Andrew Ellul
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Andrew Ellul has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marco Pagano
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
5 shared publications Isil Erel
Ohio State University , USA, NBER, and ECGI
3 shared publicationsCamelia Kuhnen
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill , USA , and NBER
2 shared publications- Fausto Panunzi2 shared publications
Uday Rajan
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan
2 shared publicationsAnastasia Kartasheva
University of St. Gallen , Switzerland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 885-906
Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation
Unemployment risk influences workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. This paper investigates the impact of unemployment risk on chief executive officers (CEOs)’ risk-taking incentive compensation. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous, boards increase the convex payoff structure of CEO pay to encourage risk taking. The increase in CEOs’ convexity payoff is stronger in firms with more independent and diverse boards, higher ownership of long-term shareholders, and in industries requiring highly skilled labor. Our findings suggest that boards internalize workers’ interests in firms’ risk-taking decisions and executive compensation is one mechanism used. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance. Funding: K. Zhang acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72272099 and 71902115]. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4714 .
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 885-906
Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation
Unemployment risk influences workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. This paper investigates the impact of unemployment risk on chief executive officers (CEOs)’ risk-taking incentive compensation. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous, boards increase the convex payoff structure of CEO pay to encourage risk taking. The increase in CEOs’ convexity payoff is stronger in firms with more independent and diverse boards, higher ownership of long-term shareholders, and in industries requiring highly skilled labor. Our findings suggest that boards internalize workers’ interests in firms’ risk-taking decisions and executive compensation is one mechanism used. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance. Funding: K. Zhang acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72272099 and 71902115]. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4714 .
- Open Access
- 12 December 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Loan Guarantees, Bank Lending and Credit Risk Reallocation
Do banks extending government-guaranteed loans simultaneously reduce their risk exposure to firms? Using unique euro-area credit register data and the COVID-19 guarantee programs as a laboratory, we find that banks extending guaranteed loans reduced non-guaranteed credit by over 30% relative to other banks lending to the same firm. Substitution was highest for riskier and smaller firms in more affected sectors and for stronger banks. Nevertheless, banks offered cheaper credit and longer maturities to guaranteed loan recipients, especially more fragile ones. This improvement in lending terms is the flipside of credit substitution: the two correlate positively.
- 12 December 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessLoan Guarantees, Bank Lending and Credit Risk Reallocation
Do banks extending government-guaranteed loans simultaneously reduce their risk exposure to firms? Using unique euro-area credit register data and the COVID-19 guarantee programs as a laboratory, we find that banks extending guaranteed loans reduced non-guaranteed credit by over 30% relative to other banks lending to the same firm. Substitution was highest for riskier and smaller firms in more affected sectors and for stronger banks. Nevertheless, banks offered cheaper credit and longer maturities to guaranteed loan recipients, especially more fragile ones. This improvement in lending terms is the flipside of credit substitution: the two correlate positively.
- 17 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
- Vol. 12 (4) , 713-722
Finance for the Greater Good
In August 2019, the Business Roundtable, one of the most recognizable lobbyist groups of the business community, issued the “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation.” Signatures, 181 in total and mostly from CEOs of Corporate America, backed the one-page declaration that concludes with the following: “Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, our communities and our country” ( Business Roundtable 2019). In his annual letter to shareholders in 2020, Jamie Dimon, chairman and CEO of JP Morgan Chase, reflects on the “fraying” of the “American dream” and on how banks and firms can work together to address an emerging economic scenario in which people and entire communities are being left behind. He argues that “successful businesses can literally and figuratively “drive by” our worst problems (think inner cities) and still thrive” ( Dimon 2020). There is a strong argument to be made that firms and banks have a unique role to play in solving many of society’s challenges through skills training, community development, and infrastructure investments, among others.
- 17 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
- Vol. 12 (4) , 713-722
Finance for the Greater Good
In August 2019, the Business Roundtable, one of the most recognizable lobbyist groups of the business community, issued the “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation.” Signatures, 181 in total and mostly from CEOs of Corporate America, backed the one-page declaration that concludes with the following: “Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, our communities and our country” ( Business Roundtable 2019). In his annual letter to shareholders in 2020, Jamie Dimon, chairman and CEO of JP Morgan Chase, reflects on the “fraying” of the “American dream” and on how banks and firms can work together to address an emerging economic scenario in which people and entire communities are being left behind. He argues that “successful businesses can literally and figuratively “drive by” our worst problems (think inner cities) and still thrive” ( Dimon 2020). There is a strong argument to be made that firms and banks have a unique role to play in solving many of society’s challenges through skills training, community development, and infrastructure investments, among others.
- 18 August 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 35 (12) , 5483-5534
Insurers as Asset Managers and Systemic Risk
Financial intermediaries often provide guarantees resembling out-of-the-money put options, exposing them to undiversifiable tail risk. We present a model in the context of the U.S. life insurance industry in which the regulatory framework incentivizes value-maximizing insurers to hedge variable annuity (VA) guarantees, though imperfectly, and shifts risks into high-risk and illiquid bonds. We calibrate the model to insurer-level data and identify the VA-induced changes in insurers’ risk exposures. In the event of major asset and guarantee shocks and absent regulatory intervention, these shared exposures exacerbate system-wide fire sales to maintain capital ratios, plausibly erasing over half of insurers’ equity capital. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
- 18 August 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 35 (12) , 5483-5534
Insurers as Asset Managers and Systemic Risk
Financial intermediaries often provide guarantees resembling out-of-the-money put options, exposing them to undiversifiable tail risk. We present a model in the context of the U.S. life insurance industry in which the regulatory framework incentivizes value-maximizing insurers to hedge variable annuity (VA) guarantees, though imperfectly, and shifts risks into high-risk and illiquid bonds. We calibrate the model to insurer-level data and identify the VA-induced changes in insurers’ risk exposures. In the event of major asset and guarantee shocks and absent regulatory intervention, these shared exposures exacerbate system-wide fire sales to maintain capital ratios, plausibly erasing over half of insurers’ equity capital. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
- 14 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
- Vol. 11 (3) , 457-464
Discrimination, Disparities, and Diversity in Finance
Andrew Ellul, Isil Erel, Camelia Kuhnen, Uday Rajan; Discrimination, Disparities, and Diversity in Finance, The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, , cfac022,
- 14 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
- Vol. 11 (3) , 457-464
Discrimination, Disparities, and Diversity in Finance
Andrew Ellul, Isil Erel, Camelia Kuhnen, Uday Rajan; Discrimination, Disparities, and Diversity in Finance, The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, , cfac022,
- 9 October 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
- Vol. 9 (3) , 421-429
The COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis and Corporate Finance
- 9 October 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
- Vol. 9 (3) , 421-429
The COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis and Corporate Finance
- Open Access
- 16 April 2018
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management
We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imput- ed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these scarring effects can be ascribed to a drop in asset managers' reputation. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives.
- 16 April 2018
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessCareer Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management
We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imput- ed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these scarring effects can be ascribed to a drop in asset managers' reputation. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives.
- 11 January 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 53 (1) , 203-241
Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders’ Informational Advantage?
By collecting and disseminating price-sensitive information, financial analysts should reduce firm insiders’ informational advantage with a consequent impact on trading dynamics and market quality. We empirically examine the impact of complete analysts’ coverage termination on stocks’ liquidity, price discovery, and insider trading profitability. Termination leads to deteriorating liquidity and price efficiency, more informed trading, and higher profitability of insider trades. The magnitude of these effects depends on the strength of insiders’ ownership and on management’s decision whether to improve the firm’s information environment after coverage termination. Institutional investors alleviate, but do not eliminate, the negative effects of termination.
- 11 January 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 53 (1) , 203-241
Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders’ Informational Advantage?
By collecting and disseminating price-sensitive information, financial analysts should reduce firm insiders’ informational advantage with a consequent impact on trading dynamics and market quality. We empirically examine the impact of complete analysts’ coverage termination on stocks’ liquidity, price discovery, and insider trading profitability. Termination leads to deteriorating liquidity and price efficiency, more informed trading, and higher profitability of insider trades. The magnitude of these effects depends on the strength of insiders’ ownership and on management’s decision whether to improve the firm’s information environment after coverage termination. Institutional investors alleviate, but do not eliminate, the negative effects of termination.
- 11 September 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1298-1340
Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence
Using a firm-level international panel data set, we study if unemployment insurance offered by the government and by firms are substitutes. We exploit cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family versus nonfamily ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. Our evidence supports the substitutability hypothesis: employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries and periods with less generous public unemployment insurance, whereas no such substitutability emerges for nonfamily firms. Received July 18, 2015; editorial decision August 8, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.
- 11 September 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1298-1340
Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence
Using a firm-level international panel data set, we study if unemployment insurance offered by the government and by firms are substitutes. We exploit cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family versus nonfamily ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. Our evidence supports the substitutability hypothesis: employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries and periods with less generous public unemployment insurance, whereas no such substitutability emerges for nonfamily firms. Received July 18, 2015; editorial decision August 8, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2017
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence
If unemployment insurance is more generous, workers should demand less implicit insurance from their employers: firm- and government-provided insurance should be substitutes. Using a firm-level international panel dataset, we investigate this hypothesis exploiting cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family vs. non-family ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. We find that employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries with more generous public unemployment insurance, while no such substitutability is present for non-family firms.
- 1 April 2017
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessEmployment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence
If unemployment insurance is more generous, workers should demand less implicit insurance from their employers: firm- and government-provided insurance should be substitutes. Using a firm-level international panel dataset, we investigate this hypothesis exploiting cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family vs. non-family ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. We find that employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries with more generous public unemployment insurance, while no such substitutability is present for non-family firms.