Yuxin He

Achieving reliable navigation is critical for GNSS receivers subject to spoofing attacks. Utilizing the inherent sparsity and inconsistency of spoofing signals, this paper proposes an anti-spoofing framework for GNSS receivers to detect, classify, and recover positions from spoofing attacks without additional devices. A sparse decomposition algorithm with non-negative constraints limited by signal power magnitudes is proposed to achieve accurate spoofing detections while extracting key features of the received signals. In the classification stage, these features continuously refine each channel of the receiver’s code tracking loop, ensuring that it tracks either the authentic or counterfeit signal components. Moreover, by leveraging the inherent inconsistency of spoofing properties, we incorporate the Hausdorff distance to determine the most overlapped position sets, distinguishing genuine trajectories and mitigating spoofing effects. Experiments on the TEXBAT dataset show that the proposed algorithm detects 98% of spoofing attacks, ensuring stable position recovery with an average RMSE of 6.32 m across various time periods.

The measurement errors induced by the space‐time adaptive processing (STAP) is gaining attention for its significant detriment to the precision of the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver positioning. To mitigate measurement errors, the steering vector (SV) estimation method based on spreading is widely employed in measurement error mitigation algorithms. However, the hazard of the SV estimation fluctuation problem is ignored in these algorithms. In this paper, the specific harm of such SV estimation fluctuation problem is analysed. To alleviate such problem and to eliminate the measurement errors as much as possible, a robust STAP beamformer for GNSS receivers is proposed. First, to acquire a series of robust SVs in different integration times, a desired signal covariance (DSC) matrix is iteratively reconstructed to remove the disturbance from thermal noise and the residual jamming signals. Second, to eliminate measurement errors, a replacement matrix is formed to help guarantee the phase linearities of the tapped delay lines (TDLs). Numerical examples demonstrate that the method can achieve a set of stable SV estimations and linear phase TDLs, leading to a carrier‐to‐noise‐power ratio () of more than 50 dBHz and a code phase bias of less than 3.4 m, which outperform the methods used for comparison.