QLQin Li

Qin Li

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Qin Li has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Evolution of cooperation in enterprise resource-sharing networks with dynamic participation and adaptive decision-making

    by Pengfei Liu, Bin Pi, Qin Li, Minyu Feng, Attila Szolnoki

    Resource sharing among enterprises is an important mechanism for improving resource utilization efficiency and facilitating collaborative development. However, the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behavior depend critically on whether enterprises choose to participate in resource-sharing activities and how they balance cooperation and competition in their decision-making processes. To investigate these issues, we develop an evolutionary cooperation model on the enterprise resource-sharing network that integrates participation status, decision-making modes, and cooperative strategies within a unified framework. Specifically, enterprises dynamically switch between active and dormant states according to their aspiration levels, while Q-learning is employed to enable adaptive selection between payoff-driven and conformist decision-making modes. Meanwhile, interactions between resource-sharing and non-sharing in active enterprises are characterized by the snowdrift game. Through extensive simulations, we systematically examine the effects of the payoff parameter, the reinforcement-learning parameters, the participation and Q-learning mechanism, and network size on enterprise participation and the evolution of cooperation. The results show that an intermediate aspiration level is most favorable for sustaining enterprise participation and facilitating the emergence of cooperation. Moreover, the dynamic activation mechanism effectively mitigates the decline in cooperation under high cost-to-benefit ratios, allowing the system to sustain a decent level of cooperative behavior. These findings highlight the important roles of dynamic participation and adaptive decision-making in shaping the evolution of resource-sharing cooperation and provide a new modeling framework to understand the emergence and persistence of cooperation in complex enterprise networks.

  • Open Access

    Social comparison shapes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

    by Xiaojin Xiong, Qin Li, Jürgen Kurths, Attila Szolnoki, Minyu Feng


  • Top Cited Papers

    Adaptive epidemic dynamics on hypergraphs with group-level immunization and rewiring

    by Yusheng Li, Meiling Xie, Qin Li, Minyu Feng, Matjaž Perc


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Cooperation in public goods games over uniform random hypergraphs with game transitions

    by Nankun Wei, Xiaojin Xiong, Qin Li, Minyu Feng, Attila Szolnoki

    The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated public goods games (PGGs) with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction scenarios. On the one hand, pairwise networks lack clear group definitions. On the other hand, a participant’s decision affects not only competitors’ fitness but also the state of the surrounding environment. To address this problem, we propose a PGG with game transition mechanisms based on uniform random hypergraphs (URH). In our model, game groups formed by hyperedges transition between two types of games, one with abundant public resources and the other with scarce public resources. The transition probability is closely related to the strategies of players within the hyperedges. By developing a Monte Carlo simulation framework that incorporates payoff accumulation, strategy imitation and game state transitions, we aim to reveal the co-evolutionary patterns of strategies and game states in group interactions. Our study highlights a nonlinear relationship between defection sensitivity and cooperation frequency under game transitions, as well as the asymmetric effects of the two sensitivities in state-dependent transitions. These observations open new directions for approaching social dilemmas.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Rumor propagation and supervision during confrontation: An importance-driven SIRQS network model

    by Wenjie Zhang, Juan Wu, Minyu Feng, Qin Li, Matjaž Perc

    The societal impact of rumor spreading is becoming increasingly severe; yet, current research remains relatively one-sided, typically focusing on either rumor propagation or rumor control while neglecting the confrontational and dynamically evolving relationship between them. To address this gap, we propose a novel confrontation framework for rumor modeling. We extend the classical susceptible-infected-recovered-susceptible (SIRS) model into an ignorant-spreader-stifler-vigilant-ignorant (SIRQS) framework by introducing a vigilant state and a confrontation mechanism, thereby capturing subtle differences in individual states during rumor propagation and in their confrontational behavior toward supervisors. At the same time, supervisors patrol the network through random walks guided by node propagation importance, enabling targeted monitoring of rumor spreaders and individuals with a high risk of spreading rumors. Using a microscopic Markov chain approach, we further characterize heterogeneous node behavior and individual differences, and couple the propagation and supervision processes to model node-state transition patterns. We conduct simulations on networks with three different sizes, various topologies, and a real-world network. The results show that the supervision subject, the preference effects associated with the number of supervisors, and the confrontation mechanism are key factors in supervision, and largely determine the effectiveness of rumor propagation control in the simulations, reflecting the substantial influence of these three mechanisms in real-world spreading scenarios. Finally, through multiple evaluation indicators, we provide references for determining the optimal number of supervisors.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Effects of stochastic games on evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

    by Yuji Zhang, Minyu Feng, Qin Li, Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki


  • Open Access

    Effects of Stochastic Games on Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations

    by Yuji Zhang, Minyu Feng, Qin Li, Matjaz Perc, Attila Szolnoki

    Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote cooperative behavior significantly. Quantitative analysis, however, is limited to homogeneous populations, while realistic populations in nature are often more complex and highly heterogeneous. We hereby provide an analytical treatment of when the evolution of cooperation can be supported in stochastic games, applying to arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and payoff structure. We highlight that the rule and frequency of game changes can have surprisingly diverse effects on evolutionary outcomes, depending on the governing social dilemmas. While stochastic games favor the evolution of cooperation in donation games, this is not the case for public goods games and snowdrift games. Hence, our framework and model results offer a more subtle insight into the long-standing enigma.

  • Open Access

    Modeling Epidemic Dynamics of Mutant Strains with Evolutionary Game-based Vaccination Behavior

    by Wenjie Zhang, Yusheng Li, Qin Li, Guojun Huang, Minyu Feng

    The outbreak of mutant strains and vaccination behaviors have been the focus of recent epidemiological research, but most existing epidemic models failed to simultaneously capture viral mutation and consider the complexity and behavioral dynamics of vaccination. To address this gap, we develop an extended SIRS model that distinguishes infections with the original strain and a mutant strain, and explicitly introduces a vaccinated compartment state. At the behavioral level, we employ evolutionary game theory to model individual vaccination decisions, where strategies are determined by both neighbors' choices and the current epidemiological situation. This process corresponds to the time-varying vaccination rate of susceptible individuals transitioning to vaccinated individuals at the epidemic spreading level. We then couple the epidemic and vaccination behavioral processes through the microscopic Markov chain approach (MMCA) and finally investigate the evolutionary dynamics via numerical simulations. The results show that our framework can effectively mitigate outbreaks across different disease scenarios. Sensitivity analysis further reveals that vaccination uptake is most strongly influenced by vaccine cost, efficacy, and perceived risk of side effects. Overall, this behavior-aware modeling framework captures the co-evolution of viral mutation and vaccination behavior, providing quantitative and theoretical support for designing effective public health vaccination policies.