SCSam Yul Cho

Sam Yul Cho

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Sam Yul Cho has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Star CEOs: influence on competitor CEOs' risk-taking

    by Sam Yul Cho, Yohan Choi

    Purpose: Research has focused primarily on the antecedents that influence the risk taking of CEOs themselves. This study examines how an important event experienced by a CEO at a direct rival firm influences a CEO's risk-taking. It also examines how prior firm performance relative to aspirations moderates the relationship.Design/methodology/approach: In order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an a difference-in-differences methodology.Findings: Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that when a CEO wins a prestigious CEO award, competitor CEOs increase their firm risk-taking in the post-award period. The proclivity becomes stronger when their prior firm performance relative to aspirations is better. These findings suggest that a CEO winning a prominent CEO award influences competitor CEOs' risk-taking.Originality/value: This study contributes to the literature on managerial risk-taking by highlighting that a star CEO winning a prominent award may serve as a striving aspiration and induce competitor CEOs to take risks, and that two different types of aspirations – striving and competitive aspirations – interact to influence the competitor CEOs' risk-taking.


  • The impact of a competitor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy on firm risk-taking

    by Yohan Choi, Jeffrey Barden, Jonathan Arthurs, Sam Yul Cho

    Using a difference-in-differences method, this study examines the effect of a competitor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy on a firm’s risk-taking. The contingent nature of a competitor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which protects the competitor from creditors’ demands during financial reorganization, may increase uncertainty in the industry. Consequently, the study tests the hypothesis that other firms in the industry respond to a competitor’s bankruptcy by decreasing risky investments in research and development (R&D), capital expenditures and acquisitions. To validate and extend this hypothesis, the study also hypothesizes that a firm’s strong financial standing—low leverage and good performance—and the firm’s diversification reduce the negative effect of the competitor’s bankruptcy on firm risk-taking. Findings from a study of US public firms suggest that, after controlling for industry conditions, firms indeed reduce their risk-taking when a competitor declares bankruptcy and that lower firm leverage, stronger firm performance, and greater firm diversification mitigate this effect. Together, these findings shed light on the literatures on bankruptcy and firm risk-taking. JEL Classification: L22, M10, D81, D25


  • One Man's Death is Another Man's Bread: The Effect of a CEO's Sudden Death on Competitors' Strategic Investments

    by Sam Yul Cho, Yohan Choi, Haemin Dennis Park, Jung Hyun Kwon

    We examine how a CEO's sudden death influences competitors' strategic investments. Consistent with the literature on death awareness and the expectancy‐valence model, we suggest that a CEO's unexpected death can trigger competitors' competitive moves. Using a difference‐in‐differences methodology, we show that a competitor increases strategic investments after its peer firm experiences a CEO's sudden death. This effect becomes stronger when the competitor and its peer firm share similar resource allocation profiles or the competitor possesses greater organizational slack. Our supplementary analysis shows that a competitor increases its strategic action intensity following a CEO's sudden demise at a peer firm. This study contributes to the competitive dynamics literature by highlighting how critical events affecting the cognitive base and values of strategic leaders expose strategic vulnerability and in turn evoke competitive moves by competitors in response to the events.


  • Performance deviations and acquisition premiums: The impact of CEO celebrity on managerial risk‐taking

    by Sam Y. Cho, Jonathan D. Arthurs, David M. Townsend, Douglas R. Miller, Jeffrey Q. Barden

    Research summary: This article draws on identity control theory and a study of acquisition premiums to explore how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect firm risk behavior. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms, but these tendencies change when prior firm performance deviates from the industry average returns, thereby leading these CEOs to pay higher premiums. The study also finds that the premiums tend to be even larger when celebrity CEOs have more recently attained celebrity status. Taken together, these findings contribute to identity control theory and CEO celebrity literatures by suggesting that celebrity status is a double‐edged sword and that the internalization of celebrity status by CEOs strongly influences the decision‐making of CEOs . Managerial summary: The purpose of this article is to examine how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect the size of acquisition premiums. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms. However, when celebrity CEOs ' prior firm performance is either better or worse than the industry average, these CEOs pay higher premiums. This situation is exacerbated when the CEO has only recently been crowned a celebrity. In effect, these CEOs feel great pressure to match the inflated performance expectations that come with celebrity status. These findings suggest that being a celebrity is a double‐edged sword. The implication here is that CEOs who have recently been crowned a celebrity should be aware of these pressures and cope accordingly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.