, respectively. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Image Processing
- Vol. 32 (10577149) , 6346-6358
Towards Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Image and Video Transformers
The transferability of adversarial examples across different convolutional neural networks (CNNs) makes it feasible to perform black-box attacks, resulting in security threats for CNNs. However, fewer endeavors have been made to investigate transferable attacks for vision transformers (ViTs), which achieve superior performance on various computer vision tasks. Unlike CNNs, ViTs establish relationships between patches extracted from inputs by the self-attention module. Thus, adversarial examples crafted on CNNs might hardly attack ViTs. To assess the security of ViTs comprehensively, we investigate the transferability across different ViTs in both untargetd and targeted scenarios. More specifically, we propose a Pay No Attention (PNA) attack, which ignores attention gradients during backpropagation to improve the linearity of backpropagation. Additionally, we introduce a PatchOut/CubeOut attack for image/video ViTs. They optimize perturbations within a randomly selected subset of patches/cubes during each iteration, preventing over-fitting to the white-box surrogate ViT model. Furthermore, we maximize the L2 norm of perturbations, ensuring that the generated adversarial examples deviate significantly from the benign ones. These strategies are designed to be harmoniously compatible. Combining them can enhance transferability by jointly considering patch-based inputs and the self-attention of ViTs. Moreover, the proposed combined attack seamlessly integrates with existing transferable attacks, providing an additional boost to transferability. We conduct experiments on ImageNet and Kinetics-400 for image and video ViTs, respectively. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
- Open Access
- 8 August 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 229-247
A Deep Dive into Dataset Imbalance and Bias in Face Identification
- 8 August 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 229-247
Open AccessA Deep Dive into Dataset Imbalance and Bias in Face Identification
- Open Access
Poisons that are learned faster are more effective
Imperceptible poisoning attacks on entire datasets have recently been touted as methods for protecting data privacy. However, among a number of defenses preventing the practical use of these techniques, early-stopping stands out as a simple, yet effective defense. To gauge poisons' vulnerability to early-stopping, we benchmark error-minimizing, error-maximizing, and synthetic poisons in terms of peak test accuracy over 100 epochs and make a number of surprising observations. First, we find that poisons that reach a low training loss faster have lower peak test accuracy. Second, we find that a current state-of-the-art error-maximizing poison is 7 times less effective when poison training is stopped at epoch 8. Third, we find that stronger, more transferable adversarial attacks do not make stronger poisons. We advocate for evaluating poisons in terms of peak test accuracy.
Open AccessPoisons that are learned faster are more effective
Imperceptible poisoning attacks on entire datasets have recently been touted as methods for protecting data privacy. However, among a number of defenses preventing the practical use of these techniques, early-stopping stands out as a simple, yet effective defense. To gauge poisons' vulnerability to early-stopping, we benchmark error-minimizing, error-maximizing, and synthetic poisons in terms of peak test accuracy over 100 epochs and make a number of surprising observations. First, we find that poisons that reach a low training loss faster have lower peak test accuracy. Second, we find that a current state-of-the-art error-maximizing poison is 7 times less effective when poison training is stopped at epoch 8. Third, we find that stronger, more transferable adversarial attacks do not make stronger poisons. We advocate for evaluating poisons in terms of peak test accuracy.
- Top Cited Papers
- 25 March 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence
- Vol. 45 (2) , 1563-1580
Dataset Security for Machine Learning: Data Poisoning, Backdoor Attacks, and Defenses
As machine learning systems grow in scale, so do their training data requirements, forcing practitioners to automate and outsource the curation of training data in order to achieve state-of-the-art performance. The absence of trustworthy human supervision over the data collection process exposes organizations to security vulnerabilities; training data can be manipulated to control and degrade the downstream behaviors of learned models. The goal of this work is to systematically categorize and discuss a wide range of dataset vulnerabilities and exploits, approaches for defending against these threats, and an array of open problems in this space.
- 25 March 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence
- Vol. 45 (2) , 1563-1580
Top Cited PapersDataset Security for Machine Learning: Data Poisoning, Backdoor Attacks, and Defenses
As machine learning systems grow in scale, so do their training data requirements, forcing practitioners to automate and outsource the curation of training data in order to achieve state-of-the-art performance. The absence of trustworthy human supervision over the data collection process exposes organizations to security vulnerabilities; training data can be manipulated to control and degrade the downstream behaviors of learned models. The goal of this work is to systematically categorize and discuss a wide range of dataset vulnerabilities and exploits, approaches for defending against these threats, and an array of open problems in this space.
- Open Access
A Deep Dive into Dataset Imbalance and Bias in Face Identification
As the deployment of automated face recognition (FR) systems proliferates, bias in these systems is not just an academic question, but a matter of public concern. Media portrayals often center imbalance as the main source of bias, i.e., that FR models perform worse on images of non-white people or women because these demographic groups are underrepresented in training data. Recent academic research paints a more nuanced picture of this relationship. However, previous studies of data imbalance in FR have focused exclusively on the face verification setting, while the face identification setting has been largely ignored, despite being deployed in sensitive applications such as law enforcement. This is an unfortunate omission, as 'imbalance' is a more complex matter in identification; imbalance may arise in not only the training data, but also the testing data, and furthermore may affect the proportion of identities belonging to each demographic group or the number of images belonging to each identity. In this work, we address this gap in the research by thoroughly exploring the effects of each kind of imbalance possible in face identification, and discuss other factors which may impact bias in this setting.
Open AccessA Deep Dive into Dataset Imbalance and Bias in Face Identification
As the deployment of automated face recognition (FR) systems proliferates, bias in these systems is not just an academic question, but a matter of public concern. Media portrayals often center imbalance as the main source of bias, i.e., that FR models perform worse on images of non-white people or women because these demographic groups are underrepresented in training data. Recent academic research paints a more nuanced picture of this relationship. However, previous studies of data imbalance in FR have focused exclusively on the face verification setting, while the face identification setting has been largely ignored, despite being deployed in sensitive applications such as law enforcement. This is an unfortunate omission, as 'imbalance' is a more complex matter in identification; imbalance may arise in not only the training data, but also the testing data, and furthermore may affect the proportion of identities belonging to each demographic group or the number of images belonging to each identity. In this work, we address this gap in the research by thoroughly exploring the effects of each kind of imbalance possible in face identification, and discuss other factors which may impact bias in this setting.