Mohammadali Dashtbali
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Mohammadali Dashtbali has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jonathan M. Henshaw
Institute of Biology I, University of Freiburg, Hauptstrasse 1, D-79104 Freiburg, Germany
3 shared publications Louisa Hutton-Adams
Department of Biosciences, Faculty of Science and Engineering, Swansea University 2 , Swansea, UK
1 shared publicationMegan Watts
Department of Biosciences, Faculty of Science and Engineering, Swansea University 2 , Swansea, UK
1 shared publicationMehdi Mirzaie
1 shared publication- William L. Allen
Department of Biosciences, Swansea University, Swansea, UK
1 shared publication - Xiaoyan Long
Institute of Biology I, University of Freiburg, Hauptstrasse 1, D-79104 Freiburg, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 August 2026
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
- Vol. 293 (2077)
Ornaments evolve faster than weapons
We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of sexually selected traits using both a mathematical model and comparative analyses, focusing on the relative rates of evolution between male ornaments and weapons. In our framework, ornaments evolve jointly with female preferences, whereas weapons evolve under direct male–male competition. Our theoretical model predicts that coevolution with mate preference is the key driver of the accelerated evolution of ornaments. Stochastic drift in female preferences causes fluctuating selection on male ornaments, resulting in rapid evolutionary change in ornament size. In contrast, weapons evolve more slowly due to the more stable selection generated by male–male competition. In the empirical part of the study, we used Brownian motion and Ornstein–Uhlenbeck models to measure the rate of trait evolution across various taxa and found that ornaments generally evolve at faster rates than weapons, consistent with the predictions of our theoretical modelling. Together, these results demonstrate how preference-driven dynamics can accelerate ornament evolution, revealing a key asymmetry between the inter- and intrasexual mechanisms of sexual selection. Our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how different forms of sexual selection shape trait evolution on macroevolutionary timescales.
- 19 August 2026
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
- Vol. 293 (2077)
Open AccessOrnaments evolve faster than weapons
We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of sexually selected traits using both a mathematical model and comparative analyses, focusing on the relative rates of evolution between male ornaments and weapons. In our framework, ornaments evolve jointly with female preferences, whereas weapons evolve under direct male–male competition. Our theoretical model predicts that coevolution with mate preference is the key driver of the accelerated evolution of ornaments. Stochastic drift in female preferences causes fluctuating selection on male ornaments, resulting in rapid evolutionary change in ornament size. In contrast, weapons evolve more slowly due to the more stable selection generated by male–male competition. In the empirical part of the study, we used Brownian motion and Ornstein–Uhlenbeck models to measure the rate of trait evolution across various taxa and found that ornaments generally evolve at faster rates than weapons, consistent with the predictions of our theoretical modelling. Together, these results demonstrate how preference-driven dynamics can accelerate ornament evolution, revealing a key asymmetry between the inter- and intrasexual mechanisms of sexual selection. Our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how different forms of sexual selection shape trait evolution on macroevolutionary timescales.
- Open Access
- 12 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Franklin Institute
- Vol. 361 (12)
The impact of vaccination and social distancing on COVID-19: A compartmental model and an evolutionary game theory approach
- 12 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Franklin Institute
- Vol. 361 (12)
Open AccessThe impact of vaccination and social distancing on COVID-19: A compartmental model and an evolutionary game theory approach
- 15 May 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Evolution
- Vol. 78 (8) , 1478-1485
Is biased mutation sufficient to save runaway sexual selection?
In the 1980s, groundbreaking theoretical studies showed that ornaments displayed during courtship can coevolve with preferences for such ornaments, leading to extreme exaggeration of both traits. Later models cast doubt on such “runaway” sexual selection, showing that even a small cost of preferences can prevent exaggerated ornaments from persisting long-term. It was subsequently shown that if mutations acting on the ornament are biased—tending to produce smaller rather than larger ornaments—then exaggeration can persist even in the presence of preference costs, seemingly vindicating the original models. Here, we unpack an implicit assumption of these “biased mutation” models: Mutations are assumed to lead, on average, to both smaller and less costly ornaments. Biased mutation consequently generates both a fitness cost (due to reduced mating success) and a fitness benefit (due to increased survival). We lift this assumption by separating an individual’s investment in an ornament from their efficiency in converting such investment into ornament size. We assume that biased mutation acts only on efficiency but not on investment, and discuss the plausibility of this alternative assumption. Our model predicts that exaggerated ornaments and preferences can persist stably once they arise, but that strong initial preferences are needed to kick-start the runaway process. Consequently, biased mutation alone may not always be sufficient to save runaway sexual selection.
- 15 May 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Evolution
- Vol. 78 (8) , 1478-1485
Is biased mutation sufficient to save runaway sexual selection?
In the 1980s, groundbreaking theoretical studies showed that ornaments displayed during courtship can coevolve with preferences for such ornaments, leading to extreme exaggeration of both traits. Later models cast doubt on such “runaway” sexual selection, showing that even a small cost of preferences can prevent exaggerated ornaments from persisting long-term. It was subsequently shown that if mutations acting on the ornament are biased—tending to produce smaller rather than larger ornaments—then exaggeration can persist even in the presence of preference costs, seemingly vindicating the original models. Here, we unpack an implicit assumption of these “biased mutation” models: Mutations are assumed to lead, on average, to both smaller and less costly ornaments. Biased mutation consequently generates both a fitness cost (due to reduced mating success) and a fitness benefit (due to increased survival). We lift this assumption by separating an individual’s investment in an ornament from their efficiency in converting such investment into ornament size. We assume that biased mutation acts only on efficiency but not on investment, and discuss the plausibility of this alternative assumption. Our model predicts that exaggerated ornaments and preferences can persist stably once they arise, but that strong initial preferences are needed to kick-start the runaway process. Consequently, biased mutation alone may not always be sufficient to save runaway sexual selection.
- Open Access
- 8 March 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Evolution Letters
- Vol. 8 (4) , 514-525
The evolution of honest and dishonest signals of fighting ability
Competition over resources is often decided via aggressive interactions, which may or may not escalate to all-out fights. Weapons and body size play important roles in such interactions, as they often provide reliable cues of an individual’s fighting ability. In contrast, traits like nonfunctional display “weapons” may dishonestly exaggerate fighting ability in order to intimidate opponents into retreating. Signals used in the context of aggressive interactions potentially evolve via very different mechanisms than courtship signals, but have received far less theoretical attention. Here, we contrast the evolution of honest and dishonest signals of fighting ability using a game-theoretic model. Contests are assumed to consist of three discrete stages: display from a distance, low-intensity physical contact, and fighting. At each stage, contestants evaluate the fighting ability of their opponents in comparison to their own based on body size and an aggressive signal. After making this evaluation, contestants decide whether to escalate the interaction or cede to their opponent. Our model predicts that both honest and dishonest aggressive signals can exaggerate far beyond their ecological optima, but that exaggeration is more pronounced for honest signals. Equilibrium levels of aggressiveness—as measured by individuals’ propensity to escalate aggressive interactions to the next stage—are independent of the honesty of signals. We additionally develop a novel approach, based on causal inference theory, to understand how changes in underlying parameters shape the coevolution of multiple traits. We use this approach to study how aggression coevolves with body and signal size in response to changes in the cost of losing a fight.
- 8 March 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Evolution Letters
- Vol. 8 (4) , 514-525
Open AccessThe evolution of honest and dishonest signals of fighting ability
Competition over resources is often decided via aggressive interactions, which may or may not escalate to all-out fights. Weapons and body size play important roles in such interactions, as they often provide reliable cues of an individual’s fighting ability. In contrast, traits like nonfunctional display “weapons” may dishonestly exaggerate fighting ability in order to intimidate opponents into retreating. Signals used in the context of aggressive interactions potentially evolve via very different mechanisms than courtship signals, but have received far less theoretical attention. Here, we contrast the evolution of honest and dishonest signals of fighting ability using a game-theoretic model. Contests are assumed to consist of three discrete stages: display from a distance, low-intensity physical contact, and fighting. At each stage, contestants evaluate the fighting ability of their opponents in comparison to their own based on body size and an aggressive signal. After making this evaluation, contestants decide whether to escalate the interaction or cede to their opponent. Our model predicts that both honest and dishonest aggressive signals can exaggerate far beyond their ecological optima, but that exaggeration is more pronounced for honest signals. Equilibrium levels of aggressiveness—as measured by individuals’ propensity to escalate aggressive interactions to the next stage—are independent of the honesty of signals. We additionally develop a novel approach, based on causal inference theory, to understand how changes in underlying parameters shape the coevolution of multiple traits. We use this approach to study how aggression coevolves with body and signal size in response to changes in the cost of losing a fight.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Nonautonomous Dynamical Systems
- Vol. 9 (1) , 317-330
Optimal strategies for controlling the outbreak of COVID-19: Reducing its cost and duration
Social distancing plays an essential role in controlling the spread of an epidemic, but changing the behavior of individuals regarding social distancing is costly. In order to make a rational decision, individuals must compare the cost of social distancing and the cost of infection. People are typically more likely to change their behavior if they are aware that the government is willing to incur additional cost to shorten the duration of an epidemic. I extend an optimal control problem of social distancing by integrating with the SIR model which describes the disease process. I present an optimal control problem to consider the behavior of susceptible individuals and the government in investment as control strategies and compute the equilibrium strategies under the potency of investment, using relative risk functions according to the investment that is made by susceptible individuals and the government. The equilibrium of this problem represents the optimal control strategies for minimizing the cost and duration of controlling an epidemic. Additionally, the model is evaluated using COVID-19 data from Egypt, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Nigeria, and Germany. The findings extracted from this model could be valuable in developing public health policy in the event of an epidemic.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Nonautonomous Dynamical Systems
- Vol. 9 (1) , 317-330
Open AccessOptimal strategies for controlling the outbreak of COVID-19: Reducing its cost and duration
Social distancing plays an essential role in controlling the spread of an epidemic, but changing the behavior of individuals regarding social distancing is costly. In order to make a rational decision, individuals must compare the cost of social distancing and the cost of infection. People are typically more likely to change their behavior if they are aware that the government is willing to incur additional cost to shorten the duration of an epidemic. I extend an optimal control problem of social distancing by integrating with the SIR model which describes the disease process. I present an optimal control problem to consider the behavior of susceptible individuals and the government in investment as control strategies and compute the equilibrium strategies under the potency of investment, using relative risk functions according to the investment that is made by susceptible individuals and the government. The equilibrium of this problem represents the optimal control strategies for minimizing the cost and duration of controlling an epidemic. Additionally, the model is evaluated using COVID-19 data from Egypt, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Nigeria, and Germany. The findings extracted from this model could be valuable in developing public health policy in the event of an epidemic.