VDVivien G. Dugan

Vivien G. Dugan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Vivien G. Dugan has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Interim Findings: October 2025 – January 2026 Influenza Season in the United States

    by Eduardo Azziz-Baumgartner, Alicia Budd, Justin S. Lee, Danielle Iuliano, Sascha Ellington, Min Levine, Xiao-Yu Z. Zheng, Larisa Z. Gubareva, Katherine Adams, Jennifer DeCuir, et al.

    Context: Antigenically drifted influenza A(H3N2) J.2.4.1 (subclade K) viruses have predominated during the 2025–2026 Northern Hemisphere influenza season. We characterized subclade K viruses detected in the United States, evaluated post-influenza vaccination antibody response against subclade K, and susceptibility of subclade K to antivirals.Methods: We described national public health laboratory influenza virus surveillance and genetic and antigenic characterization. We conducted serologic studies in children and adults who received 2025–2026 U.S. influenza vaccines to measure neutralizing antibody responses against subclade K viruses. We used Influenza Hospitalization Surveillance Network admissions data to calculate hospitalization rates and modeled influenza disease burden. Finally, we used VIrtual SARS-CoV-2, Influenza, and Other respiratory viruses Network (VISION) data to estimate influenza vaccine effectiveness using a test-negative, case control design.Findings: As of January 24, of the 2025–2026 influenza season, most (96.5%) of the 28,697 influenza-positive respiratory specimens tested by U.S. public health laboratories were influenza A, of which 24,478 (85.3%) were subtyped and 21,637 (88.4%) were A(H3N2). Most (90.5%) of the 692 characterized A(H3N2) viruses were subclade K. Post-influenza vaccination neutralizing geometric mean antibody titers against subclade K were reduced 1.62 (95% CI: 1.29–2.02) fold compared with the vaccine virus. All 681 tested A(H3N2) viruses were sensitive to antiviral medications. The estimated cumulative influenza-associated hospitalization rate was 59.5/100,000. CDC’s models estimate that approximately 20 million influenza illnesses, 270,000 hospitalizations, and 11,000 deaths occurred this season in the United States. Adjusted interim vaccine effectiveness against influenza-related emergency department or urgent care encounters was 35% (95% CI: 29–40) and 28% (95% CI: 11–42) against hospitalizations.Interpretation: While antigenically drifted subclade K viruses predominated early in the 2025–2026 season and caused substantial morbidity, influenza vaccines reduced risk of severe illnesses and that subclade K viruses were sensitive to available antiviral medications.

  • Open Access

    Reported Global Avian Influenza Detections Among Humans and Animals During 2013-2022: Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Available Surveillance Data

    by Christine M Szablewski, Chelsea Iwamoto, Sonja J Olsen, Carolyn M Greene, Lindsey M Duca, C Todd Davis, Kira C Coggeshall, William W Davis, Gideon O Emukule, Philip L Gould, et al.

    Background: Avian influenza (AI) virus detections occurred frequently in 2022 and continue to pose a health, economic, and food security risk. The most recent global analysis of official reports of animal outbreaks and human infections with all reportable AI viruses was published almost a decade ago. Increased or renewed reports of AI viruses, especially high pathogenicity H5N8 and H5N1 in birds and H5N1, H5N8, and H5N6 in humans globally, have established the need for a comprehensive review of current global AI virus surveillance data to assess the pandemic risk of AI viruses. Objective: This study aims to provide an analysis of global AI animal outbreak and human case surveillance information from the last decade by describing the circulating virus subtypes, regions and temporal trends in reporting, and country characteristics associated with AI virus outbreak reporting in animals; surveillance and reporting gaps for animals and humans are identified. Methods: We analyzed AI virus infection reports among animals and humans submitted to animal and public health authorities from January 2013 to June 2022 and compared them with reports from January 2005 to December 2012. A multivariable regression analysis was used to evaluate associations between variables of interest and reported AI virus animal outbreaks. Results: From 2013 to 2022, 52.2% (95/182) of World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) Member Countries identified 34 AI virus subtypes during 21,249 outbreaks. The most frequently reported subtypes were high pathogenicity AI H5N1 (10,079/21,249, 47.43%) and H5N8 (6722/21,249, 31.63%). A total of 10 high pathogenicity AI and 6 low pathogenicity AI virus subtypes were reported to the WOAH for the first time during 2013-2022. AI outbreaks in animals occurred in 26 more Member Countries than reported in the previous 8 years. Decreasing World Bank income classification was significantly associated with decreases in reported AI outbreaks (P<.001-.02). Between January 2013 and June 2022, 17/194 (8.8%) World Health Organization (WHO) Member States reported 2000 human AI virus infections of 10 virus subtypes. H7N9 (1568/2000, 78.40%) and H5N1 (254/2000, 12.70%) viruses accounted for the most human infections. As many as 8 of these 17 Member States did not report a human case prior to 2013. Of 1953 human cases with available information, 74.81% (n=1461) had a known animal exposure before onset of illness. The median time from illness onset to the notification posted on the WHO event information site was 15 days (IQR 9-30 days; mean 24 days). Seasonality patterns of animal outbreaks and human infections with AI viruses were very similar, occurred year-round, and peaked during November through May. Conclusions: Our analysis suggests that AI outbreaks are more frequently reported and geographically widespread than in the past. Global surveillance gaps include inconsistent reporting from all regions and human infection reporting delays. Continued monitoring for AI virus outbreaks in animals and human infections with AI viruses is crucial for pandemic preparedness.


  • Open Access

    Reported Global Avian Influenza Detections Among Humans and Animals During 2013-2022: Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Available Surveillance Data (Preprint)

    by Christine M Szablewski, Chelsea Iwamoto, Sonja J Olsen, Carolyn M Greene, Lindsey M Duca, C Todd Davis, Kira C Coggeshall, William W Davis, Gideon O Emukule, Philip L Gould, et al.

    BACKGROUND Avian influenza (AI) virus detections occurred frequently in 2022 and continue to pose a health, economic, and food security risk. The most recent global analysis of official reports of animal outbreaks and human infections with all reportable AI viruses was published almost a decade ago. Increased or renewed reports of AI viruses, especially high pathogenicity H5N8 and H5N1 in birds and H5N1, H5N8, and H5N6 in humans globally, have established the need for a comprehensive review of current global AI virus surveillance data to assess the pandemic risk of AI viruses. OBJECTIVE This study aims to provide an analysis of global AI animal outbreak and human case surveillance information from the last decade by describing the circulating virus subtypes, regions and temporal trends in reporting, and country characteristics associated with AI virus outbreak reporting in animals; surveillance and reporting gaps for animals and humans are identified. METHODS We analyzed AI virus infection reports among animals and humans submitted to animal and public health authorities from January 2013 to June 2022 and compared them with reports from January 2005 to December 2012. A multivariable regression analysis was used to evaluate associations between variables of interest and reported AI virus animal outbreaks. RESULTS From 2013 to 2022, 52.2% (95/182) of World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) Member Countries identified 34 AI virus subtypes during 21,249 outbreaks. The most frequently reported subtypes were high pathogenicity AI H5N1 (10,079/21,249, 47.43%) and H5N8 (6722/21,249, 31.63%). A total of 10 high pathogenicity AI and 6 low pathogenicity AI virus subtypes were reported to the WOAH for the first time during 2013-2022. AI outbreaks in animals occurred in 26 more Member Countries than reported in the previous 8 years. Decreasing World Bank income classification was significantly associated with decreases in reported AI outbreaks (P<.001-.02). Between January 2013 and June 2022, 17/194 (8.8%) World Health Organization (WHO) Member States reported 2000 human AI virus infections of 10 virus subtypes. H7N9 (1568/2000, 78.40%) and H5N1 (254/2000, 12.70%) viruses accounted for the most human infections. As many as 8 of these 17 Member States did not report a human case prior to 2013. Of 1953 human cases with available information, 74.81% (n=1461) had a known animal exposure before onset of illness. The median time from illness onset to the notification posted on the WHO event information site was 15 days (IQR 9-30 days; mean 24 days). Seasonality patterns of animal outbreaks and human infections with AI viruses were very similar, occurred year-round, and peaked during November through May. CONCLUSIONS Our analysis suggests that AI outbreaks are more frequently reported and geographically widespread than in the past. Global surveillance gaps include inconsistent reporting from all regions and human infection reporting delays. Continued monitoring for AI virus outbreaks in animals and human infections with AI viruses is crucial for pandemic preparedness.

  • Phylogenetic analysis of low pathogenicity H5N1 and H7N3 influenza A virus isolates recovered from sentinel, free flying, wild mallards at one study site during 2006

    by Vivien G. Dugan, Eleca J. Dunham, Guozhong Jin, Zong-Mei Sheng, Emilee Kaser, Jacqueline M. Nolting, H. Lloyd Alexander, Richard D. Slemons, Jeffery K. Taubenberger