Kevin Berryman

Recent concerns about meditation-related adverse effects (MRAEs) have led to calls for more rigorous informed consent in mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs). This paper examines whether consent procedures are warranted, and under what circumstances, and of what kind, across the diverse settings in which mindfulness is delivered. Drawing on bioethics and the informed consent literature, we argue that although MBIs may involve some risks, the evidence justifying the case for written, formalized informed consent is weak. In clinical medicine and psychotherapeutic practice, consent practices vary according to risk, permanence, invasiveness, and patient control, often relying on informal processes where risk is minimal. We propose a dose-sensitive model of informed consent that functions on a sliding scale, calibrating the intensity of mindfulness practices to the probability of risk, potential harm, and severity of adverse events. Our proportional approach avoids the harms of over-disclosure—including inefficiency, nocebo effects, and autonomy infringement—while still respecting individuals’ rights and mitigating risk. A context-sensitive, proportional consent model better aligns with ethical norms, individual autonomy, and the empirical evidence on risks of adverse effects from mindfulness practices.

This paper explores the conceptualisation of “self” from the perspective of the active inference framework (AIF), advanced meditation and Buddhist literature. We argue that AIF accounts generally emphasise the organismic self—inference supporting agentic adaptive control—while overlooking a distinct aspect: the identified-with self—unperceived subject-creating elements of experience. On the AIF received view of the self, the persistent absence of a self entails dysfunction, in contrast with insight practices, in the context of the meditative endpoint in Buddhism called awakening or nibbana, which seek the permanent elimination of identification while leaving functional agency intact.We propose a two-dimensional articulation of the self that distinguishes between the organismic and identified-with self, and differentiates between reported temporary and persistent trait-like alterations. We examine how meditative deconstruction can temporarily attenuate hierarchically deep inference, disrupting organismic selfing, while long-term meditative development may persistently reduce or even eliminate the identified-with self, yielding a specific kind of selfless experience during ordinary perception, action and cognition–without functional disadvantage. We then take initial steps toward a synthesised AIF account of selfing, proposing that reductions in identified-with selfing unmask lower-level percepts, shorten engagement in higher-level inference, and establish upper limits on the certainty of beliefs.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become increasingly sophisticated in engaging with complex philosophical concepts, a fundamental challenge emerges between technological accessibility of profound nondualist instructions and explanations on one hand and contemplative transformation in nondualist inquiry on the other. Developing nondualist understanding presents unique epistemological challenges due to its trans-discursive nature—requiring non-conceptual recognition that transcends ordinary subject-object cognition. Dialogues with large language models quickly reveal that contemporary AI systems demonstrate remarkable sophistication in clarifying nondualist concepts and simulating traditional Zen teaching methods. However, this technological facility raises questions about what might be termed “simulated understanding”—the possibility that nondualist principles are applied in AI discourse without the dissolution of boundaries that contemplative traditions associate with genuine insight. Arguments highlighting AI’s limitations suggest that the ease of technological access may undermine the struggle and existential friction that contemplative traditions consider essential for authentic realization, while arguments for AI’s utility reveal genuine possibilities as a philosophical partner, offering personalized explanations and democratizing access to esoteric domains. This tension between technological facilitation and contemplative transformation cannot be resolved through theoretical analysis alone, requiring systematic empirical investigation to determine how AI might appropriately support nondualistic understanding without compromising its trans-discursive essence. The present discussion reveals broader implications for understanding technology’s role in knowledge transmission and human development, concluding with research directions for systematic examination by philosophers, practitioners, and contemplative scientists.

This paper explores the intersection of the deep meditative deconstruction resulting from Buddhist meditative practice, specifically through the defabrication process, with the active inference framework (AIF). We propose that defabrication, central to Buddhist meditation, can be understood as a computational process whereby the repeated release of mental tension—associated with clinging and aversion—drives inference progressively lower in an agent’s hierarchical generative model. By casting the release of mental tension as a reduction in hierarchical level-specific precision over beliefs about hidden causes, we demonstrate how the phenomenology of defabrication naturally arises from the resultant system dynamics. This approach enables a computational interpretation of Buddhist meditative states, such as the jhānas, and core concepts like equanimity and stillness. More broadly, it advances a computational phenomenology of meditative deconstruction. Finally, we illustrate the deconstruction process under AIF by extending it to the cessation of phenomenal experience, suggesting this offers insight into core-knowledge structuring and the generation of experience.

This paper explores the intersection of deep meditative deconstruction, in particular the Buddhist defabrication process and its associated phenomenology, and computational mechanisms under the active inference framework (AIF). We contextualise states such as the jhānas within this process, drawing on both Buddhist theoretical frameworks and contemporary phenomenological understanding. We take a step towards ‘translating’ Buddhist meditation-based phenomenology into computational neurophenomenology. We demonstrate how Buddhist defabrication can be understood as a deconstructive process driving inference ever lower in an agent’s hierarchical generative model by the repeated release of mental tensing associated with clinging and aversion. We cast this release of mental tensing as corresponding to a hierarchical level-specific reduction in belief precision, permitting the interpretation of Buddhist notions such as equanimity and meditative stillness under AIF. We then illustrate the deconstruction process up to its conclusion in a cessation of phenomenal experience, touching on how states traversed during the process may inform areas related to core-knowledge structuring and the generation of experience.

Ethical principles and societal regulations are critical to scientific integrity, but individual human factors greatly influence adherence to them. Personal virtues may play a significant role in reinforcing adherence to communal ethical scientific practices but remain largely unexplored. This paper examines how cultivating mindful ethical virtues through meditation could support scientific ethical principles . We propose that when practiced as skillful mental cultivation, meditation may help develop new personal virtues and strengthen or attune those already present—such as conscience, regard for consequence, harmlessness, or equanimity. These virtues conceptually align with scientific ethical principles like accountability, intellectual humility, social good, and objectivity, suggesting that meditation could help bridge a gap between external collective ethical frameworks and the internal personal motivations that drive scientific conduct. In this sense, meditation could be in service of promoting good science. We outline a framework mapping this conceptual alignment and propose contemplative scientists are key to advancing empirical investigation into this connection. To support this, we recommend developing and evaluating Mindfulness-Based Ethical Development Interventions (MBED). These programs could integrate secular ethical instruction with meditation practices, providing a non-sectarian approach to cultivating ethical behaviors relevant to the scientific community. We hope to generate discussion on the potential role of meditation in enhancing ethical scientific conduct, and the significance of personal virtues in driving scientific progress. By focusing on the intersection of personal virtues and communal principles, we highlight the need for meta-scientific initiatives that prioritize and train undeveloped ethical virtues and strengthen those already present among scientists.

Buddhism holds a seeming contradiction. On the one hand, all humans are not-self (anattā). On the other, humans are said to be responsible for their actions (kamma), which seems to evoke a self who can be responsible. This apparent contradiction brings up the question of who is morally responsible if there is no self? I argue that as the Buddhist subscribes to the not-self position, they are by default moral responsibility skeptics. At first blush this appears to be a problem for responsibility in terms of kamma. But this problem is solved once impersonal interdependent causality (paṭiccasamuppāda) is taken into account, where action and responsibility can still be attributed to humans without needing a self. What the Buddhist has is causal, not moral, responsibility. This shows there is no internal tension in the Buddhist position with not-self and kamma when we consider human action and responsibility because of impersonal interdependent causality, but, there is an external tension between the Buddhist position and contemporary philosophical conceptualizations of moral selves and responsibility.

This commentary on “Mindfulness for global public health: Critical analysis and agenda” seeks to add to the discussion by considering, what are the moral or ethical implications of introducing mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) into public health? An open question should be asked: Do MBIs promote “moral health,” a type of mental well-being based on moral integrity? Currently, there is a lack of comprehensive understanding regarding the moral influences of MBIs on individuals, but more concerning is the complete absence of population or collective-based data. Moreover, the data on the moral influences of MBIs originate from neurotypical, socially advantaged, and homogeneous demographics, so caution is warranted regarding the potential impact on general public’s moral functioning before proceeding. This commentary briefly reviews the existing literature on the relationship between moral functioning and MBIs, then addresses why the unknown effects of moral functioning from mindfulness on a social level are a concern for public health. Following many of Oman’s proposed axes, it then raises questions about what MBIs could do to the moral functioning of certain populations with mental health issues, diverse and disadvantaged populations, and various multi-sector levels throughout society. In some cases, MBIs might need to include ethical adaptations, which add components that explicitly encourage moral development. These adaptations could support protective measures or mitigate moral risk factors. The commentary concludes by suggesting that ethical motivation could be an added axis to Oman’s scheme, as there is an alignment between mindfulness and public health. Nonetheless, it cautions that more research is needed at the population level on the moral influences from MBIs before their widespread implementation in public health.