Zeyu Xu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Zeyu Xu has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Meiqin Wang
Shandong University
4 shared publications - Puwen Wei
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China and State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Shandong University, Qingdao, China
3 shared publications - Shiyao Chen
Digital Trust Centre, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
3 shared publications - Chun Guo
Shandong University
2 shared publications - Jian Guo
Nanyang Technological University
2 shared publications - Jiamin Cui
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University,Qingdao,China,266237
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in Tsinghua Science and Technology
- Vol. 30 (1) , 161-170
Integral Attack on the Full FUTURE Block Cipher
FUTURE is a recently proposed lightweight block cipher that achieved a remarkable hardware performance due to careful design decisions. FUTURE is an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-like Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) with 10 rounds, whose round function consists of four components, i.e., SubCell, MixColumn, ShiftRow, and AddRoundKey. Unlike AES, it is a 64-bit-size block cipher with a 128- bit secret key, and the state can be arranged into 16 cells. Therefore, the operations of FUTURE including its S-box is defined over F 2 4. The previous studies have shown that the integral properties of 4-bit S-boxes are usually weaker than larger-size S-boxes, thus the number of rounds of FUTURE, i.e., 10 rounds only, might be too aggressive to provide enough resistance against integral cryptanalysis. In this paper, we mount the integral cryptanalysis on FUTURE. With state-of-the-art detection techniques, we identify several integral distinguishers of 7 rounds of FUTURE. By extending this 7-round distinguisher by 3 forward rounds, we manage to recover all the 128 bits secret keys from the full FUTURE cipher without the full codebook for the first time. To further achieve better time complexity, we also present a key recovery attack on full FUTURE with full codebook. Both attacks have better time complexity than existing results.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in Tsinghua Science and Technology
- Vol. 30 (1) , 161-170
Open AccessIntegral Attack on the Full FUTURE Block Cipher
FUTURE is a recently proposed lightweight block cipher that achieved a remarkable hardware performance due to careful design decisions. FUTURE is an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-like Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) with 10 rounds, whose round function consists of four components, i.e., SubCell, MixColumn, ShiftRow, and AddRoundKey. Unlike AES, it is a 64-bit-size block cipher with a 128- bit secret key, and the state can be arranged into 16 cells. Therefore, the operations of FUTURE including its S-box is defined over F 2 4. The previous studies have shown that the integral properties of 4-bit S-boxes are usually weaker than larger-size S-boxes, thus the number of rounds of FUTURE, i.e., 10 rounds only, might be too aggressive to provide enough resistance against integral cryptanalysis. In this paper, we mount the integral cryptanalysis on FUTURE. With state-of-the-art detection techniques, we identify several integral distinguishers of 7 rounds of FUTURE. By extending this 7-round distinguisher by 3 forward rounds, we manage to recover all the 128 bits secret keys from the full FUTURE cipher without the full codebook for the first time. To further achieve better time complexity, we also present a key recovery attack on full FUTURE with full codebook. Both attacks have better time complexity than existing results.
- Open Access
- 16 June 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2023 (2) , 132-175
Towards the Links of Cryptanalytic Methods on MPC/FHE/ZK-Friendly Symmetric-Key Primitives
Symmetric-key primitives designed over the prime field Fp with odd characteristics, rather than the traditional Fn2 , are becoming the most popular choice for MPC/FHE/ZK-protocols for better efficiencies. However, the security of Fp is less understood as there are highly nontrivial gaps when extending the cryptanalysis tools and experiences built on Fn2 in the past few decades to Fp.At CRYPTO 2015, Sun et al. established the links among impossible differential, zero-correlation linear, and integral cryptanalysis over Fn2 from the perspective of distinguishers. In this paper, following the definition of linear correlations over Fp by Baignères, Stern and Vaudenay at SAC 2007, we successfully establish comprehensive links over Fp, by reproducing the proofs and offering alternatives when necessary. Interesting and important differences between Fp and Fn2 are observed.- Zero-correlation linear hulls can not lead to integral distinguishers for some cases over Fp, while this is always possible over Fn2proven by Sun et al..- When the newly established links are applied to GMiMC, its impossible differential, zero-correlation linear hull and integral distinguishers can be increased by up to 3 rounds for most of the cases, and even to an arbitrary number of rounds for some special and limited cases, which only appeared in Fp. It should be noted that all these distinguishers do not invalidate GMiMC’s security claims.The development of the theories over Fp behind these links, and properties identified (be it similar or different) will bring clearer and easier understanding of security of primitives in this emerging Fp field, which we believe will provide useful guides for future cryptanalysis and design.
- 16 June 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2023 (2) , 132-175
Open AccessTowards the Links of Cryptanalytic Methods on MPC/FHE/ZK-Friendly Symmetric-Key Primitives
Symmetric-key primitives designed over the prime field Fp with odd characteristics, rather than the traditional Fn2 , are becoming the most popular choice for MPC/FHE/ZK-protocols for better efficiencies. However, the security of Fp is less understood as there are highly nontrivial gaps when extending the cryptanalysis tools and experiences built on Fn2 in the past few decades to Fp.At CRYPTO 2015, Sun et al. established the links among impossible differential, zero-correlation linear, and integral cryptanalysis over Fn2 from the perspective of distinguishers. In this paper, following the definition of linear correlations over Fp by Baignères, Stern and Vaudenay at SAC 2007, we successfully establish comprehensive links over Fp, by reproducing the proofs and offering alternatives when necessary. Interesting and important differences between Fp and Fn2 are observed.- Zero-correlation linear hulls can not lead to integral distinguishers for some cases over Fp, while this is always possible over Fn2proven by Sun et al..- When the newly established links are applied to GMiMC, its impossible differential, zero-correlation linear hull and integral distinguishers can be increased by up to 3 rounds for most of the cases, and even to an arbitrary number of rounds for some special and limited cases, which only appeared in Fp. It should be noted that all these distinguishers do not invalidate GMiMC’s security claims.The development of the theories over Fp behind these links, and properties identified (be it similar or different) will bring clearer and easier understanding of security of primitives in this emerging Fp field, which we believe will provide useful guides for future cryptanalysis and design.
- 31 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 41-60
Related-Key Differential Cryptanalysis of GMiMC Used in Post-Quantum Signatures
- 31 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 41-60
Related-Key Differential Cryptanalysis of GMiMC Used in Post-Quantum Signatures