Qin Li
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Qin Li has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Minyu Feng
The College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
17 shared publications - Matjaž Perc
University of Maribor
7 shared publications - Jürgen Kurths
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Germany
5 shared publications Attila Szolnoki
Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Budapest, Hungary
4 shared publications- Attila Szolnoki
Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research 2 , P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest
4 shared publications - Bin Pi
School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2026
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (11)
Evolution of cooperation in enterprise resource-sharing networks with dynamic participation and adaptive decision-making
Resource sharing among enterprises is an important mechanism for improving resource utilization efficiency and facilitating collaborative development. However, the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behavior depend critically on whether enterprises choose to participate in resource-sharing activities and how they balance cooperation and competition in their decision-making processes. To investigate these issues, we develop an evolutionary cooperation model on the enterprise resource-sharing network that integrates participation status, decision-making modes, and cooperative strategies within a unified framework. Specifically, enterprises dynamically switch between active and dormant states according to their aspiration levels, while Q-learning is employed to enable adaptive selection between payoff-driven and conformist decision-making modes. Meanwhile, interactions between resource-sharing and non-sharing in active enterprises are characterized by the snowdrift game. Through extensive simulations, we systematically examine the effects of the payoff parameter, the reinforcement-learning parameters, the participation and Q-learning mechanism, and network size on enterprise participation and the evolution of cooperation. The results show that an intermediate aspiration level is most favorable for sustaining enterprise participation and facilitating the emergence of cooperation. Moreover, the dynamic activation mechanism effectively mitigates the decline in cooperation under high cost-to-benefit ratios, allowing the system to sustain a decent level of cooperative behavior. These findings highlight the important roles of dynamic participation and adaptive decision-making in shaping the evolution of resource-sharing cooperation and provide a new modeling framework to understand the emergence and persistence of cooperation in complex enterprise networks.
- 1 November 2026
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (11)
Evolution of cooperation in enterprise resource-sharing networks with dynamic participation and adaptive decision-making
Resource sharing among enterprises is an important mechanism for improving resource utilization efficiency and facilitating collaborative development. However, the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behavior depend critically on whether enterprises choose to participate in resource-sharing activities and how they balance cooperation and competition in their decision-making processes. To investigate these issues, we develop an evolutionary cooperation model on the enterprise resource-sharing network that integrates participation status, decision-making modes, and cooperative strategies within a unified framework. Specifically, enterprises dynamically switch between active and dormant states according to their aspiration levels, while Q-learning is employed to enable adaptive selection between payoff-driven and conformist decision-making modes. Meanwhile, interactions between resource-sharing and non-sharing in active enterprises are characterized by the snowdrift game. Through extensive simulations, we systematically examine the effects of the payoff parameter, the reinforcement-learning parameters, the participation and Q-learning mechanism, and network size on enterprise participation and the evolution of cooperation. The results show that an intermediate aspiration level is most favorable for sustaining enterprise participation and facilitating the emergence of cooperation. Moreover, the dynamic activation mechanism effectively mitigates the decline in cooperation under high cost-to-benefit ratios, allowing the system to sustain a decent level of cooperative behavior. These findings highlight the important roles of dynamic participation and adaptive decision-making in shaping the evolution of resource-sharing cooperation and provide a new modeling framework to understand the emergence and persistence of cooperation in complex enterprise networks.
- Open Access
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Physics
Social comparison shapes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Physics
Open AccessSocial comparison shapes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 211
Performance appraisal promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 211
Performance appraisal promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Top Cited Papers
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematical Modelling
- Vol. 161
Adaptive epidemic dynamics on hypergraphs with group-level immunization and rewiring
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematical Modelling
- Vol. 161
Top Cited PapersAdaptive epidemic dynamics on hypergraphs with group-level immunization and rewiring
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 3 June 2026
- Published by The Royal Society in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
- Vol. 23 (239)
Cooperation in public goods games over uniform random hypergraphs with game transitions
The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated public goods games (PGGs) with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction scenarios. On the one hand, pairwise networks lack clear group definitions. On the other hand, a participant’s decision affects not only competitors’ fitness but also the state of the surrounding environment. To address this problem, we propose a PGG with game transition mechanisms based on uniform random hypergraphs (URH). In our model, game groups formed by hyperedges transition between two types of games, one with abundant public resources and the other with scarce public resources. The transition probability is closely related to the strategies of players within the hyperedges. By developing a Monte Carlo simulation framework that incorporates payoff accumulation, strategy imitation and game state transitions, we aim to reveal the co-evolutionary patterns of strategies and game states in group interactions. Our study highlights a nonlinear relationship between defection sensitivity and cooperation frequency under game transitions, as well as the asymmetric effects of the two sensitivities in state-dependent transitions. These observations open new directions for approaching social dilemmas.
- 3 June 2026
- Published by The Royal Society in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
- Vol. 23 (239)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessCooperation in public goods games over uniform random hypergraphs with game transitions
The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated public goods games (PGGs) with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction scenarios. On the one hand, pairwise networks lack clear group definitions. On the other hand, a participant’s decision affects not only competitors’ fitness but also the state of the surrounding environment. To address this problem, we propose a PGG with game transition mechanisms based on uniform random hypergraphs (URH). In our model, game groups formed by hyperedges transition between two types of games, one with abundant public resources and the other with scarce public resources. The transition probability is closely related to the strategies of players within the hyperedges. By developing a Monte Carlo simulation framework that incorporates payoff accumulation, strategy imitation and game state transitions, we aim to reveal the co-evolutionary patterns of strategies and game states in group interactions. Our study highlights a nonlinear relationship between defection sensitivity and cooperation frequency under game transitions, as well as the asymmetric effects of the two sensitivities in state-dependent transitions. These observations open new directions for approaching social dilemmas.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2026
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (5)
Rumor propagation and supervision during confrontation: An importance-driven SIRQS network model
The societal impact of rumor spreading is becoming increasingly severe; yet, current research remains relatively one-sided, typically focusing on either rumor propagation or rumor control while neglecting the confrontational and dynamically evolving relationship between them. To address this gap, we propose a novel confrontation framework for rumor modeling. We extend the classical susceptible-infected-recovered-susceptible (SIRS) model into an ignorant-spreader-stifler-vigilant-ignorant (SIRQS) framework by introducing a vigilant state and a confrontation mechanism, thereby capturing subtle differences in individual states during rumor propagation and in their confrontational behavior toward supervisors. At the same time, supervisors patrol the network through random walks guided by node propagation importance, enabling targeted monitoring of rumor spreaders and individuals with a high risk of spreading rumors. Using a microscopic Markov chain approach, we further characterize heterogeneous node behavior and individual differences, and couple the propagation and supervision processes to model node-state transition patterns. We conduct simulations on networks with three different sizes, various topologies, and a real-world network. The results show that the supervision subject, the preference effects associated with the number of supervisors, and the confrontation mechanism are key factors in supervision, and largely determine the effectiveness of rumor propagation control in the simulations, reflecting the substantial influence of these three mechanisms in real-world spreading scenarios. Finally, through multiple evaluation indicators, we provide references for determining the optimal number of supervisors.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (5)
Top Cited PapersRumor propagation and supervision during confrontation: An importance-driven SIRQS network model
The societal impact of rumor spreading is becoming increasingly severe; yet, current research remains relatively one-sided, typically focusing on either rumor propagation or rumor control while neglecting the confrontational and dynamically evolving relationship between them. To address this gap, we propose a novel confrontation framework for rumor modeling. We extend the classical susceptible-infected-recovered-susceptible (SIRS) model into an ignorant-spreader-stifler-vigilant-ignorant (SIRQS) framework by introducing a vigilant state and a confrontation mechanism, thereby capturing subtle differences in individual states during rumor propagation and in their confrontational behavior toward supervisors. At the same time, supervisors patrol the network through random walks guided by node propagation importance, enabling targeted monitoring of rumor spreaders and individuals with a high risk of spreading rumors. Using a microscopic Markov chain approach, we further characterize heterogeneous node behavior and individual differences, and couple the propagation and supervision processes to model node-state transition patterns. We conduct simulations on networks with three different sizes, various topologies, and a real-world network. The results show that the supervision subject, the preference effects associated with the number of supervisors, and the confrontation mechanism are key factors in supervision, and largely determine the effectiveness of rumor propagation control in the simulations, reflecting the substantial influence of these three mechanisms in real-world spreading scenarios. Finally, through multiple evaluation indicators, we provide references for determining the optimal number of supervisors.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 11 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Physics
- Vol. 9 (1)
Effects of stochastic games on evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
- 11 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Physics
- Vol. 9 (1)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessEffects of stochastic games on evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
- Open Access
Effects of Stochastic Games on Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote cooperative behavior significantly. Quantitative analysis, however, is limited to homogeneous populations, while realistic populations in nature are often more complex and highly heterogeneous. We hereby provide an analytical treatment of when the evolution of cooperation can be supported in stochastic games, applying to arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and payoff structure. We highlight that the rule and frequency of game changes can have surprisingly diverse effects on evolutionary outcomes, depending on the governing social dilemmas. While stochastic games favor the evolution of cooperation in donation games, this is not the case for public goods games and snowdrift games. Hence, our framework and model results offer a more subtle insight into the long-standing enigma.
Open AccessEffects of Stochastic Games on Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote cooperative behavior significantly. Quantitative analysis, however, is limited to homogeneous populations, while realistic populations in nature are often more complex and highly heterogeneous. We hereby provide an analytical treatment of when the evolution of cooperation can be supported in stochastic games, applying to arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and payoff structure. We highlight that the rule and frequency of game changes can have surprisingly diverse effects on evolutionary outcomes, depending on the governing social dilemmas. While stochastic games favor the evolution of cooperation in donation games, this is not the case for public goods games and snowdrift games. Hence, our framework and model results offer a more subtle insight into the long-standing enigma.
- Open Access
Modeling Epidemic Dynamics of Mutant Strains with Evolutionary Game-based Vaccination Behavior
The outbreak of mutant strains and vaccination behaviors have been the focus of recent epidemiological research, but most existing epidemic models failed to simultaneously capture viral mutation and consider the complexity and behavioral dynamics of vaccination. To address this gap, we develop an extended SIRS model that distinguishes infections with the original strain and a mutant strain, and explicitly introduces a vaccinated compartment state. At the behavioral level, we employ evolutionary game theory to model individual vaccination decisions, where strategies are determined by both neighbors' choices and the current epidemiological situation. This process corresponds to the time-varying vaccination rate of susceptible individuals transitioning to vaccinated individuals at the epidemic spreading level. We then couple the epidemic and vaccination behavioral processes through the microscopic Markov chain approach (MMCA) and finally investigate the evolutionary dynamics via numerical simulations. The results show that our framework can effectively mitigate outbreaks across different disease scenarios. Sensitivity analysis further reveals that vaccination uptake is most strongly influenced by vaccine cost, efficacy, and perceived risk of side effects. Overall, this behavior-aware modeling framework captures the co-evolution of viral mutation and vaccination behavior, providing quantitative and theoretical support for designing effective public health vaccination policies.
Open AccessModeling Epidemic Dynamics of Mutant Strains with Evolutionary Game-based Vaccination Behavior
The outbreak of mutant strains and vaccination behaviors have been the focus of recent epidemiological research, but most existing epidemic models failed to simultaneously capture viral mutation and consider the complexity and behavioral dynamics of vaccination. To address this gap, we develop an extended SIRS model that distinguishes infections with the original strain and a mutant strain, and explicitly introduces a vaccinated compartment state. At the behavioral level, we employ evolutionary game theory to model individual vaccination decisions, where strategies are determined by both neighbors' choices and the current epidemiological situation. This process corresponds to the time-varying vaccination rate of susceptible individuals transitioning to vaccinated individuals at the epidemic spreading level. We then couple the epidemic and vaccination behavioral processes through the microscopic Markov chain approach (MMCA) and finally investigate the evolutionary dynamics via numerical simulations. The results show that our framework can effectively mitigate outbreaks across different disease scenarios. Sensitivity analysis further reveals that vaccination uptake is most strongly influenced by vaccine cost, efficacy, and perceived risk of side effects. Overall, this behavior-aware modeling framework captures the co-evolution of viral mutation and vaccination behavior, providing quantitative and theoretical support for designing effective public health vaccination policies.
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 205
Modeling epidemic dynamics of mutant strains with evolutionary game-based vaccination behavior
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 205
Modeling epidemic dynamics of mutant strains with evolutionary game-based vaccination behavior