DTDavid Tayouri

David Tayouri

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


David Tayouri has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Extending the ATT&CK coverage of logical attack graphs

    by David Tayouri, Nick Baum, Alina Marchenko, Ortal Lavi, Asaf Shabtai, Rami Puzis

  • Open Access

    ATAG: AI-Agent Application Threat Assessment with Attack Graphs

    by Parth Atulbhai Gandhi, David Tayouri, Akansha Shukla, Beni Ifland, Yuval Elovici, Rami Puzis, Asaf Shabtai

    Evaluating the security of multi-agent systems (MASs) powered by large language models (LLMs) is challenging, primarily because of the systems' complex internal dynamics and the evolving nature of LLM vulnerabilities. Traditional attack graph (AG) methods often lack the specific capabilities to model attacks on LLMs. This paper introduces AI-agent application Threat assessment with Attack Graphs (ATAG), a novel framework designed to systematically analyze the security risks associated with AI-agent applications. ATAG extends the MulVAL logic-based AG generation tool with custom facts and interaction rules to accurately represent AI-agent topologies, vulnerabilities, and attack scenarios. As part of this research, we also created the LLM vulnerability database (LVD) to initiate the process of standardizing LLM vulnerabilities documentation. To demonstrate ATAG's efficacy, we applied it to three multi-agent applications. Our case studies demonstrated the framework's ability to model and generate AGs for sophisticated, multi-step attack scenarios exploiting vulnerabilities such as prompt injection, excessive agency, sensitive information disclosure, and insecure output handling across interconnected agents. ATAG is an important step toward a robust methodology and toolset to help understand, visualize, and prioritize complex attack paths in multi-agent AI systems (MAASs). It facilitates proactive identification and mitigation of AI-agent threats in multi-agent applications.


  • MIRAGE: Multi-Binary Image Risk Assessment With Attack Graph Employment

    by David Tayouri, Telem Nachum, Asaf Shabtai

    Attackers can exploit known vulnerabilities to infiltrate a device's firmware and the communication between firmware binaries in order to pass between them. To improve cybersecurity, organizations must identify and mitigate the risks of the firmware they use. An attack graph (AG) can be used to assess and visually display firmware's risks by organizing the identified vulnerabilities into attack paths composed of sequences of actions attackers may perform to compromise firmware images. In this paper, we utilize AGs for firmware risk assessment. We propose MIRAGE (Multi-binary Image Risk Assessment with Attack Graph Employment), a framework for identifying potential attack vectors and vulnerable interactions between firmware binaries; MIRAGE accomplishes this by generating AGs for firmware inter-binary communication. To evaluate the MIRAGE framework, we collected a dataset of 1,343 firmware images. We propose models for examining the risks of firmware binaries and attack paths, demonstrate their implementation on the dataset of firmware images, and list the riskiest binaries. We present a case study with a detailed description of an actual attack implementation on a selected firmware from the dataset. The use cases of the proposed framework include identifying risky external interactions, assessing supply chain risks, and analyzing security with digital twins.

  • CORAL: Container Online Risk Assessment with Logical attack graphs

    by David Tayouri, Omri Sgan Cohen, Inbar Maimon, Dudu Mimran, Yuval Elovici, Asaf Shabtai


  • Open Access

    A Survey of MulVAL Extensions and Their Attack Scenarios Coverage

    by David Tayouri, Nick Baum, Asaf Shabtai, Rami Puzis

    Organizations employ various adversary models to assess the risk and potential impact of attacks on their networks. A popular method of visually representing cyber risks is the attack graph. Attack graphs represent vulnerabilities and actions an attacker can take to identify and compromise an organization’s assets. Attack graphs facilitate the visual presentation and algorithmic analysis of attack scenarios in the form of attack paths. MulVAL is a generic open-source framework for constructing logical attack graphs, which has been widely used by researchers and practitioners and extended by them with additional attack scenarios. This paper surveys all of the existing MulVAL extensions and maps all MulVAL interaction rules to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques to estimate their attack scenarios coverage. This survey aligns current MulVAL extensions along unified ontological concepts and highlights the existing gaps. It paves the way for the systematic improvement of MulVAL and the comprehensive modeling of the entire landscape of adversarial behaviors captured in MITRE ATT&CK.