Chao Hu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Chao Hu has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Damian C. Adams
School of Forest Resources and Conservation, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
2 shared publications - Donghao Zhang
Chinese Financial Research Institute, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, PR China
1 shared publication - Huachao Feng
School of Political Science and Law, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, Zhengzhou 450002, China
1 shared publication - Jianping Tao
College of Economics & Management, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, China
1 shared publication - Jing Cheng
School of Humanities and Social Science, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212100, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Refining the Rent Dissipation Model in Land Use: Application to Agricultural Insurance in China
Despite apparent efficiency concerns, the use of agricultural insurance as a policy tool has surged in rural China. Its use offers a natural experiment to assess both economic theory of property rights and agricultural policy effectiveness, and to revisit the rent dissipation model that was originally developed to explain the role of property rights in unsustainable fisheries harvest decisions. We focus on evidence of resource overpricing behavior in the context of subsidized agricultural insurance, including evidence of a theoretically-expected increasing rent pattern. Our results reinforce the importance of transactions costs as a driver of economic inefficiency and highlight the role of social costs as an important factor to explicitly consider when designing agricultural policy. In particular, when employing the formal policy mechanism of rural agricultural insurance, we suggest that informal risk-bearing arrangements can be leveraged to reduce social costs behind apparent overpricing behavior and increase land users’ welfare consistent with intended policy goals.
Open AccessRefining the Rent Dissipation Model in Land Use: Application to Agricultural Insurance in China
Despite apparent efficiency concerns, the use of agricultural insurance as a policy tool has surged in rural China. Its use offers a natural experiment to assess both economic theory of property rights and agricultural policy effectiveness, and to revisit the rent dissipation model that was originally developed to explain the role of property rights in unsustainable fisheries harvest decisions. We focus on evidence of resource overpricing behavior in the context of subsidized agricultural insurance, including evidence of a theoretically-expected increasing rent pattern. Our results reinforce the importance of transactions costs as a driver of economic inefficiency and highlight the role of social costs as an important factor to explicitly consider when designing agricultural policy. In particular, when employing the formal policy mechanism of rural agricultural insurance, we suggest that informal risk-bearing arrangements can be leveraged to reduce social costs behind apparent overpricing behavior and increase land users’ welfare consistent with intended policy goals.
- Open Access
Price Signal of Tilled Land in Rural China: An Empirically Oriented Transaction Costs Study Based on Contract Theory
Prices are effective signals of many market conditions, while underpricing of tilled land in rural China poses a dilemma to this common sense. Using n = 191 imputed contracts in rural China, this paper aims to investigate the role of ambiguous property rights in the context of agricultural reforms. Using rank statistics, several candidate variables in the transaction costs function fc(•) were identified, including BMI (Body Mass Index), Knowledge, Subtraction and Farming Experience. The results show clear evidence for underpricing to restrain competition under ambiguous property rights. More illuminatingly, non-parametric regression analysis specifies a well-founded transaction costs function: increasing Subtraction by one unit increases transaction costs by the equivalent of US$513.40, while a one-year increase of farming experience reduces transaction costs by US$116.20, ceteris paribus. It concludes that social costs behind underpricing are detrimental to China’s rural reform. This study contributes to economic theory, with important implications for policy makers. To encourage smooth transmission of price signals, it is important to consider farmer characteristics and develop professional farmers.
Open AccessPrice Signal of Tilled Land in Rural China: An Empirically Oriented Transaction Costs Study Based on Contract Theory
Prices are effective signals of many market conditions, while underpricing of tilled land in rural China poses a dilemma to this common sense. Using n = 191 imputed contracts in rural China, this paper aims to investigate the role of ambiguous property rights in the context of agricultural reforms. Using rank statistics, several candidate variables in the transaction costs function fc(•) were identified, including BMI (Body Mass Index), Knowledge, Subtraction and Farming Experience. The results show clear evidence for underpricing to restrain competition under ambiguous property rights. More illuminatingly, non-parametric regression analysis specifies a well-founded transaction costs function: increasing Subtraction by one unit increases transaction costs by the equivalent of US$513.40, while a one-year increase of farming experience reduces transaction costs by US$116.20, ceteris paribus. It concludes that social costs behind underpricing are detrimental to China’s rural reform. This study contributes to economic theory, with important implications for policy makers. To encourage smooth transmission of price signals, it is important to consider farmer characteristics and develop professional farmers.