Xiaofeng Zheng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Xiaofeng Zheng has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xiang Li
Nankai University, China
5 shared publications - Baojun Liu
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
4 shared publications - Haixin Duan
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
4 shared publications - Mingming Zhang
Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, China
4 shared publications - Jianjun Chen
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
3 shared publications - Jianyu Lu
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 5380-5391
Starlink in the Wild: Multi-Perspective Measurements via DNS
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 5380-5391
Open AccessStarlink in the Wild: Multi-Perspective Measurements via DNS
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1619-1633
RebirthDay Attack: Reviving DNS Cache Poisoning with the Birthday Paradox
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1619-1633
Open AccessRebirthDay Attack: Reviving DNS Cache Poisoning with the Birthday Paradox
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1046-1047
Poster: A First Look at Large Language Model Applications in the Wild from Dual Perspectives
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1046-1047
Open AccessPoster: A First Look at Large Language Model Applications in the Wild from Dual Perspectives
- Open Access
- 26 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 51 (1) , 87-88
Detecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling Domains
Public hosting services offer a convenient and secure option for creating web applications. However, adversaries can take over a domain by exploiting released service endpoints, leading to hosting-based domain takeover. This threat has affected numerous popular websites, including the subdomains of microsoft.com. However, no effective detection system for identifying vulnerable domains at scale exists to date. This paper fills the research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. HostingChecker expands detection scope and improves efficiency compared to previous work by: (i) identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. It discovers 10,351 vulnerable subdomains under Tranco Top-1M apex domains, which is over 8× more than previous findings, demonstrating its effectiveness. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors (e.g., Amazon, Alibaba) and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed domain ownership validation implementation. In the end, we have reported the issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation. The full paper is provided in [2].
- 26 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 51 (1) , 87-88
Open AccessDetecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling Domains
Public hosting services offer a convenient and secure option for creating web applications. However, adversaries can take over a domain by exploiting released service endpoints, leading to hosting-based domain takeover. This threat has affected numerous popular websites, including the subdomains of microsoft.com. However, no effective detection system for identifying vulnerable domains at scale exists to date. This paper fills the research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. HostingChecker expands detection scope and improves efficiency compared to previous work by: (i) identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. It discovers 10,351 vulnerable subdomains under Tranco Top-1M apex domains, which is over 8× more than previous findings, demonstrating its effectiveness. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors (e.g., Amazon, Alibaba) and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed domain ownership validation implementation. In the end, we have reported the issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation. The full paper is provided in [2].
- Open Access
- 19 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 87-88
Detecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling Domains
Public hosting services offer a convenient and secure option for creating web applications. However, adversaries can take over a domain by exploiting released service endpoints, leading to hosting-based domain takeover. This threat has affected numerous popular websites, including the subdomains of microsoft.com. However, no effective detection system for identifying vulnerable domains at scale exists to date. This paper fills the research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. HostingChecker expands detection scope and improves efficiency compared to previous work by: (i) identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. It discovers 10,351 vulnerable subdomains under Tranco Top-1M apex domains, which is over 8× more than previous findings, demonstrating its effectiveness. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors (e.g., Amazon, Alibaba) and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed domain ownership validation implementation. In the end, we have reported the issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation. The full paper is provided in [2].
- 19 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 87-88
Open AccessDetecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling Domains
Public hosting services offer a convenient and secure option for creating web applications. However, adversaries can take over a domain by exploiting released service endpoints, leading to hosting-based domain takeover. This threat has affected numerous popular websites, including the subdomains of microsoft.com. However, no effective detection system for identifying vulnerable domains at scale exists to date. This paper fills the research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. HostingChecker expands detection scope and improves efficiency compared to previous work by: (i) identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. It discovers 10,351 vulnerable subdomains under Tranco Top-1M apex domains, which is over 8× more than previous findings, demonstrating its effectiveness. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors (e.g., Amazon, Alibaba) and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed domain ownership validation implementation. In the end, we have reported the issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation. The full paper is provided in [2].
- Open Access
- 27 February 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
- Vol. 7 (1) , 1-28
Detecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling Domains
Public hosting services provide convenience for domain owners to build web applications with better scalability and security. However, if a domain name points to released service endpoints (e.g., nameservers allocated by a provider), adversaries can take over the domain by applying the same endpoints. Such a security threat is called "hosting-based domain takeover''. In recent years, a large number of domain takeover incidents have occurred; even well-known websites like the subdomains of microsoft.com have been impacted. However, until now, there has been no effective detection system to identify these vulnerable domains on a large scale. In this paper, we fill this research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. Compared with previous work, HostingChecker expands the detection scope and improves the detection efficiency by: (i) systematically identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) effectively detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. We evaluate the effectiveness of HostingChecker and eventually detect 10,351 subdomains from Tranco Top-1M apex domains vulnerable to domain takeover, which are over 8× more than previous findings. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors, like Amazon and Alibaba, and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed implementation of domain ownership validation. Following responsible disclosure processes, we have reported issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation.
- 27 February 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
- Vol. 7 (1) , 1-28
Open AccessDetecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling Domains
Public hosting services provide convenience for domain owners to build web applications with better scalability and security. However, if a domain name points to released service endpoints (e.g., nameservers allocated by a provider), adversaries can take over the domain by applying the same endpoints. Such a security threat is called "hosting-based domain takeover''. In recent years, a large number of domain takeover incidents have occurred; even well-known websites like the subdomains of microsoft.com have been impacted. However, until now, there has been no effective detection system to identify these vulnerable domains on a large scale. In this paper, we fill this research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. Compared with previous work, HostingChecker expands the detection scope and improves the detection efficiency by: (i) systematically identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) effectively detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. We evaluate the effectiveness of HostingChecker and eventually detect 10,351 subdomains from Tranco Top-1M apex domains vulnerable to domain takeover, which are over 8× more than previous findings. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors, like Amazon and Alibaba, and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed implementation of domain ownership validation. Following responsible disclosure processes, we have reported issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation.