AEAndrew Ellul

Andrew Ellul

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Andrew Ellul has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation

    by Andrew Ellul, Cong Wang, Kuo Zhang

    Unemployment risk influences workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. This paper investigates the impact of unemployment risk on chief executive officers (CEOs)’ risk-taking incentive compensation. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous, boards increase the convex payoff structure of CEO pay to encourage risk taking. The increase in CEOs’ convexity payoff is stronger in firms with more independent and diverse boards, higher ownership of long-term shareholders, and in industries requiring highly skilled labor. Our findings suggest that boards internalize workers’ interests in firms’ risk-taking decisions and executive compensation is one mechanism used. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance. Funding: K. Zhang acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72272099 and 71902115]. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4714 .


  • Open Access

    Loan Guarantees, Bank Lending and Credit Risk Reallocation

    by Carlo Altavilla, Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano, Andrea Polo, Thomas Vlassopoulos

    Do banks extending government-guaranteed loans simultaneously reduce their risk exposure to firms? Using unique euro-area credit register data and the COVID-19 guarantee programs as a laboratory, we find that banks extending guaranteed loans reduced non-guaranteed credit by over 30% relative to other banks lending to the same firm. Substitution was highest for riskier and smaller firms in more affected sectors and for stronger banks. Nevertheless, banks offered cheaper credit and longer maturities to guaranteed loan recipients, especially more fragile ones. This improvement in lending terms is the flipside of credit substitution: the two correlate positively.

  • Finance for the Greater Good

    by Andrew Ellul, Isil Erel, Camelia Kuhnen, Robert Marquez

    In August 2019, the Business Roundtable, one of the most recognizable lobbyist groups of the business community, issued the “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation.” Signatures, 181 in total and mostly from CEOs of Corporate America, backed the one-page declaration that concludes with the following: “Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, our communities and our country” ( Business Roundtable 2019). In his annual letter to shareholders in 2020, Jamie Dimon, chairman and CEO of JP Morgan Chase, reflects on the “fraying” of the “American dream” and on how banks and firms can work together to address an emerging economic scenario in which people and entire communities are being left behind. He argues that “successful businesses can literally and figuratively “drive by” our worst problems (think inner cities) and still thrive” ( Dimon 2020). There is a strong argument to be made that firms and banks have a unique role to play in solving many of society’s challenges through skills training, community development, and infrastructure investments, among others.


  • Insurers as Asset Managers and Systemic Risk

    by Andrew Ellul, Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Anastasia Kartasheva, Christian T Lundblad, Wolf Wagner

    Financial intermediaries often provide guarantees resembling out-of-the-money put options, exposing them to undiversifiable tail risk. We present a model in the context of the U.S. life insurance industry in which the regulatory framework incentivizes value-maximizing insurers to hedge variable annuity (VA) guarantees, though imperfectly, and shifts risks into high-risk and illiquid bonds. We calibrate the model to insurer-level data and identify the VA-induced changes in insurers’ risk exposures. In the event of major asset and guarantee shocks and absent regulatory intervention, these shared exposures exacerbate system-wide fire sales to maintain capital ratios, plausibly erasing over half of insurers’ equity capital. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


  • Discrimination, Disparities, and Diversity in Finance

    by Andrew Ellul, Isil Erel, Camelia Kuhnen, Uday Rajan

    Andrew Ellul, Isil Erel, Camelia Kuhnen, Uday Rajan; Discrimination, Disparities, and Diversity in Finance, The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, , cfac022,


  • Open Access

    Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management

    by Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano, Annalisa Scognamiglio

    We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imput- ed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these scarring effects can be ascribed to a drop in asset managers' reputation. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives.

  • Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders’ Informational Advantage?

    by Andrew Ellul, Marios Panayides

    By collecting and disseminating price-sensitive information, financial analysts should reduce firm insiders’ informational advantage with a consequent impact on trading dynamics and market quality. We empirically examine the impact of complete analysts’ coverage termination on stocks’ liquidity, price discovery, and insider trading profitability. Termination leads to deteriorating liquidity and price efficiency, more informed trading, and higher profitability of insider trades. The magnitude of these effects depends on the strength of insiders’ ownership and on management’s decision whether to improve the firm’s information environment after coverage termination. Institutional investors alleviate, but do not eliminate, the negative effects of termination.


  • Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence

    by Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano, Fabiano Schivardi

    Using a firm-level international panel data set, we study if unemployment insurance offered by the government and by firms are substitutes. We exploit cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family versus nonfamily ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. Our evidence supports the substitutability hypothesis: employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries and periods with less generous public unemployment insurance, whereas no such substitutability emerges for nonfamily firms. Received July 18, 2015; editorial decision August 8, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.


  • Open Access

    Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence

    by Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano, Fabiano Schivardi

    If unemployment insurance is more generous, workers should demand less implicit insurance from their employers: firm- and government-provided insurance should be substitutes. Using a firm-level international panel dataset, we investigate this hypothesis exploiting cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family vs. non-family ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. We find that employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries with more generous public unemployment insurance, while no such substitutability is present for non-family firms.