JBJonas Blatter

Jonas Blatter

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Jonas Blatter has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Responsibility and Control

    by Jonas Blatter

    This chapter discusses the no-control problem, namely, that we cannot be responsible for our emotions because we cannot directly control them. The chapter proposes avoiding this problem by disambiguating both the relevant type of holding accountable and the kind of control required for that type of accountability. It argues that while we might not have direct voluntary control over our emotions, we do have what is called rational control over them. Finally, the chapter presents the case that the required type of accountability is that unfair emotions can sometimes be the appropriate object of reactive attitudes like anger or resentment. To that end, the relevant type of control is rational control.

  • Introduction

    by Jonas Blatter

    This first chapter of the book highlights a seemingly everyday phenomenon, namely, that we sometimes treat emotions as if they can be unfair, similar to unfair actions, and even resent others for feeling those emotions. From a philosophical perspective, this does not make much sense, since emotions lack many of the features that make actions unfair and blameworthy. In response, we can either discard this phenomenon as a misguided one or try to vindicate it by giving a theoretical account of unfair emotions. This chapter discusses the problems and merits with both responses and finally presents the case for why we nonetheless should try and give a philosophical foundation to the notion of unfair emotions.

  • Unfair Emotions

    by Jonas Blatter

    This chapter develops an account of unfairness that can be applied to emotions. It presents three important features of unfairness: (1) that an unfair emotion is morally objectionable in some way; (2) that the unfairness is conditional on the specific circumstances, and not, for example, about all instances of a certain type of emotion; and (3) that unfairness is inherently interpersonally directed at another person. Finally, the chapter discusses how unfair emotions can constitute a directed wrong. As a first approach, it discusses commonly held accounts of directed wrongs as violations of duties that correlate with someone’s moral rights or claims but dismisses this approach by arguing that we cannot have duties to have or not have a certain emotion. The alternative approach proposed at the end of the chapter is to conceive of directed wrongs as something for which the person committing the wrong has to account for to the person against whom the wrong is directed. It is the topic of the subsequent chapters to show that this type of accountability can apply to unfair emotions.

  • Fair Resentment for Unfair Emotions

    by Jonas Blatter

    The aim of this chapter is to show that if anger and resentment are fair responses to moral offences that express ill will, then they are also fair responses to unfair emotions that express ill will. It presents an account of resentment as a dispositional state that disposes to episodes of anger and that therefore the appropriateness of resentment depends, in part, on the appropriateness of anger. It addresses both the worry that resentment might itself necessarily instantiate ill will and more common worries about the supposedly necessarily violent and vengeful nature of anger. Both worries pose problems for the plausibility of emotions ever being the appropriate object of these attitudes.

  • Unfair Emotions

    by Jonas Blatter

    This book provides a novel philosophical account of the unfairness of certain emotions. It explains how the concept of unfairness can be applied to emotions and how emotions can be the proper objects of second-person moral evaluation. Emotions are an integral part of our moral practices. While the links between emotions and morality have received much philosophical attention recently, the phenomenon of unfair emotions remains under-explored. This book examines an everyday phenomenon that we often perceive other people’s emotions as unfair, in a similar way as if they acted unfairly. It argues that the notion of unfairness combines elements of the unfittingness and of the moral relevance of an emotion. In the first half of the book, the author shows how an unfair emotion can wrong another person. His account holds that an emotion is unfair to its target if its inherent action tendencies constitute a directed moral hazard to the targeted person. In the second half, the author examines to what extent we are responsible for feeling an unfair emotion, and in what way we can – and cannot – be held accountable for it. He argues not only that emotions can be unfair but also that there are limits to when we may hold people accountable for them. Unfair Emotions will appeal to scholars and graduate students working in ethics, philosophy of emotion, moral psychology, and cognitive psychology.

  • Criticism of Emotions

    by Jonas Blatter

    There are many types of criticism that can be made of individual emotions or types of emotions, discussed in the philosophical literature. Most of these do not cover what we would understand as unfairness. This chapter discusses the criticisms of unfittingness, inconsistency, as well as prudential and moral criticism of emotions. It presents four dimensions along which the discussed types of criticism differ from each other and from the notion of unfairness at interest. These are (1) the standard or norm the criticized emotion falls short of; (2) the target of criticism; (3) the normative force invoked by the criticism; and (4) whether there is special standing involved. On its face, the criticism of unfairness invokes a moral standard that targets the emotion in light of the subject’s underlying attitudes that it invokes some normative force on the subject and is made on behalf of the targeted person, who has special standing in the matter. None of the other discussed types of criticism match all these four criteria.

  • Conclusion

    by Jonas Blatter

    This chapter summarizes the argumentation of the book, provides an outlook on outstanding issues, and offers some concluding remarks. The outlook section presents three areas which have not been the focus of discussion in this book, but which warrant a more extensive treatment and further research. First, there is an outstanding issue about what degree of certainty would be appropriate to ever hold someone accountable for or even judge that someone experiences an unfair emotion. Second, anger is portrayed by different authors as either a valuable tool for protest or as an irredeemably violent emotion. Third, while the book relies on a notion of fittingness, it does not offer a full account of it. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the account offered in this book both enables a better conceptualization of the unfairness of certain emotions and engages with broader philosophical debates about emotional fittingness and moral responsibility. Ultimately, it suggests a careful approach to emotional criticism that is mindful of the delicate subject of judging someone’s emotions while affirming their relevance to how people relate to each other both personally and morally.

  • Accountability for Emotions

    by Jonas Blatter

    This chapter defends the position that emotions can be the proper target of reactive emotions, and that thereby, we can intelligibly hold people accountable for their emotions. After discussing the accounts of the distinctions between moral versus non-moral accountability proposed by Peter F. Strawson and R. Jay Wallace, this chapter presents an argument for how accountability works on both a personal and a moral level, based on Agnes Callard’s notion of co-valuation. The proposal is that the relevant cases of holding morally accountable can be captured by the notion of co-valuational expectations that are general enough to apply to all moral agents. An unfair emotion that reflects a violation of these expectations of basic human regard would count as a proper basis for genuine moral reactive attitudes.

  • Fictional emotions and emotional reactions to social robots as depictions of social agents

    by Jonas Blatter, Eva Weber-Guskar

    Following the depiction theory by Clark and Fischer we would expect people interacting with robots to experience fictional emotions akin to those toward films or novels. However, some people's emotional reactions toward robots display the motivational force typical to non-fictional emotions. We discuss this incongruity and offer two suggestions on how to explain it while maintaining the depiction theory.